Martin Sand

The integration of AI systems in medical care magnifies questions related to how physicians should work with such systems to ensure the best patient outcomes. A particularly thorny issue is related to dealing with situations of possible disagreement between an AI system’s recommendation and the course of medical action envisaged by a human clinician. The current academic debate has so far suggested three possible ways of dealing with such clinician-AI disagreements. First, by considering when clinicians are justified in deferring to the AI output (what we call the deference approach), second when the human user overrules the AI system’s output in cases of disagreement (the overruling approach), and lastly when a second human opinion is deemed necessary to resolve disagreements (the second opinion approach). In this paper, we aim to spell out the shortcomings of these three approaches for dealing with clinician-AI disagreement and offer a more nuanced perspective on such disagreements. We argue that differentiation between types of disagreements, taking into account the role attributed to AI in medical practice, is essential before determining how clinician-AI disagreements should be dealt with. By drawing on a case that exemplifies how multifaceted medical decision-making is, we point out the normative implications of possible clinician-AI disagreements ensuing from it. We highlight the distinctive uncertainties inherent to medical decision-making, showing that disagreements in these contexts are not merely unavoidable but can even be epistemically valuable. Ultimately, by considering the epistemic positions of clinicians and AI systems, our analysis raises important questions for the epistemology of disagreement that need timely attention.

Technological challenges have recently created a need to more sharply distinguish ethics from political philosophy of technology. Are there compelling arguments that warrant pursuing a political philosophy of technology as an autonomous endeavor aside from an ethics of technology and what would its content be? The present paper responds to those two questions. Via a critical discussion of three existing views on this relationship, I will argue that the best starting point for a political philosophy of technology originates from the prevalence and intractability of reasonable disagreement. I will extend this general suggestion, forcefully defended by Charles Larmore, with the condition that such reasonable disagreement needs resolution in some situations, due to urgency and the suboptimal outcomes that ensue if no decision is reached. Many current technological challenges have those characteristics. In my conclusions, I will briefly outline how investigations of technological utopias could contribute to discussions about reasonable disagreement, thereby, opening a fruitful avenue for future research in political philosophy of technology.

Technological challenges have recently created a need to more sharply distinguish ethics from political philosophy of technology. Are there compelling arguments that warrant pursuing a political philosophy of technology as an autonomous endeavor aside from an ethics of technology and what would its content be? The present paper responds to those two questions. Via a critical discussion of three existing views on this relationship, I will argue that the best starting point for a political philosophy of technology originates from the prevalence and intractability of reasonable disagreement. I will extend this general suggestion, forcefully defended by Charles Larmore, with the condition that such reasonable disagreement needs resolution in some situations, due to urgency and the suboptimal outcomes that ensue if no decision is reached. Many current technological challenges have those characteristics. In my conclusions, I will briefly outline how investigations of technological utopias could contribute to discussions about reasonable disagreement, thereby, opening a fruitful avenue for future research in political philosophy of technology.

Although quantum reality is often discussed as notoriously difficult to comprehend, quantum mechanics is applied with increasing success in the development of quantum technologies. In this paper, we collect and organise views on the influence of quantum technology on quantum mechanics and the foundations of quantum mechanics. We distinguish three types of influence: quantum technology helps in (1) understanding, (2) developing, and (3) evaluating quantum mechanics and its foundations. We outline several illustrations of these types by introducing examples. By mapping the influence of research and engineering practices in quantum technology on quantum mechanics and its foundations, this paper illuminates the interaction between the two areas. This paper suggests both how technological practices can aid in long-standing theoretical debates on understanding quantum mechanics, and how investigating the relation between quantum technology and quantum mechanics can inform understanding in the philosophy of science on the interaction between science and technology in general.

This introductory chapter paves the way for a reconciliation of Utopian Studies, philosophy of technology and political philosophy. It introduces the general idea of vindicating technological utopias and engagement with them. The value question is being moved to the fore of the present essay, sidestepping the quest for a definition to unresolved methodological problems. A commonsensical idea of utopia is not a priori flawed; its value still remains unclear. Some paradigmatic technological utopias are introduced.

Where ought we to interfere to create and ideally just society? Rawls’ assumption that the primary locus of justice is the basic structure—comprising various socio-political institutions—initiates a discussion about the nexus of a just society. Technological utopias exceed the dichotomy between individualist and collectivist utopias and add technology as a third possible constituent for justice. They also challenge to rethink the background assumptions that underlie many theories of justice and are often seen as immutable. Doing this, advances our understanding of justice.

In this chapter, it will be outlined in more detail and with some examples, how technological utopias relocate justice from institutions and individuals, for example, to human biology. The idea is controversially discussed and need not be endorsed to fulfill its illustrative function for the purpose of the present argumentation. Additionally, technological utopias suggest the possibility of reconciling incompatible views of the good life in virtual reality and resolving the problem of scarcity that underlies some of the most prominent theories of justice.

