Martin Lenz

Social philosophy of mind and epistemology seem to be fairly recent inventions. According to a still widespread picture, early modern philosophers were constrained by an individualistic paradigm that settles epistemological and psychological explanations by considering the minds of single thinkers. This picture is mainly owing to the historiography epitomized in Gilbert Ryle's attack on dualism. However, once we look beyond this picture, we can see that at least some early modern views on the mind can be read as social approaches. Accordingly, a great part of understanding the history and philosophy of early modern social epistemology depends on understanding what the Rylean picture amounts to and how it functions. Drawing mainly on my case study of Spinoza, I shall argue that the Rylean picture needs to be both taken seriously and challenged. I will begin by considering its features as a historiographical narrative and zoom in on the conceptual connection between dualism and individualism to assess its adequacy.

The Condemnation of 1277 is one of the most salient events in arguing about the nature and boundaries of philosophy. My aim is not to add another estimation of the Condemnation as a clash of faith and reason, but rather to consider the concept of philosophy at work. To sidestep deciding on a particular notion of philosophy in advance, I will focus on the kind of disagreement displayed in the document of the Condemnation. With a side-glance to contemporary argumentation theory, I shall argue that the disagreement we encounter fulfils crucial criteria of what is known today as deep disagreement. We will see that we are in fact dealing not with one concept of philosophy but two different kinds of philosophy. At the same time, it will turn out that the reception has mainly focused on one kind of philosophy only, namely the rationalist approach attacked in the Condemnation.

In this book, Martin Lenz provides the first reconstruction of intersubjective accounts of the mind in early modern philosophy. Some phenomena are easily recognised as social or interactive: certain dances, forms of work and rituals require interaction to come into being or count as valid. But what about mental states, such as thoughts, volitions, or emotions? Do our minds also depend on other minds? The idea that our minds are intersubjective or social seems to be a recent one, developed mainly in the 19th and 20th centuries against the individualism of early modern philosophers. By contrast, this book argues that well-known early modern philosophers often started from the idea that minds are intersubjective. How then does a mind depend on the minds of others? Early modern philosophers are well known to have developed a number of theories designed to explain how we cognize external objects. What is hardly recognized is that early modern philosophers also addressed the problem of how our cognition is influenced by other minds. This book provides a historical and rational reconstruction of three central, but different, early modern accounts of the influence that minds exert on one another: Spinoza's metaphysical model, Locke's linguistic model, and Hume's medical model. Showing for each model of mental interaction (1) why it was developed, (2) how it construes mind-mind relations, and (3) what view of the mind it suggests, this book aims at uncovering a crucial part of the unwritten history of intersubjectivity in the philosophy of mind.

This interview deals with the major themes in the work of Ruth Millikan. Her most fundamental idea is that the intentionality of inner and outer representations can be understood in analogy to biological functions. Another innovative feature is the view that thought and language stand parallel to each other. Thirdly, the basic ideas concerning the ontology and the epistemology of concepts are explained. Millikan aims at clarifying her position by contrasting it with Dretske, Fodor, Sellars, and Brandom. Finally, the interview addresses topics that pose problems for her account as well as questions she does not treat in her work

In the course of the debates on Priscian's notion of the perfect sentence, the philosopher Peter Abelard developed a theory that closely resembles modern accounts of propositional attitudes and that goes far beyond the established Aristotelian conceptions of the sentence. According to Abelard, the perfection of a sentence does not depend on the content that it expresses, but on the fact that the content is stated along with the propositional attitude towards the content. This paper tries to provide an analysis and a consistent interpretation of Abelard's arguments within the framework of the mediaeval models of language and mind.

One of Ockham's fundamental tenets about the human intellect is that its acts constitute a mental language. Although this language of thought shares some of the features of conventional language, thought is commonly considered as prior to conventional language. This paper tries to show that this consensus is seriously challenged in Ockham's early writings. I shall argue that, in claiming the priority of conventional language over mental language, Ockham established a novel explanation of the systematicity of thought—an explanation which anticipates the idea that thought becomes systematic through the acquisition of conventional language.

In the wake of Wilfrid Sellars’ philosophy, John Locke’s theory of ideas is often taken to fall prey to the so-called Myth of the Given. The main charge is that Locke appeals to passively received sense impressions to justify knowledge claims and ultimately confuses natural processes with normative conceptual activity. In this paper, I will argue that the accusations are founded on a faulty reading and that Locke’s account does indeed circumvent Givenism without having to abandon the foundationalist ambitions that drive his theory of ideas. I will begin by exploring the attractions and pitfalls of the Myth. Secondly, I will show how the Sellarsian objections can be launched against Locke’s theory of ideas. Thirdly, I will present my interpretation of Locke’s take on ideas and show how they fare in relation to the crucial features involved in the discussion of the Myth. By way of conclusion, I will discuss whether Locke’s way of avoiding the Myth limits his foundationalist approach.