Matheus Iglessias Mazzochi

This chapter examines Anne Conway’s ‘argument from love’ in her 'Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy'. This argument, supported by a further argument, the ‘argument from pain’, undermines the dualist dichotomy between mind and matter by appealing to a vitalist similarity principle. The goal is two-fold: first, to contribute to a close systematic reconstruction and analysis of Conway’s arguments, which so far is largely lacking in the literature; second, to establish that these arguments are richer and more compelling than commentators have thought. The chapter shows that Conway’s case against the dualist poses a considerable challenge to the dualisms of Henry More and Descartes.

It is often said that dignity is the ground of human rights. But what grounds dignity? According to proponents of the metaphysical view, dignity is grounded in our rational capacities, our sense of justice, or a disjunctive list of valuable capacities. According to a rival political view, dignity is grounded in our evolving social practice of treating one another as equals or the simple political commitment to act as if we were one another’s equals. I argue that both views face serious objections. I then consider a recent alternative proposal, the relational view, and argue that we should reject it because it fails to offer an answer to the question: what grounds dignity? In its place, I argue that we should adopt a different sort of metaphysical view—call it Naïve Humanism—which says that being loveable necessarily entails being valuable, and that all human beings are fit to love in a distinctive sort of way and are thus essentially valuable in a distinctive sort of way, possessing a dignity. I conclude by considering a methodological disagreement and suggest a way forward for all participants to this debate.