Martina Ferrari

This article accounts for a particular kind of politicised anonymity, namely ‘disobedient anonymity’, that operates as a liberatory response to the longue durée of gender violence. We examine the street performance Un violador en tu camino created by the Chilean feminist theatre collective LASTESIS, to show how disobedient anonymity is an embodied and collective disruption of colonial subjectification and state-sanctioned gender violence. Building on the insights of the Argentinian decolonial feminist scholar Rita Segato's analysis of high-intensity patriarchy as well as discussions of perverse anonymity in critical phenomenology, we examine how disobedient anonymity operates in Un violador as an embodied practice that makes possible a decolonising, feminist liberatory public. We argue that through the deployment of disobedient anonymity, Un violador re-territorialises and re-temporalises colonial fields of sens. In doing so, it institutes a new form of political subjectivity that upends colonial logics.

In this article, I investigate the limits of a phenomenology of consciousness as generative of a radicalized phenomenological method capable of bearing its relationship with coloniality. I call this method “decolonizing reduction.” The contribution of this article is thus twofold. First, it contributes to conversations about the method of critical phenomenology, arguing that the normative goal of critique of critical phenomenology is achieved via a radicalization of the phenomenological method, not its abandonment. Second, it contributes to the development of a distinctive method for critical phenomenology capable not only of investigating historical and contingent conditions of possibility of experience, but of carrying out descriptions at the site of colonial violence. By engaging with the colonial limits of the phenomenological reduction, the decolonizing reduction disrupts the world as we know it and generates alternative conditions of experience.

Yes, this book is based upon a single sentence: Beauvoir’s renowned sentence: ‘one is not born: one becomes (a) woman.’ Yet it manages to spawn nineteen articles that cover multiple themes from numerous perspectives and disciplinary interests. Its four sections, Intellectual History; History of Scandal; the Philosopher’s Debate; the Labor of Translation, include interventions on the sex/gender debates (Karen Offen, Judith Butler, Bonnie Mann, Meagan Burke), diverse philosophical interpretations of Beauvoir, as well as concrete and convincing demonstrations of how poorly translated passages promote misunderstandings (Toril Moi, Margaret Simons, Nancy Bauer). Since it is impossible to do justice to the breadth and wealth of this text in a short review, I have chosen to focus upon a few of the articles that I found particularly interesting. The brilliance of the collection lies in its interdisciplinary and meticulous analysis of this single sentence. Needless to say, its multiple interpretations don’t fit together, but provide compelling arguments that can’t be easily dismissed.

In this paper, I tend to the concept of “immemorial past” and argue that Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s turn in The Visible and the Invisible—a turn toward the conceptualization of time as chiasm and an ontology of the invisible—provides a rich resource for theorizing sexual difference. More precisely, I argue that acknowledging the different kind of temporality of life that the immemorial institutes—a temporality that is generative of meaning and signification—invites us to investigate gender’s “immemorial past.” Shifting attention from the sedimentation and presence of gender habits to the fecund lack that grounds such sedimentation allows us to account for the structure that makes gender production, institution, and differing possible in the first place. Such a structure is a “fecund negativity,” a polymorphous field or depth, that points to the inherent instability and multiplicity of gender, to the fact that gender formation can be traced back to a plural and ambiguous ground that comes to expression in cultural-historical-linguistic manifestations.Dans cet article, je m’appuie sur le concept de « passé immémorial » et montre que le tournant merleau-pontien du Visible et l’Invisible – vers la conceptualisation du temps comme chiasme et d’une ontologie de l’invisible – constitue une riche ressource lorsqu’il s’agit de théoriser la différence sexuelle. Plus précisément, je montre que reconnaître les différents genres de temporalité de vie que l’immémorial institue – une temporalité qui est génératrice de sens et de significations – nous invite à examiner le « temps immémorial » du genre. Passer de la sédimentation et de la présence des habitudes de genre au manque fécond qui fonde une telle sédimentation nous permet de rendre compte de la structure qui rend possible la production, l’institution du genre et de différer le possible à la première place. Une telle structure est une « négativité féconde », un champ ou une profondeur polymorphe, qui souligne l’instabilité inhérente et la multiplicité du genre, le fait que la formation du genre peut être retracée jusqu’à un fond pluriel et ambigu qui s’exprime dans des manifestations culturelles, historiques et linguistiques.Nel presente articolo, intendo elaborare il concetto di “passato immemoriale” e mostrare come la svolta di Merleau-Ponty nel Visibile e l’invisibile – una svolta verso una teorizzazione del tempo come chiasma e verso un’ontologia dell’invisibile – costituisca una risorsa particolarmente ricca per pensare la differenza sessuale. In particolare, vorrei sostenere che comprendere i diversi tipi di temporalità della vita che l’immemoriale istituisce – una temporalità generativa di senso e significato – ci porta a considerare il “passato immemoriale” del gender. Spostare l’attenzione dalla sedimentazione e dalla presenza delle abitudini di genere, alla mancanza feconda che sottende una simile sedimentazione, ci permette di prendere in esame la struttura stessa che rende possibile la produzione, istituzione e differenziazione del genere. Una tale struttura corrisponde ad una “negatività feconda”, un campo polimorfo o profondità che fa segno verso l’instabilità e la molteplicità inerenti al gender, ovvero al fatto che la formazione del genere può essere rintracciata in un orizzonte plurale e ambiguo, che si esprime attraverso manifestazioni culturali-storico-linguistiche.