Critics claim that technological utopias are flawed in particular ways: Their proponents are elitist and ruthless. While some of this criticism can be equally leveled at more realistic forms of socio-political engagement, there are concerns about the roots of technological utopias that must be taken seriously. Still, the overarching benefits of technological utopias might well outbalance those concerns. We will unpack the idea of technological utopias’ social obliviousness, which will pave the way toward our discussion of utopia and the scope and location of justice.

The final chapter synthesizes the main threats of the previous and recaps the main conclusions. Since my defense of technological utopianisms is conditional to their ability of advancing our understanding of justice, one might wonder—if justice is so broadly construed—whether any fail to do so. I will also suggest that the methodological point developed here requires us to accept the existence of evil utopias, a fate it shares to the same degree with more realistic approaches. The need and desire for utopianism will always embark on a particular perception of the unacceptability of the present.

This open access book advances a modest defence of technological utopias. While technological utopianism is not devoid of risks and elitism, their benefits should not be discounted in an overall assessment. Rather than rejecting them based on a too narrow definition of utopianism, we must acknowledge their potential to exceed the individualist vs. collectivist dichotomy ascribed to traditional utopias. The author argues, with reference to Rawls' idea of the basic structure that technological utopias challenge our understanding of the scope and location of justice and, thereby, advance the idea of justice. The book critically reviews the most recent literature in political philosophy, where utopias are understood as ideal theories of justice and sides with recent contributions to Utopian Studies, where utopias' potential to estrange from the present and galvanize action are underscored.

In this volume, we bring together for the first time the diverse threads within the field of serendipity research, to reflect both the origins of this emerging field within different disciplines as well as its growing influence as its own field with foundational texts and emerging practices. Many have been drawn to the mystery of serendipity, the wonder of the ‘aha’ moments humans experience when they encounter it. In the present volume we present, in contrast to the storytelling approach that drives common fascination with serendipity’s impact on our lives, chapters by experts who have addressed questions about serendipity from a more scientific approach. They ask difficult questions in the following chapters, such as: what is serendipity, exactly?, what role does it actually play in discovery and how does it influence our methods?, how can we study and measure it?, are its results always or necessarily positive?, and how can we potentially influence it?, each with the intent of scientific rigour in their investigations. This introductory review highlights the impact that the phenomenon of serendipity has on human lives, and thereby its worth as an object of serious study.

The last chapter explored some issues regarding the metaphysical underpinnings of attributing responsibility and the concept of agency. However, there are still a number of substantial questions to be answered in this area. Chapters two and three dealt with the framework conditions in which innovations are being made and the epistemic limitations due to complexity, which social actors like visioneers and innovators that aspire to develop new technologies, faced in these contexts (Seebaß 1993a, 226).

In the previous chapter, the concept of innovation was introduced and critically discussed. It was argued that innovations are ambivalent and that in order to plan and shape innovation processes normative questions about the value of concrete novelties have to be answered and their realization has to be assigned to agents. Such activities presuppose the existence of agents who can form intentions through deliberations and shape emerging technologies that are embedded in complex socio-technical systems.

There is a growing interest in the interrelation between responsibility and innovation from an interdisciplinary perspective (Blok and Lemmens 2015; Bogner et al. 2015). New and emerging technosciences such as big data and synthetic biology challenge existing paradigms of assessing technological systems as being applied, for instance, in Technology Assessment (TA). Over the past couple of years, these technosciences motivated the development of a more advanced understanding of technological change (Nordmann 2011; Grunwald 2015).

In these final remarks, the most important theses of this book will be elicited and the topics innovation, visions, and responsibility will be consolidated in order to answer the research question raised in the introduction. In the following section I will also draw attention to two aspects previously mentioned that require further emphasis in these conclusions and that deserve to be thoroughly considered in future research: the symmetry of praise and blame and their application to innovators, and the challenges and advantages of democratizing innovation (Hippel 2005; Jasanoff 2016). Let us first summarize the main arguments that I have provided.

If we wish to understand individual responsibility, we first have to deal with the preconditions of responsibility ascriptions such as the conditions for agency. This was outlined in length in chapter four. What has been neglected so far is not the question: “When is a man responsible?”—as Schlick asks—, but: “What is a man responsible for?” (Schlick 1962c) I argued that there is a number of general preconditions to be held responsible amongst which are being able to balance reasons, to act according to those reasons and to have a number of alternatives to choose from in a given situation (notions that are, as we saw, not as simple as they seem at first sight).

For better and worse, the future is often conceived in technological terms. Technology is supposed to meet the challenge of climate change or resource depletion. And when one asks about the world in 20 or 100 years, answers typically revolve around AI, genome editing, or geoengineering. There is great demand to speculate about the future of work, the future of mobility, Industry 4.0, and Humanity 2.0. The humanities and social sciences, science studies, and technology assessment respond to this demand but need to seek out a responsible way of taking the future into account. This collection of papers, interviews, debates grew out of disagreements about technological futures, speculative ethics, plausible scenarios, anticipatory governance, and proactionary and precautionary approaches. It proposes Hermeneutic Technology Assessment as a way of understanding ourselves through our ways of envisioning the future. At the same time, a hermeneutic understanding of technological projects and prototypes allows for normative assessments of their promises. Is the future an object of design? This question can bring together and divide policy makers, STS scholars, social theorists, and philosophers of history, and it will interest also the scientists and engineers who labor under the demand to deliver that future.

