Matthew Adams

People value local food for various reasons, ranging from environmental sustainability to quality and taste. As a result, it is unclear whether members of the local food movement talk about and value the same thing. And, relatedly, the scope of prominent criticisms of the local food movement is unclear: do such criticisms apply to all senses of local food, or just some? We take this unclarity as an invitation to clarify what local food is, which values are associated with local food, and how consuming local food supports these values. To this end, we distinguish between six concepts of local food that are implicit in the extant umbrella term ‘local food’, each of which is associated with different values. Our non-partisan aim is to bring new clarity to debates about the value of local food. We remain neutral about whether the added clarity will ultimately help or hinder the aims of the local food movement. We also show that engineering the concept of local food has broader theoretical value, since it helps to diffuse Strawson’s challenge to the value of conceptual engineering in a novel way.

This chapter begins with a critical examination of the respective pros and cons of the various methods that have been surveyed in the preceding eight chapters. It reiterates that rather than staking out and defending a final position, the book aspires to uncover the costs and benefits of the respective methodological approaches that are surveyed. In the words of Kierkegaard, it aims to make life “harder” rather than “easier” for bioethics by uncovering some outstanding challenges. It culminates in a meta-level discussion about the real value of reflections on methodology such as those reviewed in this book. It is argued that the interesting question is not “Which method?” but, rather, “What does self-consciousness about method contribute to practical ethics?”

This chapter considers the method of reflective equilibrium, and how it has been used in the context of debates in bioethics. It uncovers the method’s origins in the work of John Rawls and explores how it came to be adopted by Beauchamp and Childress as the unifying method of bioethics. After distinguishing between narrow and wide versions of reflective equilibrium, the chapter proceeds to discuss some problems with the view. The preliminary difficulty that is raised about wide reflective equilibrium in particular is that it is too comprehensive and indeterminate to be useful in bioethics. The chapter ends by outlining deeper concerns with the view, and to what extent internal morality’s conception of “coherence” possesses justificatory force.

This chapter examines the “internal morality” approach to medicine. According to this method, a medical ethic can be derived entirely from the contemplation of medicine’s proper nature, goals, and practice. The chapter outlines the central features of the internal morality view and distinguishes between the different versions of it that have developed, such as “essentialism” and the “practical precondition account.” The chapter then gives consideration to some objections that have been leveled against the internal morality approach. The conclusion of the chapter is that, rather than rejecting the method altogether, we should revise our expectations by assigning it a role that is more modest than that of its original, overly ambitious goal of solving substantive moral problems.

This chapter examines the “classical” roots of American pragmatism, and explains the ongoing importance understanding these roots holds for contemporary bioethics. It begins by outlining some central themes from the work of John Dewey, particularly his understanding of principles. The chapter then examines the relevant aspects of Richard Rorty’s philosophy and explains the way in which Rorty was influenced by Dewey, despite parting company with him on several important issues. Both the appeal and the limitation of these two authors’ work is brought into focus, in order to prepare the way for the discussion of “freestanding” pragmatism in chapter 7.

This chapter explores “freestanding” pragmatists such as Susan Wolf and Richard Posner, who see their specific conception of the pragmatic as untethered from the classical canon of American pragmatism. The chapter explains the four central features of freestanding pragmatism: contextualism, instrumentalism, eclecticism, and theory-independence. It then outlines some concerns with the approach. First, it examines whether there is anything distinctly pragmatist about the freestanding methodology. Second, it assesses the extent to which the approach is truly novel (i.e., whether it is really distinct from the methodologies surveyed in the previous chapters).

This chapter explores the recent shift that has occurred in bioethics away from the pursuit of objectivity or truth. Instead, the emphasis has increasingly been on narrative ethics, an approach that argues for a view of ethics as being primarily local and contingent. The chapter begins by outlining the central features of narrative ethics, explaining both the conception of narrative as the grounds for moral principles and the connections between narrative ethics and postmodernism. The chapter then outlines some problems that arise for the method of narrative ethics, such as the threat of subjectivism and the dangers of fetishizing “little narratives” at the expense of broader social understanding and critique.

