Martyna Koszkało

This article addresses the issue of the two-level nature of acts of the will, i.e. its ability to voluntarily refer to its own acts. First, we will examine the ancient sources of the concept of the two-level will (Plato and Augustine). Then, we will focus on the views of John Duns Scotus on the types of acts of will, with particular emphasis on the concept of non velle and its application in philosophical and theological issues. Against the backdrop of Scotus’s concept, we will examine the ways in which 14th-century thinkers engaged with his position and developed his account of the two-level acts of will and types of acts of will. Finally, the article discusses a significant change in the function of non velle and the use of this type of volitional act in 14th-century ethics by exploring the views of Buridan and Kilvington. -------------------------- Received: 29/01/2023. Reviewed: 30/03/2023. Accepted: 18/04/2023.

Celem artykułu jest ukazanie zasadniczych różnic między rozumieniem pojęć kontyngencji, wolności, indywidualności w filozofii Szkota w odniesieniu do tradycji arystotelesowskiej. Podkreślam, że istotnymi elementami koncepcji Szkota, będącymi wyraźnym odejściem od klasycznego arystotelizmu, są: (1) odrzucenie zasady pełności, (2) interpretacja teraźniejszości jako niekoniecznej, (3) rozwinięcie pojęcia synchronicznej kontyngencji, (4) zerwanie związku między niezmiennością i koniecznością. W swej antropologii Szkot kładzie nacisk na (1) pojęcie wolnej wolijako władzy autonomicznej i zdolnej do samodeterminacji, (2) przypisuje woli racjonalność, która nie polega na zależności woli od intelektu czy wiedzy, (3) odchodzi od arystotelesowskiego eudajmonizmu. Boga traktuje jako zdolnego do poznania i miłowania jednostkowych, kontyn- gentnych bytów. W swej aksjologii podkreśla pozytywny wymiar indywidualności, wielości i nie- powtarzalnościjednostek.

The paper is devoted to the question of the sources of normativity in John Duns Scotus. Confronted with different conceptions of the sources of normativity listed by Christine M. Korsgaard, Duns Scotus’ conception turns out to be hybrid because he iterweaves realistic and voluntaristic elements. In Scotus’ ethics one can find the sources of normativity analizing: (1) subjective condition of the agent such as beeing free and rational; (2) objective foundations of moral norms such as natural law; (3) external authority of the law maker (God’s will). The following questions have been raised: “Why is the will, according to Scotus, rational?”; “What are the conditions for the exeptions of the Second Tablet Commadments ?”; “Can one call Scotus’ position a type of metaethical voluntarism or Divine Command Ethics?”. The article also highlights the varius meanings of the term “voluntarism” with reference to Scotus’ ethics.

The object of this article is the scholastic inspirations found in the metaphysical disputation De principio individui by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The purpose ofthis study was, on one hand, a reconstruction of Leibniz’s theory concerning the principle of individuation, and on the other hand, a presentation of some texts by medieval scholastic authors (Henry of Ghent, Peter of Falco, Thomas Aquinas, Aegidius of Rome, Robert Kilwardby, William of Ockham) to whose ideas Leibniz refers in the named work, even though he had, for the most part, only second-hand information concerning them. In his juvenile treatise, Leibniz states that the individuating principle has to be universal, which means relevant to all kinds of being; it has to be metaphysical in character and not merely epistemological. He regards individuality as synonymous with unity combined with difference. He resolutely takes sides with nominalism and rejects the reality of all kinds of universal beings and beings whose unity is weaker than numerical unity. As a consequence of this assumption, he rejects the conceptions in which the principle of individuation is formed by: double negation, existence or the haecceity. By contrast, he embraces the solution (close to the tradition originated by Ockham and also related to Suarez), according to which the whole entity (tota entitas) of an individual thing is the principle of individuation. In effect, for Leibniz, any real thing is simply singular, which comes down to the thesis that a thing is singular owing to its own metaphysical subcomponents, which are singular by themselves.