The suggested effects of lifestyles and environmental exposures through epigenetic modifications have been prolific elements of the debate around (backward- and forward-looking) responsibilities for health. This chapter builds on this debate, by highlighting how considerations of luck, as a factor beyond one’s control, add another layer of difficulty, not only for the attribution of individual responsibility but also for collective responsibility to prevent and remedy the distribution of epigenetic differences in health risks. As a modest resolution to this predicament, the chapter proposes a focus on the aretaic features of collective agents as appropriate targets for blame. This proposal offers an alternative ground for normative claims of collective epigenetic responsibilities, while also avoiding substantive metaphysical and ontological commitments regarding the nature (and responsibility) of collective agents.

This volume brings together for the first time the diverse threads within the growing field of serendipity research, to reflect both on the origins of this emerging field within different disciplines as well as its increasing influence as its own field with foundational texts and emerging practices. The phenomenon of serendipity has been described in many ways since Horace Walpole initially coined the term in 1754 to categorize those discoveries that happen by “both accidents and sagacity”. This book offers a sampling of perspectives from experts in serendipity research from organizational studies, management theory, information science and library studies, psychology, literature, computer science, social science, ethics, and the history and philosophy of science. Considerations about the importance and role of serendipity are being raised now across science (both empirical and theoretical) as well as practice (from art and innovation to leadership and governance), with ever more eyes looking closer at its significance in human history and the likelihood it will play a key, while unpredictable, role in forming our future. Serendipity Science represents an emerging, and also important and potentially necessary field of study, if we are to deal well as a society with our complex times and uncertain future.

Martin Sand and Luca Chiapperino find in the concept of serendipity a versatile umbrella term to reassess their previous work on moral luckLuck (also, Epistemic Luck, Moral Luck) and collectiveCollectiveresponsibilityResponsibility. Moral luck supposedly occurs when someone receives praise or blame for things beyond control. Given the ubiquity of luckLuck (also, Epistemic Luck, Moral Luck), this seems to be a seriously disquieting aspect of ordinary morality. The rewards and recognition for serendipitous discoveries fall into exactly this category. That is: more than the intentions, actions, and characters of scientists matters for discoveries to obtain, just as in cases of moral luckLuck (also, Epistemic Luck, Moral Luck) something beyond morality affectsAffect our moral judgments. Even if a theoretical way of resolving the conceptual ambiguities that underlie this debate were found, there remain practical questions of how to perform stratification in science and innovationInnovation in ways that both hinge on, and yet refrain from, considerations of desert and achievement. With the example of Edward Jenner’sJenner, EdwardluckLuck (also, Epistemic Luck, Moral Luck)- and serendipity-infused discoveryDiscovery (also, Scientific Discovery) of vaccination, the authors attempt to better understand the intricate valueValue trade-offs that underlie stratification policies in science, which have to be constantly re-negotiated to maintain their legitimacy. Thereby, Sand and Ciapperino aim to take a bold step towards understanding the ethicsEthics of serendipity.

Problem: Visions of technology, future scenarios, guiding visions represent imaginations of future states of affairs that play a functional role in processes of technological research, development and innovation—e.g. as a means to create attention, communication, coordination, or for the strategic exertion of influence. Since a couple of years there is a growing attention for such imaginations of futures in politics, the economy, research and the civil society. This trend concerns technology assessment as an observer of these processes and a consultant on the implications of technology and innovation. TA faces increasing demands to assess imaginations of futures that circulate in the present and to participate in shaping these through scenarios or foresights. More than ever, this raises the question, which propositions can be made based on these imaginations by TA and how this can be used in advisory practices. Imaginations of futures are relevant for TA not as predictions but in their significance and effectiveness in the present, which need to be understood and assessed.Contents: This discussion paper outlines how present significance and effects of imagined futures in technological research and innovation processes can be conceived and analyzed. In this paper, all forms of imaginations of technology futures will be called “socio-technical futures” because within them technological developments and social changes are interwoven and inseparably interrelated. In this paper, we discuss why TA should analyze socio-technical futures, how such analyses can grasp the societal conditions that are expressed in the imagined futures and how these become effective in processes of technology development, communication, decision making etc. We raise the question which self-reflexive positioning or possible realignment of TA is needed as a response to its increased concern with assessing and even co-producing socio-technical futures. The latter is often demanded regarding the growing attention by politics and publics to imaginations of futures with wide temporal and spatial reach.Addressee of this paper is the TA community in a broader sense. The aim is to sensitize colleagues for the topic and its challenges, to consolidate discussions and to provide theoretical and methodical suggestions for research in TA and related advisory practices with respect to socio-technical futures. This paper has been originally initiated during the workshop “The present of technological futures-theoretical and methodical challenges for Technology Assessment”, in which all of the paper’s authors participated. The contents of this discussion paper are preliminary results that shall initiate and guide further discussions.