This chapter outlines and critically evaluates the “new casuistry” account of Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin. It begins by explaining the core elements of casuistical analyses of this kind, such as the theoretical primacy they place on actual cases as opposed to principles. In doing so, it clarifies how the “new casuistry” differs from the method of casuistry pioneers in the Middle Ages who brought abstract and universal ethico-religious precepts to bear on particular moral situations. The chapter then outlines some advantages of the method before uncovering some of its problems. In particular, problems arise from trying to separate out which cases are morally significant, and there are concerns about casuistry’s handling of the issues of indeterminacy and consensus.

This chapter is an exposition and assessment of Bernard Gert’s arguments for a conception of common morality as the keystone of ethics. It begins by outlining the moral rules, ideals, and decision procedures that Gert defines as constitutive of the content of common morality. It explains how Gert’s appeal to common morality differs from the role that it plays in the work of Beauchamp and Childress. The chapter then canvasses two objections to Gert’s position. The first raises doubts about whether his description of the content of common morality is accurate, particularly given that it is _not_ supported by any rigorous empirical evidence, and the second challenges his claim that common morality does not change over time.

This chapter provides a survey and critical evaluation of the theory of principlism, as expounded by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress in their increasingly authoritative work _The Principles of Biomedical Ethics_ (editions 1979, 1983, 1989, 1994, 2001, 2009, 2013). It explains the main elements of the theory and how Beauchamp and Childress’s conception of principlism evolved through different editions of their book, as they assimilated their responses to criticisms into an increasingly expansive account. The chapter ends with a discussion of two criticisms of principlism that remain outstanding: the first concerns the interpretation of principles and their application to actual cases, while the second questions the source and justification of principles.

Crises furnish opportunities for political change. This fact raises neglected normative questions. How should the various possible ways of taking advantage of crises be evaluated? And should such an evaluation be ‘special?’ Namely, should strategies that take advantage of crises, like deliberately playing on people’s fears or rushing through policy changes, be evaluated differently from when essentially the same strategies are used independent of any crisis? To clarify the terrain, we provide an analysis of the concept of taking advantage of a crisis. We then set out an evaluative framework that specifies the different respects in which various strategies that take advantage of crises are pro tanto good and bad. Finally, we argue that strategies that take advantage of crises are normatively special. For they are worse across certain normative dimensions – in virtue of the additional vulnerabilities that crises induce – than essentially the same strategies used independent of any crisis.

This chapter delineates two types of ideal theory that are found in Rawls’s corpus of work. The first is ideal-method theory, which is theory constructed using idealizing assumptions that do not directly correspond with the actual world. The second is ideal-content theory, namely criteria for assessing whether something is a perfectly justice institution. The chapter provides an independent justification for both types of theory, arguing that ideal-method theory is valuable within certain parameters; for instance, the idealizing assumption of strict compliance helps to clarify the distinction between distributive and retributive justice. The chapter illuminates the value of ideal-content theory by clarifying and defending Rawls’s claim that nonideal theory depends on ideal-content theory. In particular, it argues that in order to gain a systematic grasp of the more pressing problems of nonideal theory it is plausible to argue that ideal-content theory is necessary.

This chapter delineates two types of ideal theory that are found in Rawls’s corpus of work. The first is ideal-method theory, which is theory constructed using idealizing assumptions that do not directly correspond with the actual world. The second is ideal-content theory, namely criteria for assessing whether something is a perfectly justice institution. The chapter provides an independent justification for both types of theory, arguing that ideal-method theory is valuable within certain parameters; for instance, the idealizing assumption of strict compliance helps to clarify the distinction between distributive and retributive justice. The chapter illuminates the value of ideal-content theory by clarifying and defending Rawls’s claim that nonideal theory depends on ideal-content theory. In particular, it argues that in order to gain a systematic grasp of the more pressing problems of nonideal theory it is plausible to argue that ideal-content theory is necessary.

