It is often said that dignity is the ground of human rights. But what grounds dignity? According to proponents of the metaphysical view, dignity is grounded in our rational capacities, our sense of justice, or a disjunctive list of valuable capacities. According to a rival political view, dignity is grounded in our evolving social practice of treating one another as equals or the simple political commitment to act as if we were one another’s equals. I argue that both views face serious objection…
Read moreIt is often said that dignity is the ground of human rights. But what grounds dignity? According to proponents of the metaphysical view, dignity is grounded in our rational capacities, our sense of justice, or a disjunctive list of valuable capacities. According to a rival political view, dignity is grounded in our evolving social practice of treating one another as equals or the simple political commitment to act as if we were one another’s equals. I argue that both views face serious objections. I then consider a recent alternative proposal, the relational view, and argue that we should reject it because it fails to offer an answer to the question: what grounds dignity? In its place, I argue that we should adopt a different sort of metaphysical view—call it Naïve Humanism—which says that being loveable necessarily entails being valuable, and that all human beings are fit to love in a distinctive sort of way and are thus essentially valuable in a distinctive sort of way, possessing a dignity. I conclude by considering a methodological disagreement and suggest a way forward for all participants to this debate.