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie i analiza kształtowania się pojęcia woli w starożytnej filozofii pogańskiej. W kontekście poglądów Sokratesa, Platona i Arystotelesa autor przedstawia wiele greckich intuicji dotyczących psychologii aktów moralnych i ludzkiego działania. Po pierwsze artykuł przedstawia doktrynę intelektualizmu etycznego, przypisywaną Sokratesowi, według której kognitywne elementy są głównym motywem naszych działań. Z tego powodu trudno znaleźć pojęcie wolnej woli w sokratejskiej antropologii. Po drugie artykuł prezentuje interpretację platońskiej antropologii, według której sferę thymos można nazwać proto-wolą. Ostatecznie autor ukazuje, jak trudno jest znaleźć pojęcie woli w arystotelesowskiej etyce i antropologii, pomimo że Arystoteles bardzo szczegółowo wyjaśniał relacje między przekonaniami, pragnieniami i działaniem. Ani pro- airesis, ani boulesis nie mogą pełnić funkcji woli, szczególnie gdy wola ma być władzą, która pragnie, może wybierać ijest samodeterminującą się władzą.

INDIVIDUUM AND INDIVIDUALITY The analysis of some John Duns Scotus’ works This book concerns the problem of the principle of individuation and related issues in the following works of John Duns Scotus: De Principio Individuationis (Lectura in librum secundum Sententiarum, distinctio 3, pars I, q. 1-7), De Principio Individuationis (Ordinatio II, distinctio 3, pars I, q. 1-7) and Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis (liber VII, q. 13, 14 i 15). Some remarks were made about Scotus’ position on the indivituation of the human soul which was presented in the text: Eine Pariser Disputation vom Jahre 1306. Die Verteidigung des thomistischen Individuationsprinzips gegen Johannes Duns Scotus durch Guillelmus Petri de Godino OP (Thomas von Aquino. Interpretation und Rezeption, Studien und Texte, herausg. W.P. Eckert OP, Mainz 1974, pp. 559-608). The first chapter presents the extention of the term “individual”, the second the intention of the term “individuality” according to John Duns Scotus. The third shows Scotus' critique of the negative and the positive theories of individuation and presents the way and reasons why Scotus refutes these solutions. The fourth chapter is an attempt to clarify Scotus' own views on the ontological status of: common nature, individual entity, that is the principle of individuation (historically known as haecceitas), and the relation between them. The last chapter is devoted to epistemological and axiological considerations. The book also contains an introduction that consists of two parts. The first one presents the evolution of the understanding of the notions “unity/plurality” and “universality/individuality” from Greek to Christian thought. The second one shows the chronological order of Scotus’ works devoted to the problem of individuation and the philosophical and theological context of this problem. The analysis of Scotus’ texts allows us to come to the following conclusions. When we try to identify the extention of “individual” we may say that Scotus adopts a kind of moderate realism. According to him, not only do individuals have a real being but also neutral natures have a kind of unity and being. When Scotus presents the necessity of reality of the neutral nature (quiddity) he uses arguments based on the analysis of our sensitive and intellectual knowledge. The arguments are based on the analysis of human knowledge and of some real relations such as singularity, identity and equality. Scotus concludes that the human mind would not grasp a singular thing in a universal manner if this thing were singular by itself. Being singular by itself would exclude the possibility of conceptual intellectual knowledge. The real relations mentioned above must have their foundation in something in reality, something that has some kind of unity; otherwise they would only be a product of our mind. This unity is real, but less than numerical and it justifies the fact that there are degrees of diversity between things. We should affirm that there is a real foundation for making comparison between two objects. This foundation is necessary for objectivity in our knowledge. The real structure (i.e. the neutral nature), causally independent of our mind is a necessary condition for the objectivity of our concepts. Because of that, our concepts are not the simple production of our mind (totum figmentum). In this way Scotus tries to explain his theory of common nature. This common nature is the foundation of our conceptual knowledge and it needs an individuating factor to become a singular thing. The theory of neutral nature allows us to understand why we perceive the real resemblance between singulars which belong to the same species. On the other hand this neutral nature is the reason why the univocal generation is possible in the physical world. The set of individuals then consists of beings which are neither neutral natures nor universals. Scotus enumerates some types of the individual beings: persons, substances and artefacts. By the way he discusses the theory of individuation of such beings as: the components of substances and the particular accidents. When we want to ask a serious question about individuation we should refute the thesis that every thing that exists is only individual. So we should refute nominalism. For the nominalist the individuation question is a pseudo-problem. Duns criticises nominalism by his theory of the neutral nature. The neutral nature (natura communis) is real but it does not have the numerical unity. Such reality is also not a universal being. We may say that individuals and real natures are real, but only the individuals exist (because they have acts of existence – esse existentiae). Moderate realism permits Scotus to ask questions about the principle of individuation as well as about the cause of universality. The first answer is the haecceity, the second one is our mind. Scotus also criticises exaggerated realism. If the neutral nature was a universal being, the same nature would be the property (as an idea) of two different individuals. Such a consequence is unacceptable. All the individuals (with the exception of God) demand the principle of individuation. Individuation is a kind of process (not a physical but metaphysical) by which the neutral nature receives the features related to individuality. Scotus refutes the theories of individuation expounded by his adversaries and, at the same time, presents his own view on the principle of individuation. The problem of individuation is a metaphysical problem, so the term 'singularity' is understood as a prima intentio not as a intentio secunda. As first intentions refer to real things, the result is that Duns Scotus searches for a real ontological cause for anything being a single entity. Thus singularity of things is not simply a product of human mind. The main goal of Scotus' discussion