Matilde Liberti

Chapter I unfolds around the following question: which forms can radical moral change take? There, I explore three main conceptualizations of radical moral change: moral conversion (section 1), moral transformation (section 2) and moral progress (section 3), and analyse possible common elements, as well as points of departure. I conclude that there are some common parameters according to which different forms of radical moral change take shape. One parameter is that of abruptness/gradualness; for example, “epiphanic” moral conversions are characterized by an element of abruptness, and the same goes for “revolutionary” moral progress, while moral transformations and some forms of moral conversion unfold as gradual, step-by-step processes. Another parameter is whether the change was expected or unexpected: moral conversions are generally unexpected, “received” phenomena, while moral transformation and moral progress are generally planned processes, or at least expected. In Chapter II I provide a possible classification of radical moral change that revolves around three parameters: (i) whether the change is actively pursued or passively received, (ii) whether the change is experienced as gradual or abrupt, and (iii) whether the change is core or peripheral. I then isolate one particular form of radical moral change that I believe worth of attention, which is that of changes that are passively received, experienced as abrupt and that take place at the level of core commitments and values. These changes is what I call “Moral Paradigm Shifts.” In Chapter III I advocate for a type of neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics that can account for the possibility for people to undergo Moral Paradigm Shifts. The necessity of this move is due to the realization that, as of now, Virtue Ethics as a family of theories seems particularly inhospitable for radical moral changes that are progressive, to the extent to which they are disruptive of previous moral paradigms. I will argue that it is both possible and necessary for Virtue Ethics, specifically in its neo-Aristotelian declination, to adjust in order to make room for a type of moral change that is not only status quo reinforcing – as it is for standard moral development – but also potentially status quo disruptive – as it is for moral paradigm shifts.

Scholars assume the necessity of epistemic progress (EP) for moral progress (MP), where EP involves forming more accurate moral judgments. This is problematic, since we lack the cognitive control necessary to form accurate moral judgments (Klenk & Sauer 2021). Thus, if it is true that EP is necessary for MP, and if it is true that we are naturally bad epistemic agents, then MP is impossible. Here I consider three possible logical relations between EP and MP: (A) EP is necessary and sufficient for MP, (B) EP is necessary but not sufficient for MP, and (C) EP is neither necessary nor sufficient for MP. I argue that (A) cannot account for full MP, while (B) is a promising route if we wish to maintain both the epistemic requirement and the possibility for full MP. Finally, I argue that (C) is the only logical way to dismiss the control requirement. Drawing from Iris Murdoch, I suggest that her account of MP that just is EP is an original as well as a promising way to re-frame the debate in a way that allows to account for our natural lack of cognitive control, without it hindering the possibility of MP.

Cases of akratic behavior are generally seen as paradigmatic depictions of the knowledge-action gap (Darnell et al 2019): we know what we should do, we judge that we should do it, yet we often fail to act according to our knowledge. In recent decades attention has been given to a particular instance of akratic behavior, which is that of “inverse akrasia”, where the agent possesses faulty moral knowledge but fails to act accordingly, thus ending up doing the right thing. In particular, two literary examples are considered as exemplifying this kind of akratic situation: Huckleberry Finn (Arpaly & Schroeder 1999, Arpaly 2000, Hursthouse 1999, Kleist 2009, Holton manuscript) and Neoptolemus as understood by Aristotle (NE; Arpaly & Schroeder 1999). In this paper I will argue that those of Neoptolemus and Huck Finn are not cases of inverse akrasia (Holton manuscript) but are much better explained as instances of what Williams (1993) called “moral incapacity”. In particular, the reason why they fail to act according to their original judgments is due to a lack of motivation to act accordingly, which is grounded in their moral self-identities (Blasi 1984; Vigani 2016). The paper will unfold as follows: I will, first, argue that neither Neoptolemus nor Huck Finn show akratic behavior; thus, they cannot be legitimately labeled as “inverse akratics” (par 1.); then, I will argue that they act the way they do notwithstanding their faulty judgments because they are effectively motivated to do so. Such motivation originates in their moral self-identities and is experienced through the threat of self-betrayal (par 2); finally, I will argue that when an agent is motivated to act in a way that is integral with her moral self-identity, acting otherwise is experienced as something one cannot ultimately do; that is, as a moral incapacity (par 3). This “cannot” is neither a metaphor for an “I shouldn’t”, nor an instance of what has been recently labeled a “moral impossibility” (Caprioglio Panizza 2020, 2021), since it does not arise from the normative force of deontic judgments, and it is neither physically nor psychologically impossible for the agent to act otherwise.