Spanning nearly twenty years (1993-2012), the essays in Judith Butler’s Senses of the Subject investigate the processes of subject formation. Via an engagement with canonical philosophical figures like Descartes, Malebranche, Merleau-Ponty, Spinoza, Irigaray, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Fanon, Butler develops the thesis that a radical “susceptibility” or “impressionability” vis-à-vis social and linguistic powers is constitutive of the “I.” This claim, as I suggest in the review, has two implications. First, any attempt to account for this process of initial formation is inherently paradoxical; it seeks to put into words a moment that is temporally and structurally prior to the emergence and development of the “I” and the ability to recount such an emergence. Second, the subject, and also the process of subject’s formation, is structurally and temporally open, incessantly relying upon that which is “external” to the subject for its emergence. This collection, which is exclusively devoted to Butler’s engagement with the philosophical tradition, is an invaluable contribution not only to the understanding of Butler’s philosophy and her relationship with the canon. It also opens the space for an investigation of Butler’s philosophical commitments to query why the body seems to dematerialize from her work, even, it seems, when she makes the materiality of the body an explicit focus of her inquiry.Sur une durée de presque vingt ans (1993-2012), les essais rassemblés dans Senses of the Subject de Judith Butler examinent les processus de la formation des sujets. À travers le débat avec des figures philosophiques canoniques telles que Descartes, Malebranche, Merleau-Ponty, Spinoza, Irigaray, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Sartre et Fanon, Butler développe la thèse qu’une « susceptibilité » ou « impressionnabilité » radicale par rapport aux pouvoirs sociaux et linguistiques est constitutive du « Moi ». Cette thèse, comme je le suggère dans ma recension, a deux implications. En premier lieu, toute tentative de rendre compte de ce processus de formation initiale est paradoxal ; elle consiste à mettre en mots un moment qui est temporellement et structurellement premier par rapport à l’émergence et au développement du « Moi » et donc à la capacité de rendre compte d’une telle émergence. En second lieu, le sujet, et donc aussi le processus de formation du sujet, est structurellement et temporellement ouvert, et repose continuellement sur ce qui est « externe » au sujet pour son émergence. Ce recueil, exclusivement consacré au débat de Butler avec la tradition philosophique, est une contribution incontournable, non seulement pour la compréhension de la philosophie de Butler et de sa relation avec le canon, mais encore parce qu’il ouvre un espace pour examiner pourquoi le corps semble dématérialisé dans son oeuvre, même lorsqu’elle fait de la matérialité du corps le centre de sa réflexion. Distribuiti lungo l’arco di quasi vent’anni (1993-2012), i saggi contenuti in Senses of the Subject di Judith Butler indagano il processo della formazione del soggetto. Attraverso un confronto con figure canoniche della filosofia come Cartesio, Malebranche, Merleau-Ponty, Spinoza, Irigaray, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Sartre e Fanon, Butler sviluppa la tesi che l’“Io” sia costituito da una radicale “suscettibilità” o “impressionabilità” rispetto ai poteri sociali e linguistici. Questa tesi, come suggerisco nella mia recensione, ha due implicazioni. In primo luogo, qualunque tentativo di rendere conto di questo processo di formazione iniziale è paradossale: si tratterebbe di un tentativo di esprimere attraverso le parole un momento che è temporalmente e strutturalmente precedente all’emergere e svilupparsi dell’“Io” e alla capacità di riportare e riferire questo stesso emergere. In secondo luogo, il soggetto, così come il processo della sua formazione, è strutturalmente e temporalmente aperto, e si affida incessantemente a ciò che è “esterno” al soggetto stesso nel suo emergere. La raccolta in questione, interamente dedicata al confronto di Butler con la tradizione filosofica, non soltanto rappresenta un contributo inestimabile per la comprensione della filosofia dell’autrice e della sua relazione con la tradizione; essa offre anche la possibilità di mettere a fuoco i termini dell’impegno filosofico di Butler, così da chiarire perché il corpo sembri smaterializzarsi dal suo lavoro anche laddove apparentemente l’autrice fa della materialità del corpo un nucleo centrale della propria indagine.

