Mathis Koschel

In this paper, a hylomorphic reading of Kant’s account of laws of nature is discussed. It is argued that existing interpretations cannot make sense of Kant’s commitment to empirical laws of nature, because they construe matters in such a way that there is an opposition between the necessity that comes with lawhood and the empiricality—and hence contingency—of empirical laws of nature. It is laid out how a hylomorphic reading does not come with said opposition and is thus a promising candidate for making sense of Kant’s commitment to empirical laws of nature. Furthermore, the distinction between two senses of necessity that are in play regarding empirical laws of nature is proposed: for one, the necessity of the causal connection and, then, the necessity of a specific law’s being a law. Clearly distinguishing these two senses of necessity removes interpretative pressure towards the existing interpretations and thus opens up the possibility of a hylomorphic reading. It is further shown how such a reading, including its connection to Kant’s account of cognitive capacities, allows one to comprehend many passages in which Kant employs hylomorphic vocabulary. Indeed, Kant is arguing in these passages for a hylomorphic account.

I address a longstanding problem in Kant scholarship: how is Kant’s use of the term ‘mechanism’ to be understood? It seems that Kant uses that term in a variety of ways, from a narrow sense (“motion communicated between matter”) to a very wide sense (“any causation that is not noumenal”). I argue that Kant has a unified conception of mechanism, where the wider senses are to be understood in light of a conception of nature according to which all of nature is purely mechanistic in the narrow sense. In contrast to his mechanistic predecessors, Kant holds that this conception of nature is an idea, an imaginary end-point of science that we need for orientation but can only approach asymptotically.

The topic of this dissertation is the concept of nature and how Kant and Hegel each conceive of it. Both agree that <nature> cannot be an empirical concept but is rather presupposed in all experience and object-related thinking. Yet, Kant holds that we can only conceive of nature as a unified whole when we conceive of it as a mechanical system. Whereas, according to Hegel, the unity of all the different kinds of natural phenomena can only be accounted for by means of his dialectical method. A crucial and novel point in my reading of Kant is that the concept of nature as a mechanical system is merely a regulative ideal, i.e., an imaginary end-point of science that we only approach asymptotically. It is this point that allows me to resolve long-standing puzzles in the scholarship regarding organisms and free will. For this point allows for a coherent reading of Kant, a reading that involves that 1) we do in fact have experience of organisms as purposive and that 2) Kant’s distinctive kind of determinism is compatible with an open future. My reading of Kant furthermore provides a uniquely suited entry-point into Hegel’s dialectical account of nature, according to which not only human beings and organisms, but even solar systems do not fit the mould of a flat-footed mechanical determinism. This allows me to show that Hegel is—in several respects—both an inheritor and radicalizer of Kant.

This essay discusses how, for Hegel, freedom can be realized in nature in a rudimentary fashion in solar systems. This solves a problem in Kant’s account of freedom, namely, the problem that Kant only gives a negative argument for why freedom is not impossible but does not give a positive account of how freedom is real. I give a novel account of Kant’s negative argument. Then, I show how, according to Hegel, solar systems can be considered as exhibiting freedom in a rudimentary fashion. Finally, I lay out how Hegel systematically develops this point about the freedom of solar systems in the ‘Mechanism’-chapter of the Science of Logic. In doing so, he uses Kant’s negative argument in a ‘purified’ form to arrive at an account of an ‘intimate token-type relation’ between the planets in a solar system and the law that governs their motion. The essay as a whole provides a concrete example of how Hegel is an inheritor and radicalizer of Kant, both with respect to freedom’s reality and with respect to philosophical method.