about the nominalist (or conceptualist) position is to show that no thing is individual by itself. Because common nature is real it needs an individuating factor to become a singular thing. This factor cannot be a twofold negation, as Henry of Ghent wanted. According to Henry of Ghent it is owing to this negation that one thing is not another thing and the same thing is not multiplied in itself. Scotus claims that a double negation only describes a situation that is a result of individuation and asks about the component that causes this negation in a singular thing. Neither the individuality is the result of the action of a natural extrinsic agent because the individuality as a perfection is connected with a substantial category and should not be based on relation. Nor can actual existence be the principle of individuation because it is outside the category of substance and an individual is fully determined as an individual regardless of its actual being. However, Scotus does not mean that individuals have acts of existence previous to their creation. He only suggests that the principle of individuation must be an element deriving from the essential, not from the existential, features of a thing. Duns Scotus uses a similar argument to refute the theory of individuation by quantity and by a set of accidents. Quantity is an accident, so it is also posterior to individuality of a substance and it is not able to cause this individuality. Adopting quantity as the principle of individuation may lead to the following surprising consequence: in a process of destruction a piece of quantity belonging to an individual "A" may become a piece of quantity of an individual "B". If the individuality of a thing depended on quantity, the individuals "A" and "B" would be the same individual, which seems to be absurd. Scotus treats matter in a similar way: it may be abstracted from things and, as such, it is common to many individuals. Furthermore, matter is indeterminate and indistinct in itself, so it cannot cause a distinction between individuals. At last the form taking as the quiddity cannot be the principle of individuation because it is the principle of similarity. Then Scotus has to ask: why the form is ¬this form. All Scotus' arguments against the mentioned views help him to define his demands on the principle of individuation and to highlight the crucial role it plays in being. First of all, the principle of individuation must be something real and positive, intrinsic to a thing and the category of substance, independent of other quidditative or existential characteristics. Such a factor must be indivisible in itself, it must possess its own perfection, and be in itself something singular, diverse and unique for each individual. It must be a component of being, in Scotus' language a formal entity, which is responsible for the final actualisation of a thing independently of a thing's act of existence. This factor has got its own real unity, a numerical one, by virtue of which it can give singularity to a thing. As a component, which is incapable of being abstracted, it does not add anything to the quidditative characteristics of a singular thing. We are not able to know this factor directly, due to the imperfection of our intellect, but we can only understand its features and functions by a philosophical analysis using the method of analogy. Sometimes Duns Scotus names this factor 'individual differentia' and emphasises that the 'nature' of this factor will become clearer when we compare the individual differentia with the specific differentia. By analogy to the function of the specific differentia, the individuating factor is added to common nature (which is responsible for specific features of a thing), to determine this nature as one single substance. Moreover, haecceity is the principle that makes a single thing incapable of division into subjective parts, so we can say that by haecceity individual is nonexemplifiable. Finally, such a principle of individuation is the principle of diversity of individuals in one species, their relative identity, incommunicability and the uniqueness of each of them. The diversity of terminology that Duns uses for the ontological status of haecceity creates difficulty when we interpret his ideas. In “Lectura” he claims that the principle of the individuation is the formal entity (formalitas). The relation between this principle and common nature is the same as the relation between the act and the potency. Next Scotus in “Ordinatio”, probably because of his theory of the absolutely simple notions, claims that the principle of the individuation is the ultimate reality of the form (ultima realitas formae). The relation between such a principle of individuation and common nature is the same as that between the quasi-act and the quasi-potency. Moreover, in “Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis” he points out that the principle of individuation is the individual form (forma individualis) or the individuating grade (gradus individualis). All these positions are coherent because Duns, in all his texts, claims that the principles of individuation are primary diverse (primo diversae) it means that they have nothing in common. Socrate’s haecceity and Plato’s haecceity are not of the same nature. We cannot abstract them because they are not repeatable for each individual being, so they do not have a common nature. The structure of the individual being we may characterise as follows: each individual (with the exception of God) is composed of an entity of common nature (i.e. the quiddity or the species nature) and the individuating entity. The kind of composition they make is essential unity (unum per se), so the haecceity is not an accidental form of the quiddity. Hecceity belongs to the category of substance but not to the category of any accident. In the “Lectura” and “Ordinatio” this type of unity Scotus explains by his theory of the formal distinction or the medium distinction, in his “Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis” by his theory of the unitevely contained entities (perfectiones unitive contentae). In a particular being the haecceity and the common nature are not separable even by God, so the first could not exist without the second. The analyses of Scotus’ texts led us to formulate the following definition of the principle of individuation: haecceity is not accidental, not an abstractable real entity that is the cause of non-exemplification, determination, uniquness, relative identity and perfection. Such a factor must have the features that it give to an individual, combining with common nature to create unity per se. At last Scotus says that the beauty and the order in the world lies on individuals. If this is so, individuals are the main goal and intention of God. It guarantees the perfection and superiority of individuals above universal beings.