In this article, I illustrate ways in which the concepts of the norm and normativity, as well as discourses about normality and the good life, are implicated in relations of power that inform individuals’ values. By analyzing the separation of conjoined twins as a paradigmatic example of practices of overmedicalization, I consider the implications of taking the “goodness” of normality for granted. I argue that overmedicalization procedures establish an interpretative framework that does not leave room for recognizing the contingency of societal suppositions about normality and the good life. It is this kind of ethical reflection (or lack thereof) that I problematize as being symptomatic of individuals’ “normalized” ethical reflection.

In this paper, I attend to the ontological shift in Merleau-Ponty’s later writing and suggest that this conceptual turn opens the space for questions of the latent sense of the sensible foreclosed by dualist accounts and propositional theories of meaning. By attending to the Nature Lectures, I claim that there is a sens [meaning and orientation] of nature whose regulatory principle ought to be found in nature itself. This is to say that there is a normativity of nature that, albeit not exclusive of sociocultural-linguistic norms, is irreducible to them. As I argue, this normativity is a “transspatializing and transtemporalizing”: it transverses its carnal manifestations, thereby inaugurating and becoming traceable within their materialization while remaining invisible in its excess or poietic renewing. I conclude by attending to the question of the “latent sense” of nature, suggesting that this sense is not conceptual or propositional, but intuitive as in the sense of right and left, a sense that is distributed across spatio-temporal individuals and emerges via the play of yet-to-be-determined incarnate manifestations.Dans cet article, j’aborde le tournant ontologique du dernier Merleau-Ponty et je suggère qu’il implique une interrogation sur le sens latent du sensible, exclu par les approches dualistes ainsi que par les théories propositionnelles de la signification. En analysant les cours sur la Nature, je vise à montrer qu’il y a un sens [signification et direction] de la nature, dont le principe régulateur est à chercher dans la nature elle-même. Cela revient à dire qu’il y a une normativité de la nature qui, bien qu’elle n’exclue pas les normes socio-culturelles-linguistiques, ne leur est pas pour autant réductible. Une telle normativité est « trans-spatiale et trans-temporelle » : elle traverse ses manifestations charnelles, en inaugurant ainsi et en devenant traçable dans ses matérialisations, tout en demeurant invisible dans son excès et dans son renouvellement poïétique. Je termine en abordant la question du « sens latent » de la nature, en suggérant que ce sens n’est ni conceptuel ni propositionnel, mais intuitif, tout comme l’est le sens de la droite et de la gauche, c’est-à-dire un sens qui est distribué à travers les individus spatio-temporels et qui émerge dans le jeu des manifestations incarnées encore-à-déterminer.In questo articolo intendo esaminare la svolta ontologica degli ultimi scritti di Merleau-Ponty per suggerire come questa apra ad un’interrogazione sul senso latente del sensibile, che rimane escluso dagli approcci dualistici e dalle teorie proposizionali del significato. Analizzando i corsi sulla Natura, vorrei mostrare come vi sia un senso [significato e orientamento] della natura il cui principio regolatore deve essere rintracciato nella natura stessa. Ciò significa che vi è una normatività della natura che, benché non esclusiva delle norme socioculturali-linguistiche, è irriducibile ad esse. Questa normatività è “trans-spaziale e trans-temporale”: essa attraversa le sue manifestazioni carnali, inaugurando e divenendo tracciabile nelle sue materializzazioni, pur rimanendo invisibile nella sua eccedenza o rinnovamento poietico. Concludo soffermandomi sulla questione del “senso latente” della natura, suggerendo che questo senso non è concettuale o proposizionale, ma intuitivo al modo del senso della destra e della sinistra, un senso che è distribuito attraverso gli individui spazio-temporali e che emerge nel gioco delle manifestazioni incarnate ancora-da-determinare.