Il libro di Silvia Caprioglio Panizza The Ethics of Attention. Engaging the Real with Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil (2022) ci fa innanzitutto interrogare sulle nostre modalità di interazione col mondo. Secondo l'autrice, esiste un modo di relazionarsi "bene" con la realtà, e questo modo passa inevitabilmente attraverso l'attenzione, un concetto a cui sia Simone Weil che Iris Murdoch hanno dedicato un posto d’onore all’interno delle loro riflessioni sulla morale. Il libro ha molti meriti: in primo luogo, rilancia la centralità dell'attenzione in campo morale entrando in un dialogo dinamico e affascinante con Murdoch e Weil, il quale viene arricchito ulteriormente da rimandi alla letteratura psicologica contemporanea, nonché a concetti appartenenti alla tradizione del Buddismo zen. In secondo luogo, offre un'esplorazione avvincente e scrupolosa del ruolo che l'attenzione può svolgere quando si tratta di destreggiarsi tra questioni etiche attuali e oltremodo scomode, come la maniera in cui trattiamo gli animali e i venditori ambulanti. Il fil rouge che connette i capitoli è una sorta di magnetismo della verità, della realtà così com'è indipendentemente da noi e dalle nostre preoccupazioni; nel prendere sul serio questo magnetismo, il libro di Caprioglio Panizza è allo stesso tempo stimolante dal punto di vista teorico ed estremamente pratico. Ir.

In her recent paper Virtuous Construal (2019) Vigani provides psychological support to McDowell’s silencing effect of virtue, arguing that it is through her moral outlook that the virtuous person represents the situation as an occasion for virtue only. The term “silencing” is still, however, a controversial matter, for it might lead to the conclusion that the virtuous person does not feel any sort of attachment to what is being silenced, thus suffers no genuine loss when it comes to forsaking something valuable in the face of virtue (“no-genuine loss theory”: McDowell 1998; Baxley 2007). On the other hand, if we try to argue that what is silenced does not completely cease to exist in the eyes of the virtuous, then it is not clear what the difference between virtue and self-control (Aristotle’s enkrateia, continence; NE 1150a35) amounts to. The aim of this paper is to defend the difference between virtue and continence in terms of cognition ; that is to say, to provide further support to Vigani’s argument explaining how it is possible for something to be valuable yet be silenced (thus avoiding the no-genuine loss theory) and how this possibility is precisely what marks the difference between virtue and continence. I shall articulate my defence in the following steps: (A) arguing for the compatibility between a difference in cognition and Aristotle’s distinction between the virtuous and the enkrates (sections 1 and 2), (B) arguing that the silencing effect does not imply blindness to commonly shared human values (e.g. family, relationships, survival; section 3), and (C) making sense of the difference between virtue and continence in terms of deliberation (section 4). I shall be as loyal to Aristotle as possible, grounding my argument on the following premises: (i) virtuous actions issue from a virtuous conception of a life worth living (eupraxia: NE 1139a31-b5); (ii) there is some sort of context-dependency when it comes to deliberating virtuously (NE 1112b10-20); and (iii) virtuous deliberation does not allow for the inner struggle that is proper of continent deliberation (a “harmony” between appetites and reason: NE 1151b35-1152a5; while the continent is the one who has self-control: NE 1152a25-7). If I manage in the quest, then we will have found what the continent is missing in order to become virtuous, and it shall neither look in-humane nor undesirable; just hard.