The paper presents Suárez’s view on the individuation of beings, which he developed in his Disputatio V, De unitate individuali eiusque principio. The aim, apart from simply presenting Doctor Eximius’s thought, is also to compare his views with his scholastic predecessors. When considering the question of individuation, Suárez remained under a considerable influence of the medieval tradition, which, however, he transformed in his writings according to his own convictions. He used the language of Duns Scotus when speaking of individuation and determining it in terms of indivisibility, but rejected the idea of individuation by matter, classically attributed to the Thomistic School. Postulating the individuation principle, identified with the entity, and not with the act of existence nor the being of haecceitas, Suárez departed from non-classical interpretations of the thought of Thomas Aquinas as well as from the Scotistic solutions, and postulated a view that to some extent resembled that of Ockham and Bonaventure, although Suárez does not explicitly refer to the latter.

The paper presents John Duns Scotus’ view on the relationship between the notions of person, individual being and incommunicability. Scotus’ opinions on this matter are presented in the context of the approaches taken by Boethius and Richard of St Victor. The main conclusions of the article are as follows. According to Scotus, although individual, the nature of God is communicable. Its individuality is not the effect of a causal relation, however God is an individual being per se. Due to the communicability of God’s nature, each Person of God possesses divinity in full sense. Each God’s Person, as a person, has got two kinds of independence: actual and dispositional, hence one could say that each Person of God is necessarily independent. Individuality of a contingent being is an effect of a process of individuation, in which a neutral nature is contracted into the individual nature by the causal factor, i.e. the haecceitas. Nature as nature is communicable; however, nature which is individual is not communicable due to its individuality. Rational, created, and individual nature is the foundation of the realization of personality. A created person is independent, both in actual and dispositional sense, however, it is not necessarily independent as it has an obediental potentiality to be personified by another personhood. Separated soul (anima separata), in turn, is individual because of its haecceitas, which is the ultimate reality of the form. Because of this kind of individuality, this soul is incommunicable and it has actual independency, although it is not dispositionally independent. Thus, due to its dispositional dependency, the separated soul is not the person.

