Mary Katrina Krizan

In _On Generation and Corruption_ 1. 10 and 2. 7 Aristotle discusses mixing and mixtures. Recent scholars tend to read the two texts together, thus treating the production of homoeomers in _GC_ 2. 7 as a process of mixing the material elements. I argue that the tendency to treat homoeomers as mixtures of material elements is incorrect: _GC_ 1. 10 explains the mixing of bodies that have already been produced from the elements, whereas _GC_ 2. 7 explains the processes that produce compound bodies from simpler constituents. In _GC_ 2. 7 only the primary contraries mix in the formation of a homoeomer: material elements cannot be constituents of mixtures for theoretical and physical reasons. This makes sense of the production of homoeomers in _GC_ 2. 7 despite worries about mixing the material elements. For Aristotle, the production of homoeomers is simultaneously a process of _mixing_ the primary contraries and _generating_ the homoeomers from the destruction of material elements.

This chapter offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of elemental transformation, as presented in _On Generation and Corruption_ 2.4, arguing that traditional and revisionary interpretations of Aristotle’s simple bodies, as found particularly in the literature on prime matter, are unable to explain the structure of the elements in a way that is consistent with his account of the elemental transformations. Here an alternative model of elemental structure is presented, one that can explain the unity of Aristotle’s elements; on this alternative model, prime matter retains a role as a persisting substratum of substantial change between the elements, although it is ultimately not the matter that constitutes an element.

In Parts of Animals II 1, 646a12-24, Aristotle identifies three compositions, arranged from simple to complex. Although the passage clearly indicates that non-uniform parts are constructed from uniform parts, two ambiguities in the passage call the status of uniform compounds into question. Both ambiguities point toward divergent interpretations of (1) the relationship between uniform parts of living things and their inanimate or inorganic counterparts, and (2) the relationship of uniform compounds to their own material causes. The objective of this paper is to identify and resolve the two ambiguities in PA II 1, 646a12-24, with an eye toward the consequences for uniform materials in Aristotle’s natural philosophy. In doing so, this paper argues that for Aristotle, uniform parts of living things, while they are parts of living bodies, are structurally as well as functionally distinct from inorganic and non-functional compounds.

Aristotle’s Meteorology 4.12 is puzzling, in part because the chapter appears to extend teleological explanation to include certain inorganic materials without natural biological functions, such as metals and stone. This paper examines two attempts to explain why such materials can have functions, and shows that they are problematic. As an alternative, I argue that raw inorganic materials—as well as separated parts of organisms—can have extrinsic functions. Extrinsic functions can explain why natural inorganic materials can be sorted into natural kinds, even if their functions are ultimately related to their uses in the productive arts.

Seventeenth-century advancements in physical science are often presented as overthrowing the Aristotelian tradition; perhaps Aristotle's emphasis on formal and final causes left little room for a physical theory grounded in material and efficient causes. In Aristotle's Science of Matter and Motion, Christopher Byrne argues that Aristotle is not to blame, as he indeed possessed a unified theory of matter and motion. In contrast to traditional interpretations, which place an undue explanatory burden on formal and final causes, Byrne argues that Aristotle's theory of the physical world is dependent on the features possessed by perceptible objects, qua perceptible, as well as non-teleological changes in matter.Byrne's...

In On Generation and Corruption 1. 10 and 2. 7 Aristotle discusses mixing and mixtures. Recent scholars tend to read the two texts together, thus treating the production of homoeomers in GC 2. 7 as a process of mixing the material elements. I argue that the tendency to treat homoeomers as mixtures of material elements is incorrect: GC 1. 10 explains the mixing of bodies that have already been produced from the elements, whereas GC 2. 7 explains the processes that produce compound bodies from simpler constituents. In GC 2. 7 only the primary contraries mix in the formation of a homoeomer: material elements cannot be constituents of mixtures for theoretical and physical reasons. This makes sense of the production of homoeomers in GC 2. 7 despite worries about mixing the material elements. For Aristotle, the production of homoeomers is simultaneously a process of mixing the primary contraries and generating the homoeomers from the destruction of material elements.

In The Powers of Aristotle’s Soul, Thomas Kjeller Johansen offers a fresh treatment of Aristotle’s De Anima, showing that Aristotle can successfully explain the cause of life and activities of living things by appealing to a minimal number of definitionally independent capacities, in much the way that a faculty psychologist would. Johansen situates Aristotle’s account of the soul within the framework of his natural philosophy, arguing that the definitional independence of the soul’s capacities does not conflict with the internal unity of the soul. In doing so, he offers explanations of the further abilities and capacities of the soul, including phantasia and locomotion.In the first eight chapters of the book ..

according to a certain interpretative tradition, Aristotle is committed to prime matter—an indefinite, indeterminate, and unknowable material substratum that exists as pure potentiality and underlies, among other features, the elements and their mutual transformations.1 This interpretative tradition has come under attack from various sources; among such sources are those who wish to deny Aristotle’s commitment to a material substratum that is ontologically more basic than the elements, and who instead affirm the conclusion that Aristotle’s account of nature and change does not require prime matter.2A different objection to the interpretative tradition is voiced by those who wish to maintain Aristotle’s commitment...