Martina Properzi

_Riassunto_: Il concetto di modello corporeo è un’acquisizione relativamente recente della neuropsicologia. Studiosi attivi in questo ambito di ricerca interpretano il concetto di modello corporeo come facente riferimento ad un modello interno, una rappresentazione cognitiva delle proprietà anatomiche, volumetriche e posturali del corpo umano. È stato dimostrato come il modello corporeo fornisca un _background_ cognitivo stabile a processi d’integrazione dell’informazione multisensoriale riferita al corpo proprio. In questo senso, si ritiene che esso concorra a generare una forma elementare di autocoscienza corporea, il cosiddetto sé corporeo minimale. Il presente contributo intende fornire un’aggiornata rassegna tematica sul modello corporeo trattato contestualmente alla teoria neuropsicologica del sé corporeo minimale. A tale scopo, saranno discussi studi teorici di rilievo che condividono una comune base sperimentale: le _Illusioni della Proprietà Corporea_ (IPC). Attenzione verrà riservata anche alle principali ricadute che un tale lavoro di sistematizzazione teorica ha recentemente conosciuto in psicopatologia, filosofia della neuroscienza e neurofilosofia. Saranno infine segnalati alcuni problemi aperti nella contemporanea ricerca sul modello corporeo. _Parole chiave_: Neuropsicologia; Modello corporeo; Sé corporeo minimo; Illusioni della proprietà corporea _The body model and the neuropsychological theory of the minimal bodily self. A thematic revie _ _Abstract_: The body model is a relatively new concept developed by neuropsychologists that refers to an internal model or cognitive representation of the anatomical, volumetric, and structural aspects of the human body. The body model has been shown to provide a stable cognitive background for body-related multisensory integration, thereby contributing to the formation of an elementary kind of corporeal self-consciousness, the so-called minimal bodily self. Here, I provide an updated thematic review of research on the body model in the context of the neuropsychological theory of the minimal bodily self. It examines theoretical studies based on experiments on _Body Ownership Illusions_ (BOI) and the important implications this work has for psychopathology, the philosophy of neuroscience and neurophilosophy. Finally, it points to some unanswered questions in contemporary research on the body model. _Keywords_: Neuropsychology;_ _Body Model; Minimal Bodily Self; Body Ownership Illusions.

The text, known as Biologievorlesung, written by the German phenomenologist Max Scheler appeared in 1993 in volume XIV of the Schelerian Gesammelte Werke by M.S. Frings. It collects the surviving fragments of the notes on the “Gnoseological foundations of biology” elaborated by Scheler for the cycle of lectures, which were held as Privatdozent at the University of Munich in the winter semester of the academic year 1908-1909. Despite being interesting in many respects, the text is still largely unexplored to the very day. In this article I intend to focus on two points: 1) demonstrate the relatively advanced state of progress of the proposal expressed therein by the author compared to his real first phenomenological production between the publication in 1912 of the long article Über Selbsttäuschungen and 1922, the year that marks Scheler's open detachment from the Catholic cultural horizon hitherto embraced, and 2) bring out the systematic unity of the epistemological, ontological and phenomenological themes, articulated here, in a first attempt to develop an ontology of modern science, understood as the product of a vision of a historically located world, through a descriptive analysis of the intentional structures of consciousness implicated in intellectual knowledge.

In this contribution I propose a contemporary reading of the ontological dimension of Max Scheler’s early phenomenology of sense perception. My examination will start with a brief informal explanation of this theory, and his scientific and philosophical sources. The second step will be the introduction of some elements of Formal Philosophy : this piece of research will focus on N. B. Cocchiarella’s interpretation of FP and it will allow me to introduce the concept of a Philosophical Formal Ontology in comparison with the computational one. Finally, the third step will be the construction of a semi-formalized model of Scheler’s early phenomenology of sense perception. Here I will use a dynamic-epistemic version of the modal calculus KT5.

