Martin Gibert

In this article, we argue that YouTube’s algorithm should be programmed to make a modest but significant percentage (e.g. 2%) of recommendations for the climate. Just as a librarian has a (meta-editorial) responsibility to highlight certain titles and not others, we believe that so should YouTube’s algorithm. The company, we argue, has duties of content moderation, reparation and meta-editing, as well as strong consequentialist reasons to program its algorithm to do so. With 2 billion users, our proposed intervention could be an effective contribution to mitigating the climate crisis in a transparent and accountable way. We consider different setups, with varying degrees of transparency and centralization. We then address the worries that such a project may raise: the risk of manipulation, the threat of a slippery slope, and the concerns for freedom of expression. We conclude that none of these elements seriously undermine the desirability of our proposal.

Is it possible to build virtuous robots? And is it a good idea? In this paper in machine ethics, I offer a positive answer to both questions. Although moral architectures based on deontology and utilitarianism have been most often considered, I argue that a virtue ethics approach may ultimately be more promising to program artificial moral agents (AMA). The basic idea is that a robot should behave as a virtuous person would (or recommend). Now, with the help of machine learning technology, it is conceivable to get an AMA to learn from moral exemplars. To support my claim, I sketch the steps of building such a virtuous robot, using the thought experiment of programming an autonomous car facing a trolley-like dilemma situation. It appears that, at least in certain contexts, the virtue ethics approach can provide its own and original solution. I then give four reasons to favor it. Not only are virtuous robots technically feasible, but they have the advantage over their deontological and utilitarian counterparts of fostering normative consensus between these moral schools, improving social acceptability, and beginning to address the technical challenge of moral perception.

La morale n'est pas seulement affaire de raison. Elle engage aussi l'imagination. Tout ce qui compte moralement dans une situation ne se donne pas d'emblee, au premier coup d'oeil. Pour percevoir ce qui importe, il faut changer de perspective, recadrer la situation ou la comparer avec des alternatives contrefactuelles. L'imagination nous permet ainsi de voir les choses autrement et d'elargir notre perception morale. Elle enrichit notre connaissance, comme le montre encore le recours aux experiences de pensee. Quels sont les mecanismes psychologiques a l'oeuvre? Comment en tenir compte dans nos deliberations? Martin Gibert propose de repenser le role de l'imagination en morale a la lumiere des recherches les plus recentes en ethique et en psychologie.

Is it OK to lie to Siri? Is it bad to mistreat a robot for our own pleasure? Under what condition should we grant a moral status to an artificial intelligence (AI) system? This paper looks at different arguments for granting moral status to an AI system: the idea of indirect duties, the relational argument, the argument from intelligence, the arguments from life and information, and the argument from sentience. In each but the last case, we find unresolved issues with the particular argument, which leads us to move to a different one. We leave the idea of indirect duties aside since these duties do not imply considering an AI system for its own sake. The paper rejects the relational argument and the argument from intelligence. The argument from life may lead us to grant a moral status to an AI system, but only in a weak sense. Sentience, by contrast, is a strong argument for the moral status of an AI system—based, among other things, on the Aristotelian principle of equality: that same cases should be treated in the same way. The paper points out, however, that no AI system is sentient given the current level of technological development.

Les véhicules autonomes, assistants virtuels et autres systèmes d’intelligence artificielle sont conçus pour prendre eux-mêmes des décisions. Alors qu’ils sont appelés à occuper une place grandissante dans nos vies, nous devons nous demander en fonction de quels principes moraux nous voulons les programmer, ce qui soulève des questions inédites. Qu’est-ce qu’un agent moral artificiel? Existe-t-il de bons et de mauvais robots? Et s’il est vrai que les machines reflètent les valeurs de ceux qui les conçoivent, comment éviter de reproduire certains biais et préjugés?

Is it OK to lie to Siri? Is it bad to mistreat a robot for our own pleasure? Under what condition should we grant a moral status to an artificial intelligence system? This paper looks at different arguments for granting moral status to an AI system: the idea of indirect duties, the relational argument, the argument from intelligence, the arguments from life and information, and the argument from sentience. In each but the last case, we find unresolved issues with the particular argument, which leads us to move to a different one. We leave the idea of indirect duties aside since these duties do not imply considering an AI system for its own sake. The paper rejects the relational argument and the argument from intelligence. The argument from life may lead us to grant a moral status to an AI system, but only in a weak sense. Sentience, by contrast, is a strong argument for the moral status of an AI system—based, among other things, on the Aristotelian principle of equality: that same cases should be treated in the same way. The paper points out, however, that no AI system is sentient given the current level of technological development.

ABSTRACT : According to the most popular version of virtue ethics (Hursthouse, 1991; Zagzebsk,i 1996), the right action in a given situation is the action that a fully virtuous agent would do given the circumstances. However, this criterion raises two objections: in some situations, it does not determine the right action correctly, and in other situations, it does not determine any right action at all. In this article, we argue that these objections stem from either simple imaginative resistance or a question-begging stance. We propose thereby to modify the criterion in such a way as to exclude the character of the non-virtuous agent from the morally relevant circumstances. Finally, we examine the implications of our proposal for the issue of moral development.