•  313
    The paper deals with such a modification of genuine modal realism as to accommodate impossible worlds into its ontology. First of all, the theory of modal realism is presented. Next, several motivations for the acceptance of impossible worlds are adduced. Furthermore, Lewis’s argument against impossible worlds is denied. Then, it is argued that the same methodology as in the case of possible worlds can be used when impossibilia are at issue. Finally, the theory of extended modal realism is formu…Read more
  •  286
    Extended Modal Dimensionalism
    Acta Analytica 32 (1): 13-28. 2017.
    Modal dimensionalism is realism about spaces, times and worlds—metaphysical indices that make objects spatial, temporal and modal, respectively, and that play the role of alethic relativizers, i.e. items to which matters of truth are relativized. This paper examines several arguments against MD and shows that MD offers a feasible way to understand modal discourse.
  •  274
    On the Indispensability of (Im)Possibilia
    Humana Mente 6 (25). 2013.
    According to modal realism formulated by David Lewis, there exist concrete possible worlds. As he argues the hypothesis is serviceable and that is a sufficient reason to think it is true. On the other side, Lewis does not consider the pragmatic reasons to be conclusive. He admits that the theoretical benefits of modal realism can be illusory or that the acceptance of controversial ontology for the sake of theoretical benefits might be misguided in the first place. In the first part of the …Read more
  •  204
    The paper outlines and immediately discusses the so-called ‘soft’ impossibility, i.e., non-logical impossibility generated by modal realism. It will be shown that although in a particular case genuine modal realism, straightforwardly applied, deems impossible a proposition that other philosophers have claimed to be (intuitively) possible, there is a variety of methodologically acceptable moves available in order to avoid the problem. The impossibility at issue is the existence of island universe…Read more
  •  28
    Concrete Impossible Worlds
    Filozofia 68 (6): 523-530. 2013.
    The paper deals with such a modification of genuine modal realism as to accommodate impossible worlds into its ontology. First of all, the theory of modal realism is presented. Next, several motivations for the acceptance of impossible worlds are adduced. Further, Lewis’s argument against impossible worlds is presented. It is argued that the argument can be weakened by rejection of one of its premises. Finally, two objections against the proposal are countered. Although my strategy accounts for …Read more
  •  27
    Metaphysics: Aristotelian, Scholastic, Analytic (review)
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (2): 266-270. 2013.
  •  26
    Trading Ontology for Ideology
    Acta Analytica 35 (3): 405-420. 2020.
    In this paper, I defend modal dimensionalism against the objection that it is ontologically and ideologically heavy. First, I briefly outline the theory and the objection against it. The objection relies on the widely accepted view that ontological and ideological parsimony are operational criteria when comparing metaphysical theories. Second, I outline the conventional distinction between ontology and ideology in the metaphysical tradition. Third, I challenge a particular kind of parsimony: red…Read more
  •  24
    Impossibilists's Paradise on the Cheap?
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu (3): 283-301. 2013.
    The aim of the paper is to discuss the ersatz theory of Lewis’s impossible worlds, point out its undeniable benefits and demonstrate its costs. Firstly, I present two approaches to Lewis’s impossible worlds taken as constructions out of possibilia. Secondly, I evaluate the proposals using the Lewisian criteria of success concerning the well defined conception of analysis. Although appealing, I do not find the proposals fully persuasive. Thirdly, I discuss the objection from an ad hoc distinction…Read more
  •  21
    Fiction: Impossible!
    Axiomathes 28 (2): 247-252. 2018.
    I argue that modal realism is unable to account for fictional discourse. My starting point is an overview of modal realism. I then present a dilemma for modal realism regarding fictional characters. Finally, I provide responses to both horns of the dilemma, one motivating modal dimensionalism, the other motivating a disjunctive analysis of modality.
  •  12
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 20 (1): 81-97. 2016.
    The paper defends the so-called extended modal realism, a theory according to which there are concrete impossible worlds. Firstly, modal realism is presented. Next, the way of how its ontology enriched by impossible worlds should look like in order to save its main theoretical virtues is pursued. Finally, I argue for a claim that metaphysical impossibility equals to dissimilarity between worlds instantiating distinct metaphysical structures.
  •  10
    Correction to: Trading Ontology for Ideology
    Acta Analytica 35 (4): 623-624. 2020.
    The original version of this article unfortunately contains incorrect argument in section 5 and the corrected section headings.
  •  6
    Modal Realism: Yet Another Hybrid Version
    Belgrade Philosophical Annual 28 3-19. 2015.
    The aim of this paper is to provide an analysis of modality by means of the existence of concrete impossible worlds. In particular, I pursue a strategy according to which logical impossibility is analyzed as logical inaccessibility. I then consider whether it makes sense to think of logical models in isolation from the concrete world but without their being divorced from all spatiotemporal totalities. The metaphysics of structure developed in this paper assumes that structural properties of poss…Read more
  • Possible-worlds semantics proved itself as a strong tool in analysing the statements of actuality, possibility, contingency and necessity. But impossible phenomena go beyond the expressive power of the apparatus. The proponents of possible-worlds apparatus thus owe us at least three stories. The first one is the story about ontological nature of possible worlds, the second one is the story about the theoretical role such entities play and the third one is the story about the impossible. Modal R…Read more
  • Theories of possible worlds abound. Since the introduction of modal logic, the term of a possible world, and the very nature of an entity denoted by the term, have stood on the top of metaphysical inquiries. A possible world, roughly speaking, is a complete way things could have been. On the face of it, whatever is possible takes place in some possible world, and whatever is not possible, does not. The aim of the present book is to argue that even impossible things happen. By taking David Lewis’…Read more
  • The Israel Philosophy Association 16th Annual Conference
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (2): 277-279. 2013.