Riassunto: Può la corporalità dirsi ancora una condizione costitutiva dell’esperienza nella presente era digitale? Esistono due fondamentali modi di affrontare la questione, la cui rilevanza è stata di recente sottolineata da ricercatori attivi nei campi dell’ Intelligenza Artificiale Incorporata. Il primo interpreta la questione come incentrata su un’indagine della relazione fra corporalità e digitalizzazione, il processo cioè di digitalizzare dati il quale rende possibile simulare, aumentare e perfino costruire la realtà all’interno di uno spazio di esperienza virtuale, assumendo l’idea tradizionale del computing come un’attività che utilizza dispositivi artificiali, elettronici, per processare, gestire e comunicare informazioni. Il secondo considera la stessa relazione da una diversa prospettiva, facendo cioè riferimento al computing come a un’attività naturale, secondo l’emergente ricerca di computing naturale condotta nel campo del computing non convenzionale. Seguendo quest’ultima prospettiva, che sta acquisendo un crescente consenso all’interno della comunità scientifica, il lavoro indagherà il ruolo costitutivo della corporalità rispetto all’esperienza virtuale associata a una nota ed oramai autonoma area di ricerca del computing naturale, vale a dire il computing morfologico, utilizzando il metodo della fenomenologia genetica. Parole chiave: Computing naturale e computing artificiale; Corporeità; Morfologia naturale e morfologia artificiale; Fenomenologia genetica Lived Body and Virtual experience. A Phenomenological Perspective: In what sense can corporality still be considered a constitutive condition for experience in the current digital age? Recent scholarship in the fields of Embodied Artificial Intelligence and the philosophy of Embodied Artificial Intelligence has probed the relevance of two approaches to this question. The first queries the relationship between corporality and digitization, i.e., examining how it is possible to simulate, augment, and even construct reality within a space of virtual experience by digitizing data. This approach builds on the traditional idea of computing as an activity that uses artificial, mostly electronic, devices to process, manage, and communicate information. The second approach, increasingly favored by computer scientists, considers computing to be a natural activity, and approaches this same relationship from the perspective of emerging research in unconventional computing, specifically Natural Computing. This paper follows the latter approach, addressing the constitutive role of corporality in virtual experience associated with a well-known and still autonomous research area within Natural Computing, that is, Morphological Computing, from the from the point of view of genetic phenomenology. Keywords: Artificial and Natural Computing; Corporality; Natural and Artificial Morphology; Genetic Phenomenology

La dimensione epistemologica dell’opera giovanile, pre-fenomenologica di M. Scheler non è stata ad oggi adeguatamente studiata. Questo breve articolo intende esplorare tale dimensione della prima riflessione filosofica scheleriana da una prospettiva analitica di tipo storiografico. Particolare attenzione sarà quindi riservata alle fonti e ai principali temi di interesse epistemologico affrontati dall’autore. I testi di riferimento sono la tesi di dottorato Beiträge zur festellung der Beziehungen zwischen den logischen und ethischen Prinzipien, lo scritto di abilitazione Versuch über die philosophische Methode, pubblicato con il titolo Die transzendentale und die psycologische Methode e il frammento del primo libro della Logik, opera che Scheler ritira dalle stampe nel 1906. Conclusivamente, si proporrà un percorso di lettura dell’epistemologia che Scheler elabora nel contesto delle due versioni della sua successiva filosofia fenomenologica.

Questo articolo ricostruisce la dimensione formale dell’ontologia elaborata da Max Scheler fra il 1908-1909 ed il 1922, nel corso cioè della sua prima fase produttiva d’interesse fenomenologico. Particolare attenzione è riservata alla struttura “architettonica” della prima ontologia formale scheleriana, composta da un trivium di sotto-discipline formali. L’autore elabora in questo modo la distinzione, sostenuta dai maggiori rappresentanti dei primi Circoli tedeschi di fenomenologia realista, fra un’ontologia formale “pura” che indaga la regione formale analitica dell’“oggettività in generale” e ontologie formali generali interessate alle forme o categorie oggettuali dell’essere reale, organizzato in sommi generi materiali. L’articolo mostra inoltre come l’approccio scheleriano all’ontologia formale apra percorsi di recupero e rielaborazione di un’idea tipicamente pre-moderna: l’ontologia è disciplina che tratta anche dell’ordine sovra-predicamentale delle relazioni trascendentali.

In this Short Communication we will discuss the role played by quantum computing within the emerging morphological paradigm in the unconventional natural computing. We intend merely introduce the main reasons why a coherent representation of Universality in morphological natural computing needs to be grounded on a version of Quantum Field Theory independent, in many senses, from the Quantum Mechanics formalism in fundamental physics, namely formulated as a thermal field theory. This theory describes the “emergence” of natural information and computation’s complexity at a quantum level, thus overcoming the trivializing argument against the so-called “pancomputationalism” in morphological natural computing

This brief paper aims to underline which are the philosophical limits of mereotopology, when one takes it as a basic unitary theoretical framework for formal ontology. Mereotopology is a first-order theory of the relations among wholes, parts and the boundaries between parts, that combines mereological and topological concepts. Nowadays, with the expression “formal ontology” one intends either the computational (engineering) version, or the philosophical (categorial) one. It is important, then, to avoid terminological confusions. The main philosophical reason that keeps me from developing the connection between computational and philosophical formal ontologies on mereotopological basis is the following: anti-Representationalism and Monism are two ontological stances very difficult to join together, as mereotopology does, if one takes into account the ontological implications of the emerging dynamical dual paradigm in the information theoretic approach to quantum physics. In general, it is this approach to the current fundamental and experimentally extremely successful physical theories about the microphysical realm, namely Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Field Theory, that allows to overcome the “gap” between the two disciplinary fields of formal ontology, making information a physical magnitude. I do not oppose anti-Representationalism, but its connection with the monistic stance, because of the fact that nowadays information appears as a basic component of the microphysical realm just like energy-matter. This fact justifies a realistic but information-matter dual ontology as the proper formal ontology of the emerging paradigm in the information theoretic approach to contemporary quantum physics. The primacy that Aristotle gives to the theory of principle (act/potency) as to the theory of categories is a very helpful tool to solve the main question that arises within a realistic dual ontological theoretical framework: the question of the non-stable nature of the categories, that reflect the increasingly complexity of the physical dynamic realistic orders. Here is the importance of an historical approach to the topic, given also the fact that mereological formal ontology originates with the works of three authors (Bolzano, Brentano, Husserl) that studied, directly or indirectly, Aristotle’s ontology.

