Matthew Caulfield

We build on a recent contribution to this journal by Kogelmann and Carroll (J Bus Ethics 195(1):121–132, 2024) on the ethics of pecuniary externalities, which are costs imposed on third parties mediated via the price mechanism. Where Kogelmann and Carroll countenance a number of different ways of evaluating pecuniary externalities, we focus here on one based on individuals’ claim-rights. Considering a number of cases, we argue that an approach focused primarily on individual claim-rights is inadequate to capture the wrongfulness of pecuniary and other externalities, relying in part on work by Nicolas Cornell (Yale Law J 129(7):2030–2077, 2020). We argue, rather, that the distinctively social justification of competitive markets seems analytically necessary to make sense of wrongs in market competition. Thus, we claim that even consideration of particular relational wrongs among private market actors calls for reference to some social justification for competitive markets. We apply desiderata for the development of particular conceptions of how competitive markets are socially justified, arguing a recent prominent attempt seems to have fallen short. In this vein, we also highlight the dilemma of individualism versus collectivism which different conceptions of social justification for competitive markets now seem to straddle, and which they must navigate going forward.

Building from recent criticisms that mainstream political corporate social responsibility has failed to effectively address the potential expansion of corporate influence in society, we advance a new conceptualization of corporate social responsibility inspired by U.S. federalist political theory. As federalism has served as a prevailing U.S. theory for arranging governmental political power for the advancement of the public interest, we derive from federalist principles descriptive, normative, and instrumental theoretical foundations for arranging corporate power and directing corporate social action in the pursuit of similar goals. What we call “federated corporate social responsibility” (FCSR) revives an older institutional approach to corporate responsibility, paying particular attention to the division of moral labor in society and how different corporate responsibility prescriptions stand to affect the social ecosystem of power. Federalist institutional strategies deploying separations of power and constitutions are used to develop a concept of corporate “constitutional devices,” which have promise to constrain the corporation as it fulfills its social responsibilities, even outside the ambit of a strong state and in light of barriers to constant, effective stakeholder accountability. We conclude by outlining FCSR managerial strategies, which sometimes endorse corporate social inaction in the interest of a desirable distribution of authority across society.

Business owners sometimes refuse to transact with certain customers on principle, given some normative (political, personal, moral, or religious) commitment which they hold. I call such refusals ‘conscientious refusals.’ Evaluating two possible positions on the permissibility of vendor conscientious refusals, I argue in favor of an impersonal market in which vendor conscientious refusals are generally not justified. I argue impersonal norms, which crowd out conscientious considerations, support pluralist, healthy markets from which we reap individual and communal benefits; further, impersonal markets buttress individual freedom by providing a distinctive sphere of activity characterized by norms of radical inclusivity. These considerations constitute a strong case that vendor conscientious refusals are ceteris paribus unjustified. I conclude by addressing several potential objections to this view.

A question facing nearly all private firms is whether they may keep employee pay secret. Many think it is obvious that firms are obligated to disclose a good deal of pay information once we properly appreciate the severity of pay discrimination in our economy and the autonomy-related interests that would be served by pay disclosure. This article puts forth a dissenting voice against the vast majority of recent commentary. It exploits a fissure between reasons we have to support certain coercive regulations and reasons firms have to act in the absence of such regulation. While acknowledging that we may need transparency regulations for firms that fail to act morally, it argues that otherwise moral firms need not disclose pay on the surveyed grounds.

Jeffrey Moriarty argues that unequal pay for employees who do the same work is not necessarily wrong, but can be wrong if it is discriminatory or deceptive. Moriarty does this in part by stressing that pay should be considered primarily as a price for labor and therefore that our views on price discrimination and unequal pay should mirror each other. In this critique, I argue that Moriarty fails to adequately account for the expressive functions of pay. A pluralist view of pay reveals otherwise overlooked normative concerns regarding pay and cautions against adopting too strong of an analytical connection between price discrimination and unequal pay.