Martin W. Niederl

[English] Overlooked Generic Masculine Forms – Consistency in Usage of Gender-Conscious Language in the "Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie" (German Journal of Philosophy) in 2020 The present article examines to what extent and how consistently gender-conscious language is used in academic papers. We analysed every paper published in 2020 in the journal “Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie” (transl.: German Journal for Philosophy) that contained overlooked usages of generic masculine forms in otherwise gender-conscious language. Our results showed that only 16 out of 35 papers used gender-conscious language. Out of those 16, only 5 used gender-conscious language in more than 50% of possible usages. None of the articles consistently used gender-conscious language. This means that in each of those 16 papers that used gender-conscious language, at least one “overlooked generic masculine form” was detected. Our hypotheses that generic masculine forms are more often overlooked if they are either (i) not related to the thematic focus of the article, or (ii) technical terms, were confirmed. [German] Der vorliegende Artikel untersucht, inwiefern und wenn ja wie konsequent in wissenschaftlichen Artikeln gegendert wird. Analysiert wurden alle 2020 erschienen Artikel in der Deutschen Zeitschrift für Philosophie, in denen übersehene generische Maskulina vorkommen. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass lediglich in 16 von 35 Artikeln gegendert wurde. Von diesen 16 Arbeiten gendern wiederum nur fünf in mehr als 50% der Fälle. In keinem der analysierten Artikel wird jede Personenbezeichnung, die potentiell gegendert werden könnte, auch tatsächlich gegendert. Das heißt, in jedem einzelnen dieser 16 Artikel gibt es mindestens ein “übersehenes generisches Maskulinum”. Unsere Hypothesen, dass generische Maskulina öfter “übersehen” werden, wenn sie entweder nicht im thematischen Fokus des Artikels stehen oder Fachbegriffe sind, konnten bestätigt werden.

In his latest paper on animal agency, Glock (2019) presents a series of arguments to the extent that non-linguistic animals are capable of acting rationally and for reasons. This notwithstanding, he still denies them the ability to conceptualise reasons as reasons. I will argue that, in using Glock’s account, one can in fact claim that non- linguistic animals are capable of conceptualising reasons as reasons. For this, I will apply Glock’s own criteria for concept-possession to the concepts of a reason and of intention. My argument will thus be twofold. First, I will directly argue for the idea that animals can conceptualise reasons as reasons. Second, I will refer to empirical research suggesting that animals attribute intentions to others. If the ability to conceptualise intentions really is necessary for conceptualising reasons, then this research should provide further plausibility to the claim that animals can conceptualise reasons as reasons. I thus submit that my arguments will further improve upon Glock’s account by (1) showing that animals can conceptualise reasons as reason, (2) lending further support to the idea that non-human animals can act rationally, and (3) providing some initial foundation for the claim that they can reason.