I'm a PhD student at the University of Chicago and research assistant for Giacomo Melis's project on Animal Rationality and Epistemic Defeat.
My primary interests are in moral psychology, the philosophy of action, and non-human animal cognition.
What I’m primarily intrigued by is how agents relate to and represent the reasons that inform their actions. The way I’m currently approaching this is by looking into theories of non-human animal agency and cognition. The idea is basically this: some animals clearly are agents; but actions are intricately related to reasons; so the challenge is to model both reasons and action in a way that allows b…
I'm a PhD student at the University of Chicago and research assistant for Giacomo Melis's project on Animal Rationality and Epistemic Defeat.
My primary interests are in moral psychology, the philosophy of action, and non-human animal cognition.
What I’m primarily intrigued by is how agents relate to and represent the reasons that inform their actions. The way I’m currently approaching this is by looking into theories of non-human animal agency and cognition. The idea is basically this: some animals clearly are agents; but actions are intricately related to reasons; so the challenge is to model both reasons and action in a way that allows beings with the cognitive capacity of animals like pigs and chimpanzees to count as agents proper.
