Matteo Andreozzi

The conviction underlying environmental ethics is that, just as it is possible to establish the rational foundations of an ethical system through which human beings regulate their relationships with each other, it is also possible to rationally establish an ethical system capable of regulating our relationship with nature. Such a system can also exist without being a subset of traditional morality, without depending on interhuman ethics and without representing a specific case of ethics applied to the environment. That environmental ethics, especially based on the answers it provides to its own metaethical questions, distances itself from some fundamental assumptions of traditional ethics is therefore undeniable.

Within this chapter. I will explore the concepts of formal validity and material validity, and I will use them as critical tools for evaluating the robustness and applicability of moral systems. I will use these notions to help distinguish between the internal coherence of an ethical framework and its practical feasibility in guiding human conduct. Formal validity refers to the internal logical consistency of an ethical theory. A formally valid theory is one in which the principles and normative claims are non-contradictory, logically ordered, and free from fallacious reasoning. For instance, Kantian deontology, with its emphasis on the Categorical Imperative, aims to provide a universalizable foundation for morality. Its formal validity lies in the rigorous logical structure that governs moral duties: an action is morally permissible if it can be consistently willed as a universal law. The absence of logical fallacies and the presence of conceptual coherence are essential markers of formal validity, ensuring that the theory stands resilient under rational scrutiny. However, formal validity alone is insufficient to guarantee an ethical theory’s real-world applicability. This is where material validity comes into play. Material validity concerns the practical translation of a formally valid ethical theory into concrete moral action within the complexities of human life. A materially valid theory not only sustains internal logical consistency but also offers action-guiding prescriptions that can be realistically adopted without imposing supererogatory demands on moral agents. For example, utilitarianism, while formally valid in its calculus of maximizing utility, may struggle with material validity if its demands for constant utility-maximization become excessively burdensome, requiring individuals to sacrifice their well-being beyond reasonable expectations.

In The School of Athens by Raffaello Sanzio the upper part of the fresco located in the Room of the Signature, inside the Apostolic Palaces, is occupied by an allegorical representation of philosophy. It is a female figure sitting on a marble throne with decorations taken from the ancient world: two Artemis of Ephesus and, on the armrests, a human being between two eagles. The woman is wearing a colored and decorated dress according to the four natural elements: in the brown part, representing the earth, there are plants; in the green one, representing water, there are fish; in the red one, representing fire, flames; while in the sky blue one, representing air, stars. The task of the philosophical discipline is indicated by an inscription engraved on two slabs, each of which is held by a child and symmetrically arranged on the two poles of the representation: causarum cognitio, “knowledge of causes.” The woman’s gaze, as well as that of the two children and the two Artemis of Ephesus, is directed to the left of the fresco (observer’s side), in the direction of the “causes.” On the right side, which is ideally occupied by “knowledge,” two books are instead clearly visible, held by the hypostasis of philosophy. One is aqua green in color and is placed horizontally, resting on the woman’s left leg and supported by her right hand. The book has its pages facing the viewer of the representation, and on their edge is engraved the word Naturalis. The second book, brown in color, is instead placed vertically on top of the first and is held by the left hand of philosophy. On the cover (back) we can read the inscription Moralis.

Several environmental problems are currently seriously undermining the traditional belief that the moral community should be restricted to human beings only. New scientific theories, especially in the fields of biology, ethology, and ecology, together with recent scientific discoveries demonstrating how human activities are jeopardizing ecosystem services urge for a paradigmatic change in our moral convictions. Environmental ethics has taken up the challenge and opened an extremely urgent and inspiring call for philosophical research. This is the call for extending the moral community to non-human and non-paradigmatic entities, regarding them as moral patients. The main aim of this book is to analyze the possibility and the legitimacy of a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic. In pursuing this aim, I primarily demonstrate the possibility and need to extend the status of moral patient beyond the ideal paradigmatic human being. I also provide an original categorization of several theoretical projects that have been proposed in the last few decades. Secondly, this book comprises a constructive critique of the most significant moral theories debated in the field and outlines a personal theoretical proposal for a new environmental ethic. My claim is that the refusal of ethical and ontological supremacy of human beings is not only necessary, but also sufficient to set the foundation for a formally and materially valid ethical system. Even without abandoning the most accepted forms of moral epistemology, it is nonetheless possible to admit the need to respect different kinds of non-human and non-paradigmatic moral patients.

