Matheus Rui

O objetivo desse artigo será apresentar parte do debate atual sobre o papel da intenção na teoria da ação e na racionalidade prática. Para isso, iniciarei com a perspectiva do autor responsável pela retomada da filosofia da ação na contemporaneidade, Donald Davidson. Após oferecer uma breve exposição da concepção davidsoniana da intenção e da ação, e sobre os modelos teóricos “crença-desejo” e “crença-desejo-intenção” na filosofia da ação, pretendo desenvolver algumas considerações sobre o aspecto normativo da racionalidade prática (no sentido em que envolve “razões para”) e o papel que a intenção tem nesse processo. Para isso, apresento o modo como Michael Bratman (1987) desenvolve uma linha de argumentação a favor de um tipo de função que a intenção pode desempenhar como input no raciocínio prático, argumentando em prol de um papel genuíno para a intenção em uma concepção de racionalidade prática. Por fim, apresento alguns desdobramentos da discussão sobre o modelo crença-desejo versus o modelo crença-desejo-intenção como propostas conflitantes para a explicação da racionalidade prática.AbstractThis paper aims to present part of the current debate about the role of intention in action theory and practical rationality. For this, I begin with the perspective of the philosopher responsible for the resumption of contemporary philosophy of action, Donald Davidson. After a brief exposition of davidsonian conception of intention and action, and of “belief-desire” and “belief-desire-intention” theoretical models in philosophy of action, I intend to develop some considerations about the normative aspect of practical rationality (in the sense that it involves “reasons for”) and the role of intention in that process. For this, I present the way that Michael Bratman (1987) develops a line of argumentation in favor of a certain type of role intention can play as input in practical reasoning, arguing for a genuine role for intention in a conception of practical rationality. Finally, I present some outspread on belief-desire versus belief-desire-intention discussion, as competing proposals for practical rationality explanation.

The aim of this paper is to delve into the epistemological challenge surrounding the qualitative and quantitative aspects of belief and credence through a decision-theoretic framework: belief emerges as a cognitive process balancing the urge for information and the fear of error. The first part is primarily historical, and delves into the philosophy of science and its concern about the acceptance of probabilistic hypothesis. In the second part, the focus shifts from the philosophy of science to contemporary epistemology, specifically the rationality of belief and credence. The main outcome of this paper lies in highlighting how the decision-theoretic approach illuminates the nature of belief rationality, exploring the connection between belief and credence, the context-dependent nature of belief, and the significance of deductive closure as rational requirements.

It is certainly well accepted that formal models play a key role in scientific job. Its use goes from natural sciences like physics and even to social sciences like economics and politics. Using mathematics allows the researcher to consider more complicated scenarios involving several variables. Some models are developed to make predictions, others to describe a phenomena, or just to improve the explanation of events in the world. But what has all this to do with philosophy? The aim of the present paper is to investigate debates on the role of formal models in a specific philosophical subject, precisely, the epistemology of rationality. Are we able to explain why models are needed in epistemological work? This answer will be addressed on the assumptions that epistemological theorizing is committed with normative statements. More specifically, epistemologists are concerned with normative questions about what rationality requires from epistemic agents. The first goal is to discuss some assumptions about the role of mathematical models in formal epistemology undertaking. And secondly, I will argue for the following two claims: formal models are useful tools for predicting consequences of normative assumption about what is intuitively required by rationality; and insofar rationality theory is normative in virtue of being instrumentalist and aiming at truth, formal models are means-end tools, therefore, for rationality, mathematical models are devices for maximizing truth in doxastic states.