In recent epistemology, the debate between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism about knowing-how is a central topic. A commonly acknowledged virtue of intellectualism is supposed to be its theoretical simplicity. This paper therefore evaluates the dispute by taking simplicity as the theoretical virtue. To do so, we analyse what simplicity amounts to, and we argue that two dimensions are at stake in the present assessment: how many further questions a theory must answer, and how many primiti…
Read moreIn recent epistemology, the debate between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism about knowing-how is a central topic. A commonly acknowledged virtue of intellectualism is supposed to be its theoretical simplicity. This paper therefore evaluates the dispute by taking simplicity as the theoretical virtue. To do so, we analyse what simplicity amounts to, and we argue that two dimensions are at stake in the present assessment: how many further questions a theory must answer, and how many primitive notions it must introduce. Once simplicity is understood in these terms, intellectualism does not outperform anti-intellectualism. In conclusion, we argue that it is a mistake for intellectualism to treat simplicity as a main source of its justification.
