•  2348
    Beauty, odds, and credence
    Philosophical Studies 176 (5): 1247-1261. 2019.
    This paper considers fair betting odds for certain bets that might be placed in the situation discussed in the so-called Sleeping Beauty Problem. This paper examines what Thirders, Halfers, and Double Halfers must say about the odds as determined by various decision theoretic approaches and argues that Thirders and Halfers have difficulties formulating plausible and coherent positions concerning the relevant betting odds. Double Halfers do not face this problem and that is an important considera…Read more
  •  52
    A Neglected Way of Begging the Question
    with Peter Kung
    American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3): 287. 2010.
    Some arguments beg the question. Question-begging arguments are bad arguments and cannot increase the level of justification one has for the conclusion. Question-begging arguments, unlike some other bad arguments, need not suffer the problem of having unjustified premises. Even if the premises are justified and even if the premises entail the conclusion, a question-begging argument fails to have any force when it comes to increasing one's justification for the conclusion. For example, many regar…Read more
  •  453
    Taking aim at the truth
    Philosophical Studies 157 (1): 47-59. 2012.
    One prominent feature of belief is that a belief cannot be formed at will. This paper argues that the best explanation of this fact is that belief formation is a process that takes aim at the truth. Taking aim at the truth is to be understood as causal responsiveness of the processes constituting belief formation to what facilitates achieving true beliefs. The requirement for this responsiveness precludes the possibility of belief formation responding to intentions in a way that would count as f…Read more
  •  459
    A new argument for evidentialism?
    Philosophia 38 (2): 399-404. 2010.
    In his “A new argument for evidentialism” (Shah, Philos Q 56(225): 481–498, 2006 ), Nishi Shah argues that the best explanation of a feature of deliberation whether to believe that p which he calls transparency entails that only evidence can be reason to believe that p. I show that his argument fails because a crucial lemma that his argument appeals to cannot be supported without assuming evidentialism to be true in the first place.
  •  486
    Getting It Right By Accident
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1): 72-105. 2010.
  •  798
    There are three main points of the paper. 1. There are straightforward ways of manipulating expected gains and losses that result in a divergence between fair betting odds and credence. Such manipulations are familiar from tools of finance. One can easily see that the Sleeping Beauty case is structured in such a way as to result in a divergence between fair betting odds and credence. 2. The inspection of credences and betting odds in certain betting situations shows that the two main extant po…Read more
  •  663
    Rule following: A pedestrian approach
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2): 283-311. 2010.