In this article, I propose a philosophical reading of Max Schelers work centered on the theme of metaphysics. This is in order to understand what the unique contribution offered by the author is, in an open debate towards contemporary philosophical reflection. The argument will be divided into four main steps : 1) to show how the theme of metaphysics emerges within Scheler's philosophy ; 2) to examine the model proposed by the author, especially highlighting how Scheler here attempts to draw a new "way" of development for the metaphysical discourse, linked to the figures of Geist and spiritual act; 3) highlight the development of a central difficulty in Schelers model; 4) outline a possible in depth study of the authors philosophical work, in my view, capable of providing an appropriate key to start understanding where the difficulty inside Schelers model originates from. Precisely, the development of the last two steps give me the opportunity to show how Scheler conceives the profound connection between metaphysics and philosophy of life that represent the common object in the ideas proposed here.

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the research program of formal ontology developed by M. Scheler before his last 1922 theoretical shift. Scheler’s theory of dialectical negation will be also investigated. In regard to the first topic, the focus will be on the complex architecture of Scheler’s formal ontology, deepened within a theoretical framework of realistic ontology: integrated into this framework, formal ontology becomes a basic tool for building phenomenological realisms. In regard to the second topic, the focus will be on the close theoretical relationship between Scheler’s mature suggestion of a phenomenological objective dialectics essence-being underlying his theory of the “functionalization of the essential knowledge” (Funktionalizierung der Wesenserkenntnis) ─ systematically presented for the first time in the 1921 work Probleme der Religion ─, and the formal ontological foundation of a logical theory of a “pluralistic” dialectical negation, that is, dually, an intuitionistic, hence paracomplete, and a paraconsistent negation. Finally, it will be introduced the basics of a semiotic interpretation of Scheler’s phenomenological formal ontology within the rigorous framework of Category Theory (TC). This interpretation “strengthens” the traditional (inter)subjective side of phenomenological analysis with a new ─ in the application suggested ─ “in the third person” objective side of semiotic analysis, that shares with the first one a common pre-logical and ante-predicative level of inquiry.

Riassunto: Questo lavoro tratta le dimensioni analitiche della hyletica e della genetica nella prima fenomenologia della percezione sensibile di M. Scheler, caratterizzata da una fondazione realistica della materia e della forma del percetto. La hyletica fenomenologica indaga la “materia” o contenuto qualitativo del vissuto nel suo aspetto pre-intenzionale di dato sensoriale informe, privo cioè di forma oggettiva. La genetica fenomenologica indaga la genesi o formazione dei due poli della relazione intenzionale atto-oggetto, a partire dal loro originario momento d’indistinzione allo stadio primitivo della coscienza percettiva. In questo lavoro si sottolinea l’originale elaborazione scheleriana dell’analisi fenomenologica: hyletica e genetica sono parte di un’indagine volta a indagare i diversi aspetti della realtà intesa come fenomeno vissuto caratterizzato dalla resistenza delle cose rispetto a un comportamento animato da finalità adattative. Il percipiente non è per Scheler il soggetto autocosciente, ma l’organismo come agente di informazione/comunicazione in costante interazione con il proprio ambiente circostante. Parole chiave: Hyletica fenomenologica; Fenomenologia genetica; Oggetto reale; Materia; Resistenza Matter and Form in Max Scheler’s Early Phenomenological Aesthetics: This paper addresses the analytic dimensions of Hyletics and Genetics in M. Scheler’s early phenomenology of sense perception, characterized by its realistic foundation for the matter and form of percepts. Phenomenological Hyletics studies the “matter”, i.e., the qualitative content of lived experiences with respect to the pre-intentional aspect of its unformed sensory input, lacking in objectual form. Phenomenological Genetics studies the “genesis” or formation of intentionality’s relata, starting from the early moments of indistinction at the initial phase of perceptual consciousness. This paper highlights the pivotal role and, above all, the original elaboration of these two analytic dimensions by the author: within Scheler’s work, phenomenological Hyletics and Genetics form part of an inquiry that stresses different aspects of reality, understood as a living phenomenon characterized by the resistance of things to adaptive behavior. According to Scheler, therefore, the perceiver is not a self-conscious subject, but rather an organism, i.e., an agent of information-communication that continuously interacts with his surrounding environment. Keywords: Phenomenological Hyletic; Genetic Phenomenology; Real Object; Matter; Resistence