FRANCIS SUÁREZ’S VIEWS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN THE ABSOLUTE POWER OF GOD AND THE NATURAL LAW The article presents Francis Suárez’s views concerning the problem of the possibility of granting dispensation from the natural law by the absolute power of God. Suárez’s opinions on this matter were shown in his comprehensive work on the philosophy of law: De legibus ac Deo legislatore, in Book II De lege aeterna, naturali, et jure gentium, chapter XV entitled Utrum Deus dispensare possit in lege naturali etiam de absoluta potestate. Analyzing the notion of natural law Suárez accepts the Thomistic formula, according to which, the created world is a collection of things with invariable natures. These natures require us to fulfil certain moral obligations and to act in a proper manner. And for this reason, natural law, included in the Decalogue, is invariable and even God is not able to grant its dispensation. The commandments involve an intrinsic principle of justice and obligation and for this reason they are not liable to dispensation. God cannot act contrary to His own nature and His being just, so He would not order people to do something intrinsically unjust. Doctor Eximius justifies moral norms expressed in the Decalogue axiologically, not in a voluntaristic way, by referring to God’s will alone. Suárez criticises both strong theological voluntarism, attributed to Ockham, as well as weak theological voluntarism, attributed to John Duns Scotus. Keywords: FRANCIS SUÁREZ, ABSOLUTE POWER OF GOD, NATURAL LAW

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie i analiza kształtowania się pojęcia woli w starożytnej filozofii pogańskiej. W kontekście poglądów Sokratesa, Platona i Arystotelesa autor przedstawia wiele greckich intuicji dotyczących psychologii aktów moralnych i ludzkiego działania. Po pierwsze artykuł przedstawia doktrynę intelektualizmu etycznego, przypisywaną Sokratesowi, według której kognitywne elementy są głównym motywem naszych działań. Z tego powodu trudno znaleźć pojęcie wolnej woli w sokratejskiej antropologii. Po drugie artykuł prezentuje interpretację platońskiej antropologii, według której sferę thymos można nazwać proto-wolą. Ostatecznie autor ukazuje, jak trudno jest znaleźć pojęcie woli w arystotelesowskiej etyce i antropologii, pomimo że Arystoteles bardzo szczegółowo wyjaśniał relacje między przekonaniami, pragnieniami i działaniem. Ani pro- airesis, ani boulesis nie mogą pełnić funkcji woli, szczególnie gdy wola ma być władzą, która pragnie, może wybierać ijest samodeterminującą się władzą.

Both in Polish and international literature Duns Scotus’ ethical thought has had a number of conflicting interpretations. The article presents the main elements of Duns Scotus’ ethical thought. The quaestions it tries to answer are the following: a) is Scotus’ ethics voluntaristic; b) if so, what type of voluntarism can one attribute to Scotus. Finding Scotus’ ethics moderately voluntaristic I distinguish and characterize three types of voluntarism that could be attributed to Scotus: psychological voluntarism (Duns finds the will more perfect than the intellect as its acts are more perfect); theological voluntarism (Duns takes the Commandments of the first table to be obligatory in a stronger way than the Commandments of the second table), causal voluntarism (the will is taken to be the primary cause of free action, non determined even by the most perfect good).

God’s Knowledge of Future Contingents. John Duns Scotus’ Explanation The article concerns John Duns Scotus’ views on the problem of God’s knowledge of future contingents, presented by Scotus in his Lectura in librum primum Sententiarumd. 39, n. 1-93. He begins his analysis of the notion of God’s knowledge concerning the future events by criticizing two theories: first, the claim that the content of the idea of a thing, possessed by God, can include contingency of this thing; second, the claim that eternity of God is simultaneous with the flowing time as a whole, and therefore His knowledge of future contingents is the knowledge of present contingents. Duns Scotus presents his own conception in the form of the following claims: (1) there is contingency in the reality, however, we are not able to prove it; (2) the proximate second causes are not the causes of contingency in things; (3) the main cause of contingency in reality is God, precisely His will. Thus, contingency is not an imperfection because it is produced immediately by God. The article also presents Scotus’ theory of synchronic contingency. This conception explains the possibility of God’s contingent knowledge of contingent reality. Keywords: John Duns Scotus, future contingents, God’s knowledge, free will, necessity, contingency