Maşuk Şimşek

The article aims to uncover the underlying cognitive foundations of the logical and semantic paradoxes. It is divided into two sections. The first part explores the cognitive and logical dimensions to unravel the reasons behind our vulnerability to paradoxes. By focusing on two established triggers—allowing excessively large sets in a system and resorting to impredicative definitions—it is argued that Kant’s insights into reason’s pursuit of unity and an unconditioned condition shed light on paradoxes arising from treating too large multiplicities as sets. Concerning impredicative definitions, it is argued that Kant’s analysis of the qualitative negation of qualities explains why pseudo-sets resulting from such definitions are not representable thought entities. Drawing on Kantian insights, this section reinterprets Cantor’s distinction between completed sets and inconsistent multiplicities and examines two famous solutions: Zermelo’s axiom schema of separation and von Neumann’s nonset class V. The second part contends that Kantian diagnoses are relevant to both logical and semantic paradoxes, elucidating the structures of sample paradoxes for each type. The Burali-Forti paradox and Russell’s paradox are examined as logical paradoxes, which result in pseudo-sets, illustrating Kant’s concept of nihil negativum—the empty object without a concept. The semantic paradoxes considered are Grelling’s and Berry’s paradoxes, whereby how self-reference and the use of nonapplicable predicates contribute to their paradoxical nature are explained. The study concludes by asserting that while current solutions effectively address paradoxes, additional support is needed in their cognitive dimensions, or areas where Kant’s epistemology provides profound insights.

Leibniz argues that there must be a fundamental level of simple substances because composites borrow their reality from their constituents and not all reality can be borrowed. I contend that the underlying logic of this ‘borrowed reality argument’ has been misunderstood, particularly the rationale for the key premise that not all reality can be borrowed. Contrary to what has been suggested, the rationale turns neither on the alleged viciousness of an unending regress of reality borrowers nor on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, but on the idea that composites are phenomena and thus can be real only insofar as they have a foundation in substances, from which they directly ‘borrow’ their reality. The claim that composites are phenomena rests in turn on Leibniz's conceptualism about relations. So understood, what initially looked like a disappointingly simple argument for simples turns out to be a rather rich and sophisticated one.

The scientific successes of the last 400 years strongly suggest a view on which things are organized into layers, with phenomena in higher layers dependent on and determined by what goes on below. Philosophers have recently explored the idea that we can make sense of this idea by appeal to a relation called grounding. This book develops the rudiments of a theory of grounding, and applies that theory to questions of independent interest. The theorizing consists in saying in more detail what grounding is and how it relates to explanations of the relevant sort, discussing objections to the deployment of a notion of grounding, and drawing points of contrast between a grounding-centered approach to relative fundamentality and other approaches in the literature. The book then turns to a demonstration of how this theorizing bears fruit in the investigation of other interesting questions. The applications are to central questions concerning (i) how to distinguish between truths that say how objective reality is in itself, quite independently of us, and truths that do not; (ii) the nature of truth; and (iii) the relation between fundamental physical facts and the rich panoply of other facts that depend on and are determined by them, including facts concerning our own doings. The aim is to advance our understanding of one of the deepest and thorniest questions which the stunning scientific achievements of the last 400 years pose: how higher-level phenomena, including ourselves, fit into an ultimately physical world.

This paper offers a modification of Fabrice Correia’s and Alexander Skiles’ (Grounding, Essence, and Identity) definition of grounding in terms of generalized identity that extends it to zero-grounding. The definition promises (1) to improve our understanding of zero-grounding by capturing it within the framework of generalized identity, and (2) to unlock the theoretical potential of zero-grounding for Correia’s and Skiles’ account. The latter is demonstrated by arguing that the definition allows an essentialist theory of modality based on Correia’s and Skiles’ account to answer a recent explanatory challenge by Jessica Leech (From Essence to Necessity via Identity) by combining the following two ideas: (1) Some necessities are grounded in truths about zero-grounding, and (2) at least some identity-propositions are zero-grounded. Finally, some advantages of the zero-grounding approach over Correia’s and Skiles’ recent definition of necessity in terms of generalized identity and logical consequence are argued for.

An important question for the causal modeling approach is how to integrate non‐causal dependence relations such as asymmetric supervenience into the approach. The most prominent proposal to that effect (due to Gebharter) is to treat those dependence relationships as formally analogous to causal relationships. We argue that this proposal neglects some crucial differences between causal and non‐causal dependencies, and that in the context of causal modeling non‐causal dependence relationships should be represented as mutual dependence relationships. We develop a new kind of model – “hybrid models” ‐ based on this suggestion, and formulate a set of axioms for those models. Our formalism has important implications for Kim's exclusion problem: whereas Gebharter's framework vindicates Kim's causal exclusion objection against nonreductive physicalism, our framework has no such implication, and can help non‐reductive physicalists vindicate the efficacy of high‐level properties. A further benefit of our formalism is that it yields a natural and plausible way of thinking about interventions in multi‐level contexts.

Penrose's conformal cyclic cosmology describes the cosmos as a collection of successive universes, the so-called aeons. The beginning and ending of our universe are directly connected to two other, anterior and posterior, universes. Penrose considers but rules out a different interpretation of conformal cyclic cosmology: that the beginning of our universe is connected to its own end in a cosmic loop. The paper argues that the view, aeon monism, should be regarded as a natural interpretation of conformal cyclic cosmology and discusses its implications for the concept of eternal return in light of the most popular metaphysics of time.