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Martina Orlandi

Trent University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    5
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 More details
  • Trent University
    Assistant Professor
McGill University
PhD, 2021
CV
Homepage
Oshawa, ON, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action
Philosophy of Mind
Moral Psychology
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Ethics of Belief
  • All publications (5)
  •  80
    Self-deception as normative violation
    Philosophical Explorations 28 (2): 218-236. 2025.
    This paper defends an account of self-deception as a violation of the self-deceived’s own epistemic norms. I show that, compared to the most prominent version of a deflationary view of self-deception, a normative violation account does a better job of distinguishing self-deception from other similar biases, better captures the experiential tension characteristic of self-deception, and rescues the role of the self in self-deception.
    Self-Deception
  •  118
    ‘I knew all along’: making sense of post-self-deception judgments
    Synthese 203 (136): 1-15. 2024.
    Individuals deceive themselves about a wide variety of subjects. In fortunate circumstances, where those who manage to leave self-deception embrace reality, an interesting phenomenon occurs: the formerly self-deceived often confess to having ‘known [the truth] all along’. These post-self-deception judgments are not conceptually innocuous; if genuine, they call into question the core feature of prominent theories of self-deception, namely that self-deceived individuals do not believe the unwelcom…Read more
    Individuals deceive themselves about a wide variety of subjects. In fortunate circumstances, where those who manage to leave self-deception embrace reality, an interesting phenomenon occurs: the formerly self-deceived often confess to having ‘known [the truth] all along’. These post-self-deception judgments are not conceptually innocuous; if genuine, they call into question the core feature of prominent theories of self-deception, namely that self-deceived individuals do not believe the unwelcome truth. In this paper I argue that post-self-deception judgments do not track a belief, but rather a suspicion of the unwelcome truth. I do this by showing that post-self-deception judgments are themselves instances of self-deception where the individual is self-deceived that they believed the unwelcome truth. I then suggest that the motivational cause of the self-deceit is hindsight bias, specifically the kind known as foreseeability, and that as a result, post-self-deception judgments are not reliable because they do not accurately track previous self-deceptive experiences.
    Philosophy of MindSpecific Agentive PhenomenaAction Theory, MiscellaneousIntentionsPhilosophy of Act…Read more
    Philosophy of MindSpecific Agentive PhenomenaAction Theory, MiscellaneousIntentionsPhilosophy of Action, MiscSelf-Deception
  • Fiction has a special power to give us insight into our flaws
    Aeon Psyche. 2024.
  • ‘Nobody Makes it Alone’: Towards a Relational View of Resilience (edited book)
    with Evandro Barbosa, Lisa Bortolotti, Flavio Williges, Matheus Mesquita, Denis Coitinho, Jana Rosker, Simone Gubler, Mauro Rossi, Leonardo Ribeiro, Peter Anstey, Ryan Doody, Thaís Cristina Alves Costa, Joshua Preiss, and Marcelo de Araújo
    Routledge. 2023.
    This chapter argues that the Covid-19 pandemic has exposed the limits of the mainstream individualistic notion of resilience and, in light of these limits, it advances a new, relational notion of the concept of resilience that contributes to the individuals’ well-being and takes into consideration the role of systemic inequality. The first half of the paper argues that the individualistic notion is flawed in two ways: i) it can foster ill-being because it is cognitively taxing, and ii) it discou…Read more
    This chapter argues that the Covid-19 pandemic has exposed the limits of the mainstream individualistic notion of resilience and, in light of these limits, it advances a new, relational notion of the concept of resilience that contributes to the individuals’ well-being and takes into consideration the role of systemic inequality. The first half of the paper argues that the individualistic notion is flawed in two ways: i) it can foster ill-being because it is cognitively taxing, and ii) it discounts systemic inequality because it transfers the responsibility of any achievement and failure onto the single individual without regard for conditions of oppression. The second half of the paper reconceptualizes the concept of resilience as a relational notion that takes into account structural support as well as conditions of oppression and marginalization. According to this latter notion of resilience, the chapter argues that oppression, lack of material conditions, or lack of structural support are elements that can impact the appropriateness of calls to be resilient. A relational notion of resilience fosters well-being because it puts the collective community at the center (instead of the individual) and it takes into consideration material conditions and structural injustices.
    Ethical Theories in Applied EthicsPolitical EthicsPhilosophy of Action, MiscThe WillSpecific Agentiv…Read more
    Ethical Theories in Applied EthicsPolitical EthicsPhilosophy of Action, MiscThe WillSpecific Agentive PhenomenaAction Theory, Miscellaneous
  •  272
    Self-control in action and belief
    with Sarah Stroud
    Philosophical Explorations 24 (2): 225-242. 2021.
    Self-control is normally, if only tacitly, viewed as an inherently practical capacity or achievement: as exercised only in the domain of action. Questioning this assumption, we wish to motivate the...
    Philosophy of MindEpistemologyAgencyMotivation and WillAction Theory, MiscellaneousSpecific Agentive…Read more
    Philosophy of MindEpistemologyAgencyMotivation and WillAction Theory, MiscellaneousSpecific Agentive PhenomenaPhilosophy of Action, Misc
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