This collection of essays takes up the most famous feminist sentence ever written, Simone de Beauvoir’s “On ne naît pas femme: on le devient,” finding in it a flashpoint that galvanizes feminist thinking and action in multiple dimensions. Two entangled controversies emerge in the life of this sentence: a controversy over the practice of translation and a controversy over the nature and status of sexual difference. Variously translated into English as “One is not born, but rather becomes a woman” (Parshley, 1953), “one is not born but rather becomes woman” (Borde and Malovany-Chevallier, 2010), and “women are made, not born” (in popular parlance), the conflict over the translation crystallizes the feminist debate over the possibilities and limitations of social construction as a theory of sexual difference. Tensions over the English translation open the way to asking bigger questions about philosophical meaning and translational practice across a number of language contexts.

This article begins at a crossroads; it straddles the difficult ground between the recent public outcry against sexual violence and concerns about the coloniality of voice made visible by the recent decolonial turn within feminist theory. Wary of concepts such as “visibility” or “transparency”—principles that continue to inform the call to “break the silence” by “speaking up” central to Western liberatory movements—in this article, I return to silence, laying the groundwork for the exploration of what a revised concept of silence could mean for the development of practices of cross-cultural communication that do not play into coloniality.

And what if we also learn to listen for silence?This article is one in a series of attempts on my part to think the inbetween of traditionally juxtaposed claims of voice versus silence. It takes seriously both claims that voice is lived as liberatory by many, on the one hand, and that words may be inadequate to bear witness to the humiliation, pain, and systematic degradation of trauma and violence, on the other. Thus situated, I turn to silence to locate resources for the renewal of sense. Specifically, I propose that the mobilization of silences can be a powerful decolonizing praxis. Attending to Gloria Anzaldúa's iterations of the myth of la Llorona in "My Black Angelos" and Prietita and the Ghost Woman,1...

We are happy to feature four invited submissions by Lisa Guenther, Kym Maclaren, Bonnie Mann, and Gayle Salamon, all of whom respond to the questions motivating our inaugural issue. Both Salamon and Maclaren offer a response to the question “What is critical phenomenology?” by exploring the productive relationship between critical theory and phenomenology. Salamon does this by tracing the history of the term critical phenomenology. Maclaren further explores the productive relationship between critical theory and phenomenology en route to her analysis of intimacy. Focusing on the phenomena of shame and long-term solitary confinement, Mann and Guenther take up that question by performing the work of critical phenomenology. Mann also offers suggestions regarding critical or, as she calls it, feminist phenomenology’s relation to the tradition—both of classical phenomenology and feminist philosophy. Guenther shows how the work of critical phenomenology is already at play in the practices of resistance among prisoners in the Security Housing Unit of Pelican Bay State Prison in California.

Starting with the acknowledgment of the necessity of radical imagination for social change, and with the threat that neoliberal capitalism poses to radical imagination, our hope is that this themed issue offers the time and space to cultivate radical imagination as it takes up questions of racial justice. Moreover, our intent is to solicit critical phenomenology toward robust investigations of radical imagination, what it makes possible, and the ways in which current social, economic, and political arrangements sustain or foreclose the space and time for its cultivation. What the past few years have made clear is that individuals and institutions continue to be complicit in the perpetuation of structural inequality and racial violence in our society. For us, the editors of Puncta, acknowledging this complicity means at a minimum to use our platform to amplify the voices of scholars of color and establish a forum devoted to critical conversations about racial justice. In sum, we hope we can create a space-time for the cultivation of radical imagination. This themed issue strives to be such a venue; the ten articles featured in this issue explore the intersections of race/racialization with methodological concerns within the field of critical phenomenology, theoretical understandings of the notion of race itself, and demands for racial justice on scholarly, activist, and imaginary grounds.

… philosophy must be a practice as much as it is a theory.Leah Kalmanson, Cross-Cultural Existentialism, p. 1In the face of the sheer quantity of life's uncertainties, Leah Kalmanson's Cross-Cultural Existentialism provides more than a novel take on existential theory ; following the mantra of European existentialists that "philosophies are meant to be lived," Cross-Cultural Existentialism introduces the reader to a series of practices central to the Ruist tradition required to make philosophy "a concrete attitude, a way of life". Kalmanson's turn to the East Asian tradition is largely motivated by her assessment that the...