The contemporary methodological debate about justice has centered around a dispute about the value of so-called ideal theory. I argue that justice performs a social-guiding function, which explains how people should respond to their limited and fallible abilities to realize justice institutionally. My argument helps to re-orientate the contemporary methodological debate. The obvious disagreement between many prominent supporters and skeptics of ideal theory obscures the fact that they are united by a false assumption: the practical value of justice exclusively consists of its institution-guiding function. To capture the overlooked social-guiding function, a richer normative theory of justice is required; I show how such a theory can be supplied by “ideal-transitional” principles.

We argue that the future-like-ours argument against abortion rests on an important assumption. Namely, in the first trimester of an aborted pregnancy, there exists something that would have gone on to enjoy conscious mental states, had the abortion not occurred. To accommodate this assumption, we argue, a proponent of the future-like-ours argument must presuppose that there is ontic vagueness. We anticipate the objection that our argument achieves “too much” because it also applies mutatis mutandis to conscious humans. We respond by showing that an explanation can be given for why it is wrong to kill conscious humans that is independent of the underlying metaphysics. Our response brings into focus a reason why—at least in the context of an ethical argument like the future-like-ours argument—appeal to a highly controversial metaphysics is ad hoc. Such metaphysics is not necessary to explain the wrongness of killing conscious humans, only nonconscious fetuses.

I defend affirmative action on the ground that it increases certain people’s ability to exercise their basic liberties, rather than because it rectifies injustice in the narrow context of educational admission procedures. I present this justification using a Rawlsian contractualist framework to forge a “nonideal principle of justice.” Drawing on social science, I argue that this principle supports affirmative-action policies like those in the contemporary U.S., and blocks the objection that such policies are unfair. In closing, I show how my account can be used to refine some features of contemporary affirmative-action policies, and I reflect more generally on the value of nonideal principles of justice for tackling exigent topics.

Ideal theory has been extensively contested on the grounds that it is ideology: namely, that it performs the distorting social role of reifying and enforcing unjust features of the status quo. Indeed, a growing number of philosophers adopt a nonideal methodology—which dispenses with ideal theory—because of this ideology critique. I argue, however, that such philosophers are confused about the ultimate dialectical upshot of this critique even if it succeeds. I do so by constructing a parallel—equally plausible—ideology critique of nonideal methodology; specifically, I argue that capitalist and managerial social attitudes have commodified people’s conception of justice and induced suspicion of ideal theory, which is not construed as having direct practical value. Consequently, nonideal methodology performs the distorting role of reifying and enforcing the hegemonies of capitalism and managerialism. Ideal theory and nonideal methodology are, therefore, in symmetrically bad positions.

Local food is often defended on environmental grounds. However, environmental defenses of local food are flawed, and all environmental defenses are limited as they at most establish that local food is instrumentally valuable. These deficiencies motivate a different approach. By drawing on the aesthetics of engagement, a theory of environmental aesthetics, I argue that local food has an overlooked intrinsic value; it can allow people to become engaged with—and thereby aesthetically appreciate—the environment. My argument charts a comparatively neglected area of aesthetics: the aesthetics of taste and smell and, more specifically, the role that these senses play in the aesthetic appreciation of the environment.

We defend a scalar theory of the relationship between material scarcity and justice. As scarcity increases beyond a specified threshold, we argue that deontological egalitarian constraints should be gradually relaxed and consequentialist considerations should increasingly determine distributions. We construct this theory by taking a bottom-up approach that is guided by principles of medical triage. Armed with this theory, we consider the range of conditions under which justice applies. We argue that there are compelling reasons for thinking that justice applies under a far broader range of conditions than is standardly supposed, including those that could sensibly be labelled as conditions of extreme rather than moderate scarcity.

I argue that the degree to which a criminal should be punished is determined by three elements: a baseline amount that proportionally compensates the victim and an additional penalty that, first, reforms the criminal and, second, deters others from becoming unjust. My interpretation provides a solution to the interpretive puzzle that has most vexed commentators: the alleged tension between Plato's philosophical theory of punishment and the content of his penal code. I defend a two-step solution to the puzzle. First, on my interpretation, because of the broad role that deterrence must play, this alleged tension is—to a degree—merely apparent. Second, the actual tension can be explained by Plato's commitment to the rule of law, given the epistemic limitations of actual people.