Matheus dos Reis Gomes

We aim to investigate the interdependence between language, logic, and thought in Husserl’s Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft [Formal and transcendental logic. Attempt at a critique of logical reason] (Hua XVII), focusing on three main dimensions: the function of language as a medium for the expression of rational truth, its dual ontology as a sensible and intentional phenomenon, and the complex relationship between thought and language. In the first section, we explore the notion of λόγος in Husserlian thought, highlighting language as a vehicle for expressing rational truth, contrasting formal logic with the logic of thought. In the second section, we analyze the dual ontology of language, arguing that it exceeds its acoustic or graphic materiality, maintaining a constancy of meaning that transcends its empirical variations. In the third section, we examine the relationship between thought and language, emphasizing intentionality as a central component in the constitution of meaning. We conclude that language is fundamental in the formation of knowledge and reality, as it operates as an ideal and universal structure that, beyond mere communication, shapes the contents of thought and spiritual life, revealing its epistemological and constitutive role in human experience.

Neste artigo, buscamos descrever o papel crucial da hipótese dos marcadores somáticos (HMS) na interação entre o que denominamos de ‘imperativo emocional’ e a ingerência da razão durante o processo de tomada de decisão na obra Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, de António Damásio. Primeiramente, examinamos a interação entre raciocínio, emoções e ação humana, com ênfase nos processos cognitivos subjacentes à tomada de decisão. Em seguida, exploramos a influência dos fatores emocionais e biológicos na HMS, indo além da análise de custo-benefício, destacando a relevância da memória e das representações mentais no processo decisório. Posteriormente, abordamos a influência da HMS, emoções e sentimentos em decisões, especialmente em cenários de risco e recompensa imediata, enfatizando a necessidade de considerar implicações imediatas e futuras. A seguir, investigamos os marcadores somáticos em termos neurais, discutindo se são inatos ou adquiridos e sua influência no comportamento social e em lesões cerebrais. Por fim, analisamos a relação entre processos cerebrais, como os córtices pré-frontais, e a interpretação de sensações corporais, respostas emocionais e tomada de decisões, acentuando a importância dessas regiões na assimilação dos marcadores somáticos e sua influência em pensamentos, percepções e comportamentos. Concluímos que a HMS é vista como um mecanismo biológico que integra informações emocionais e cognitivas, moldando avaliações e escolhas.

This article investigates the centrality of infantile sexuality in the Freudian model of psychic constitution and libidinal economy. The thesis maintains that the fragmentation and plasticity of the ‘instinct’ (Trieb), articulated by ‘primal repression’ (Ursprüngliche Verdrängung), establish an unconscious logic grounded in the dialectic of desire and prohibition. Rejecting empirical-biological accounts, the analysis emphasizes the metapsychological function of sexuality as structuring principle. The instinct is construed as a decentered force operating through detours, substitutions, and condensations, dismantling the genital norm and reinscribing perversion not as pathology, but as structural operator of desire. Fetishism and castration anxiety are treated as expressions of the constitutive negativity of sexuality, with ‘disavowal’ (Verleugnung) sustaining the perceptual split vis-à-vis the absence of the phallus. Pubertal reorganization is conceived not as rupture but as continuous transformation, displacing sexual difference from anatomy to the symbolic. Libido retains its infantile matrix, reshaping erogenous zones within a psychosomatic economy. The Freudian theory thus inscribes sexuality as foundational structure of subjectivity and its libidinal organization.

In this article, we aim to describe the crucial role of the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) in the interaction between what we term the ‘emotional imperative’ and the interference of reason during the decision-making process in António Damásio’s work Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. Firstly, we examine the interaction between reasoning, emotions, and human action, with emphasis on the cognitive processes underlying decisionmaking. Next, we explore the influence of emotional and biological factors on SMH, going beyond cost-benefit analysis, highlighting the relevance of memory and mental representations in the decision-making process. Subsequently, we address the influence of SMH, emotions, and feelings on decisions, especially in scenarios of risk and immediate reward, emphasizing the need to consider immediate and future implications. Following this, we investigate somatic markers in neural terms, discussing whether they are innate or acquired and their influence on social behavior and brain lesions. Finally, we analyze the relationship between brain processes, such as the prefrontal cortices, and the interpretation of bodily sensations, emotional responses, and decisionmaking, accentuating the importance of these regions in assimilating somatic markers and their influence on thoughts, perceptions, and behaviors. We conclude that SMH is seen as a biological mechanism that integrates emotional and cognitive information, shaping evaluations and choices.