The philosophical foundations of the veg(etari)an diet. Food choices as ethical choices Although recent decades have seen a substantial increase in talking about the moral value of nature, the discussion has not yet undermined the belief according to which we can use nature without restraint, as long as we respects other human beings. The food issue is a classic example: our very existence and survival within planet Earth implies a competition which implies our use and killing of other forms of life, not belonging to our moral community. However, is still really indisputable that only human beings, and no other non-human natural entities, are members of this community? The main aim of this paper is to explore the answers provided to this question by the best-known contemporary philosophers, who defend the need to adopt a vegetarian diet: Peter Singer and Tom Regan. The central assumption of both authors is that, even though there are undoubtedly differences between humans and other natural entities, the ethical principles that underlie relationships between human beings are based and justified on the possession of traits that are also possessed by a large part of the non-human animals. Thus, we do not have to overturn any of the assumptions of traditional ethic. In fact, we have to apply them correctly: if the ability to experience pleasure and pain and/or of being conscious have intrinsic value, as already widely supported by the Western moral tradition, then all the entities with sensitivity and/or cognition abilities have a moral status. Singer’s utilitarian ethics, however, focus on the sensitive analogies between humans and animals. Regan’s deontological ethics discuss cognitive analogies between all sentient beings. Both philosophers claim that the burden of ethically justify nutritional choices is not on veg(etari)ans, but on those whose eating habits produce the same quantity and quality of exploitation and death of non-human animals: habits that can no longer be defended by simply mentioning the pleasure (such as the good taste of meat) that some can derive from the slaughter of animals. The paper also explores critiques and alternative philosophical foundations for a less anthropomorphic, but still ethically bonding, veg(etari)anism. Contributions to debate offered by authors such as Midgley, Goopaster, Callicott, Taylor, Palmer, and Fox have indeed the merit to recognize the same moral value to different natural entities and still promote a more general veg(etarian) lifestyle which appears more aware of our being rooted in a nature made up of complex dynamic relationships whose energy flows are also food flows.

The Humiliation by Darwin. Biological Roots of Non-Anthropocentric Developments in Contemporary Environmental Ethics In a 1916 essay, the famous founder of psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud compares his theory to the discoveries of Nicolaus Copernicus and Charles Darwin, talking about three severe humiliations inflicted by scientific investigation on human narcissism. The main aim of this paper is to show how some of the most famous non-anthropocentric environmental ethics are rooted in the humiliation inflicted by Darwin further developments of his theory. The paper focuses on authors such as Aldo Leopold, John Baird Callicott, Paul Taylor, and Holmes Rolston III. Leopold and Callicott’s land ethic claims that moral community will sooner or later correspond to the entire biotic community, following a process of social-ethical evolution characterized by the gradual extension of that same moral feeling of communitarian altruism of which Darwin discusses great evolutionary advantages. Taylor brings a famous epigram wrote by Darwin – in which he recommends himself to never define “superior” or “inferior” the structure of an organism – to its extreme ethical consequences, to the point of founding a biocentric ethics articulated around the intrinsic value of every living organism. Rolston’s Earth ethic pick up a humanity “humiliated” by Darwin’s discoveries and their further developments and offer a chance to redeem itself, moving from its great uniqueness to its great moral responsibility. Through an analysis of the main thesis of the theories of the above cited authors, the paper shows how, in order to found a non-anthropocentric environmental ethics, we should not deny, but rather put in dialogue – and thus highlight – both human natures: the one of a biological organism that lives adapting to the world, and the one of a moral agent who decides how to live his life.

The main aim of this paper is to explore the legitimacy and the implications of ascribing intrinsic value to biodiversity. Several environmental problems are seriously undermining the traditional belief that the moral community should be restricted to human beings only. In this context, the notion of “biodiversity” offers an extremely urgent and inspiring call for philosophical research. Nevertheless, some environmental ethicists still claim that biodiversity has no intrinsic value. I show that the concept of “intrinsic value” has different meanings, depending on their epistemological, ontological, axiological, and normative bases. I argue that while biodiversity has no value in its own right, in itself, or for its own sake, it can be regarded as having value as such. I also claim that ascribing intrinsic value to biodiversity allows a true reconciliation between anthropocentric interests and the need to extend the moral community beyond humanity.