Decolonial, postcolonial, and postmodern criticism is indebted to Frantz Fanon for revealing the hegemony of vision and visual language in Western imperial discourse. Yet, the import of Fanon's critique of coloniality reaches beyond a focus on vision into the sonorous. Attending to the often overlooked auditory dimension of Fanon's work, I argue, brings attention to the role of listening as a condition of possibility of a revolutionary consciousness. Listening to Fanon's careful descriptions of the experience of many Algerians of listening to the National Liberation Front's radio broadcast, The Voice of Free and Fighting Algeria in “This is the Voice of Algeria,” I propose that what makes possible the institution of a revolutionary consciousness is listening to murmurs. Listening to the materiality of voice and sound rather than the propositional content of speech is revolutionary because it challenges core values central to the project of colonial modernity: metaphysical logocentrism and the fungibility to which colonial modernity strives to reduce colonized subjects.

This paper is one in a series of attempts on my part to think through one of the central challenges left to us by Merleau-Ponty’s sudden death in 1961: if we understand the turn, in his later writings, toward an ontology of the flesh as “a radical rethinking of the experience of belonging from within, [as] a phenomenology of being-of-the-world”, how are we to bear witness to such an experience? What modalities are called forth to do justice to this belonging? The task accrues existential and ethical weight when, at stake in our analyses, are historical and social structures like coloniality that normalize experience, perception, and sense-making while marginalizing others. It is my contention, in this article, that when the phenomenological inquiry becomes critical the question of modality becomes ethically central; how we bear witness to experiences of marginalization and the operations of power that produce them matters in that it risks reifying the same normative structures that predicate the oppression of many. With these questions and considerations in mind, in this article, I return to silence and propose that the mobilization of what I call “deep silences” can be a powerful tool for a critical phenomenology that bears witness without capitulating to the imperative of transparency norming the modern/colonial world system. Deep silence, in fact, designates signifying practices that do not primarily operate within the bounds of logocentrism and speech as the foundational principles of meaning, or that rely upon conceptual, analytical, and instrumental thinking, mobilizing instead the somatic, affective, and sensual dimensions of existence. In this article, I am primary concerned with the sense-making effected by the aesthetic as an instance of deep silence. Specifically, I focus on the image- and ritual-centered photographic documentaries of Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, which, I suggest, challenge the hegemonic normativity of modern/colonial aesthetics, introducing the reader to other sensibilities wherein the distinction between theory and practice has no purchase and the multiplicity of creative expressions is recognized.

In this paper, I argue that lived time is anagrammatical. Anagrammatical time is a time that lands differently along race/gender/class lines. Its sens – its grammar – is rearranged by the context of its unfolding, at times effecting temporal harm while, at others, offering paths for temporal freedom. After introducing the notion of anagrammatical in part 1, in part 2, I turn to Merleau-Ponty’s notions of Stiftung and virtuality to account for the “nestedness” of anagrammatical time. The past and present of anagrammatical time, I show, co-exist in the present diachronically. In part 3, I focus on temporal harm. I show how, in the context of the afterlife of slavery, the immemorial functions as a traumatic, compulsive-repetitive temporality, as a thief of time temporalizing with the felt necessity and determinacy of the future anterior. In part 4, I briefly turn to the temporal grammar of the “could have been” to think through temporal freedom.

Thanks to the revival in Bergson’s scholarship prompted by Gilles Deleuze’s Bergsonism, it is widely recognized that Bergsonism challenges the metaphysics of presence. Less attention, however, has been devoted to the status of negation or negativity in Bergson’s thought. Differently from Deleuze, I argue that Bergson’s claim that memory and perception, past and present, differ in kind does not call for the erasure of the negative but rather for the radical reconceptualization of negation in temporal terms. Thinking negation temporally allows Bergson to open the space for conceptualizing existence beyond presence, for developing an account of the paradoxical nature of the past. With an insight that anticipates Derrida’s thinking, Bergson tells us that the past is neither “there” nor “not-there,” neither a presence nor an absence. Grâce au regain d’intérêt pour Bergson qu’a suscité le livre de Gilles Deleuze, Le bergsonisme, il est maintenant largement reconnu que le bergsonisme met la métaphysique de la présence à l’épreuve. On a cependant moins porté attention au statut de la négation ou de la négativité dans la pensée de Bergson. Au contraire de Deleuze, je soutiens que l’affirmation de Bergson selon laquelle la mémoire et la perception, le passé et le présent, diffèrent en espèce n’amène pas un effacement du négatif mais plutôt une reconceptualisation radicale de la négation en termes temporels. En pensant la négation temporellement, Bergson peut ouvrir un espace pour conceptualiser l’existence au-delà de la présence et développer une explication de la nature paradoxale du passé. Anticipant la pensée de Derrida, Bergson nous montre que le passé est ni « présent » ni « non-présent », ni une présence ni une absence.