De acordo com uma antropologia filosófica orientada fenomenologicamente, a tese aqui defendida é que a intersubjetividade constitui a raiz originária da subjetividade pessoal. É demonstrado através da análise da vivência empática, elaborada por Edmund Husserl e Edith Stein, que permite reconhecer o fundamento fenomenológico-ontológico da pessoa do outro conectado à identificação da estrutura essencial do ser humano, tripartida em: corpo vivo (Leib, dimensão físico-psíquica), alma (Seele) e espírito (Geist). Dessa forma, o problema atual da mente e do corpo é reconduzido em direção às suas raízes metafísicas originais e à expressão tradicional mente-corpo. Por fim, os resultados da análise fenomenológica da empatia são confrontados com a recente descoberta dos “neurônios espelho” em um diálogo frutífero entre ciência e filosofia que preserva ambas as condições epistemológicas e seus respectivos critérios metodológicos, superando o binômio redutivo mente-corpo e compreendendo a verdade da pessoa humana.

The present work consists, in summary, to analyze the Kantian conceptions about the epistemology and, more precisely, of the constitution of the thesis on the criticism and, not less important, of the formulation of the conceptual structure "transcendental apperception", that is, of the ―I think‖ in philosophy. Front to the problems of the modern philosophy, to relate the criticism in Kant to the coming of the German idealism requests to bring to the surface one of the main philosophers, so much of the idealism in itself, but a successor, par excellence, of the neokantians, to know: Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762 -1814). Therefore, for this approach tends the transformation of the philosophy the Kant under the reading of Fichte concerning the reformulation of the concept of the "transcendental apperception, in other words, of the me leaning, for the formulation of the ― "pure I" in Fichte.

Dialogical Investigation (D.I.) is a teaching methodology that addresses a phenomenological epistemology such as education for the student's education and learning in relation to a learning and the accomplishment of a teaching activity the existence. Created by the philosopher and teacher of the Federal University of Juiz de Fora (UFJF), Juarez Gomes Sofiste, this article analyzes the method of D.I. with a premise of the educational methodological response exposed to the problematic of mechanistic teaching of learning in the contemporaneity, in concluding that an organization chosen and philosophically presented for education through the D.I. What is important is that the paradigm shifts are not true in the target teaching, in the context of a new perspective, from the perspective of the philosophy of education and, in a synthetic way, are brought to a totally "libertarian", pedagogical and phenomenological concept in the teaching of philosophy.

Bringing to the fore the situation of religion in the face of the psychoanalytic perspective, it reminds us — within the advent of the psychology of religion in the nineteenth century — to a Weltanschauung on the sacred and, at the same time, to the religious phenomenon itself in its contemporary complexity. On the religious phenomenon, Sigmund Freud directs his gaze to one of the most important criticisms of religion; according to the Viennese, religion is an ingrained illusion of sentimentality that the individual suffers from the cosmos. This article presents the Freudian perspective of religion, with the understanding of God according to the philosophical influence of Ludwig Feuerbach — who points to theology as an anthropology and formulates the concept of projection in his work.

In this article, I intend to demonstrate the fundamental recognition of Husserlian phenomenology in the face of the tactile dimension in relation to the differentiation of the visual dimension in the constitution of the external object body [Körper-Objekts] in Ideas II. First, I try to present the relationship between the body and localized sensations [lokalisierter Empfindungen]. Secondly, I seek to define the constitution of the body in the tactile scope in the face of the visible dimension, in order to demonstrate the importance of primary constitutions in the face of intentional consciousness in view of the conclusion that the constitution of the external object body in Ideas II occurs in the tactile dimension and not in the visible dimension.

During the First World War in 1915, Sigmund Freud wrote Vergänglichkeit, a short essaythat reflects, among other themes, on the ephemerality of life and beauty. Originally published in German, the essay explores how the awareness of transitoriness influences the human psyche through a dialogue between Freud, a young poet, and a melancholicfriend. Freud discusses the fragility of beauty, the appreciation of transitoriness, mourning, libido, the impact of war, and the renewal of meaning in the face of the inevitability of decline.

In this article, we present the structuring of the unity of the stream of consciousness (Bewusstseinsfluss) and its continuum through the analysis of retentive consciousness, longitudinal intentionality (Längsintentionalität), and temporal perception in Husserl, based on § 39 of the Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Internal Time-Consciousness. Our hypothesis is that these elements play fundamental roles in the ordering of temporal conscious experience, since retentive consciousness, as delineated by Husserl, not only retains the past but actively constitutes the continuous unity of the stream of consciousness, seamlessly integrating past experiences with the temporal now (Jetzt). This capacity is facilitated by the double intentionality of retention (doppelte Intentionalität der Retention), which allows consciousness to structure its temporal experiences in a continuous and cohesive manner. Additionally, longitudinal intentionality operates in the transformation of proto-sensations into more complex retentional structures, contributing decisively to the structuring of the temporal continuity of conscious experience. We also explore temporal perception in Husserlian phenomenology, highlighting how the interaction between the constitution of immanent (transcendental) time and the quasi-temporal insertion (quasi-zeitlich) of the phases of the stream of consciousness promotes a unified and continuous perception of time. We argue that this dynamic explains temporality in human experience and underscores the importance of the self-appearance (Selbsterscheinung) of the stream of consciousness for the cohesion of conscious life in Husserlian phenomenology.