Matej Cibik

The contemporary public sphere is full of fantasies about the good old days when “men were men and women were women” and “the world made sense.” And while it is easy to discard these proclamations as empty nostalgia, the motivations and underlying normative facts behind them not only are philosophically complex but also help explain the broader social importance and political implications of longing for the past. This paper aims to analyze the phenomenon of nostalgia from the perspective of the recent debate on moral change. The main ambition is to explain how changing moral frameworks may lead to a crisis of intelligibility among sections of the population who, for different reasons and to differing degrees, have not adopted the prevailing moral outlook and have been “left behind” by the evolution of shared beliefs. We use two main models of moral change. One is derived from Alasdair MacIntyre’s theoretical opus and uses his notion of “practice” as an evolving normative system of rules and beliefs. The second uses Michael Freeden’s morphological analysis, showing how the relationships between “core” and “peripheral” concepts change over time in any complex set of beliefs. Both theories are capable of explaining how, on an individual level, a loss of meaning can occur when a given person gets “out of sync” with broader social-normative developments. This theoretical model enables us to analyze both the ramifications of nostalgia and the problems and dangers associated with it when it becomes widespread.

This paper is guided by two research hypotheses: (1) In contemporary public discourse, many of the most urgent political problems are predominantly framed and understood in moral terms; (2) this shift in framing has far-reaching consequences, impeding our understanding of the underlying problems and their eventual solution. The two hypotheses are demonstrated using multiple examples, with the fight against climate change serving as the main case study. The moral framing (thinking in terms of individual actions, duties and obligations, blame and personal responsibility) is shown to crowd out political considerations (focused on institutions and policy), even when such moral considerations are either out of place or immaterial. Consequently, individual actions and responsibility are shown to be overemphasized in contemporary public discourse to such an extent that the viable political solutions are often discounted or overlooked. The context of the argument offered here is provided by the realism-moralism debate on the distinction between morality and politics. The ambition of the paper is to show that, regardless of their possible deeper distinction (the “distinctively political normativity”), there is a strong pragmatic case for carefully distinguishing between ethical and political theorizing. Morality and politics provide different frames, distinct interpretive frameworks that consequently give rise to contrasting solutions. Therefore, they need to be kept apart.

Though historically important, the notion of tacit consent plays little role in contemporary discussions of political legitimacy. The idea, in fact, is often dismissed as obviously implausible. The ambition of this paper is to challenge this assumption and show that tacit consent can become a key ingredient in a theory of legitimacy. Instead of defining tacit consent through residence (where, according to John Locke or Plato's Socrates, staying in the country amounts to tacitly consenting to its system of rule), the paper explores a different strategy, delimiting tacit consent as an absence of active dissent. The basic idea starts from the fact that widespread anti-government protests and demonstrations always carry a potent delegitimating force. Political legitimacy is therefore never permanent and unchangeable, regardless of the nature of the regime, and can be undermined at all times by active dissent from the population. Having established the relationship between dissent and delegitimation of political power, even the inverted, stronger claim is defended: the absence of active dissent (i.e., tacit consent) can, under certain circumstances, serve to legitimize political power. The paper sets up and defends several conditions that need to be met for the right normative mandate to be created by the population tacitly accepting the existing power arrangements. If those are fulfilled (especially when full freedom of expression and information is granted), tacit consent can become a vital element of political legitimacy.

The paper examines the complex relation between anti-democratic forces (“the extremists”) and the broader liberal-democratic institutional environment. The task of containing extremists is analysed both from a theoretical standpoint and in terms of its practical feasibility. I argue that the realities of political communication and the character of political argumentation make containing extremism in practice a much more daunting proposition than is usually understood in the literature. Insights from political philosophy, political science and communication theory are brought together to press these points. As a result, extremists often cannot be stopped from running for office even if the state possesses tools to ban extremist parties. Moreover, once extremist politicians become members of legislative bodies, several democratic and procedural considerations start to apply to them so that it becomes difficult to limit their influence. Their elevated status (given their positions as legitimate representatives of the people, together with the increased media and argumentative platform they gain) complicates attempts at stopping the proliferation of their views. The last part of the paper briefly sketches possible (remnants of) a strategy of containment, arguing that only a combination of informal sanctions can be (partially) successful, including deplatforming, refusal to engage with them, and a pariah status in the legislative assembly.

The popularity of conspiracy theories poses a clear challenge for contemporary liberal democracies. Conspiracy theories undermine rational debate, spread dangerous falsehoods and threaten social cohesion. However, any possible public policy response, which would try to contain their spread, needs to respect the liberal commitment to protect pluralism and free speech. A successful justification of such a policy must therefore: 1) clearly identify the problematic class of conspiracy theories; and 2) clarify the grounds on which the state is justified in acting against them. This article argues that the prevailing epistemic approaches to conspiracy theorizing cannot fulfil these criteria. Defining conspiracy theories by their flaws in reasoning, questionable coherence or factual mistakes can neither sharply distinguish problematic conspiracy theories from other, non-problematic worldviews nor justify state action. Thus, we propose to understand conspiracy theories through their ethical unreasonableness. We hold that containment of conspiracy theories is justifiable insofar as they undermine the liberal-democratic ideals of mutual respect, freedom and equality. We then show that such ‘ethical’ criteria for conspiracy theories can be sufficiently robust and clear-cut so that they can serve as a useful guide for public policy.

Tattoos are widely regarded as morally neutral, and the decision to have them as carrying no ethical implications. The aim of this paper is to question this assumption. I argue that decisions to have tattoos involve risks that are not merely prudential—they are normative. The argument starts with a thesis that the power we presently have over our lives is constrained by the need to respect our future selves. If we make a discretionary choice that disregards our future interests and preferences, then, under certain circumstances, we can be morally to blame. I argue that certain decisions to get tattoos fit this description. Therefore, getting some tattoos makes us blameworthy.

Ever since the publication of Scanlon’s Promises and Practices and What We Owe to Each Other, expectations have become an important topic within discussions on promises. However, confining the role of expectations to promises does not do justice to their importance in creating obligations more generally. This paper argues that expectations are one of the major sources of obligations created within our personal relationships. What we owe to our friends, partners, or siblings very often follows neither from the duties associated with the given role, nor from our explicit promises, commitments, declarations, or consents. The obligations that our close relationships create often arise from a shared understanding of those relationships—and subsequent mutually acknowledged expectations.

In spite of the iron curtain looming large between western academics and their (often politically persecuted and institutionally detached) colleagues in the eastern bloc, some intellectual developments bear striking similarities. This paper analyses one of them: the conception of human rights by Ladislav Hejdánek as opposed to Kantian constructivism, which was developed in the “west” by John Rawls and others. Both Rawls and Hejdánek, who was one of the philosophical heavyweights of Czech dissent, are moved by very similar concerns: the need to ground objective values without falling into utilitarianism or some (other) form of naïve ethical objectivism. They view political values as constructed and yet objective, not given but still sound. Given the immense difference in their professional position and philosophical style, this indicates a truly interesting case of a unity of concern bridging the east and the west, even under very unfavorable political conditions.

The conflict between perfectionism and the neutrality of a liberal state is one of the burning issues of contemporary liberalism and political philosophy as a whole. The paper examines the roots of the perfectionist as well as neutralistic thinking, which are found in the philosophies of Immaneul Kant and John Rawls respectively. Through the reconsideration of the latter the character of the conflict can also be redefined. The aim of the paper is to show the basic difference between the above mentioned conceptions, which in the long run appears to be an anthropological one.