Philosophers focus on when we ought to trust and distrust. The effects of being trusted or distrusted are often overlooked. When they are considered, philosophers concentrate on their rich, expressive effects. This paper shifts perspective to the simpler, practical effects of being (dis-)trusted: being trusted makes things easier; being distrusted makes things harder; and whether we are (dis-)trusted tells us something about what others think we will do. I argue that these basic features help to…
Read morePhilosophers focus on when we ought to trust and distrust. The effects of being trusted or distrusted are often overlooked. When they are considered, philosophers concentrate on their rich, expressive effects. This paper shifts perspective to the simpler, practical effects of being (dis-)trusted: being trusted makes things easier; being distrusted makes things harder; and whether we are (dis-)trusted tells us something about what others think we will do. I argue that these basic features help to shape our practical agency. I then argue that when patterns of being (dis-)trusted or trust are pervasive or systematic in a society, they can harm and wrong people and contribute to injustice by changing the opportunities open to the (dis-)trusted. I also explain how these practical effects can put us in a ‘distrust trap’, where distrust self-perpetuates. I then suggest what should be done to counter these wrongs.
