Matthew Adelstein

We argue that adopting the Self-Indication Assumption (SIA)—a thesis about self-locating evidence, according to which your existence favours theories on which there are more observers who you yourself might be over theories on which there are fewer—strongly confirms the disjunction of theism, modal realism, or axiarchism. We say that if SIA is correct, your existence becomes highly surprising on garden-variety atheism. For almost certainly, if each of these views are false, only a proper subset of possible observers who you might be would exist, if any. In contrast, on some forms of theism—forms of theism on which God must create an unsurpassably good world—it’s not so unlikely God would create every possible observer, to love and/or benefit each one. Something similar is true of axiarchism, and modal realism entails that every possible observer exists. As a result, we argue, your existence strongly confirms the disjunction of maximizing theism, modal realism, or axiarchism over garden-variety atheism, conditional on SIA.

The procreation asymmetry is a widely held view in ethics, claiming that one should make existing people happy but has no reason to make happy people. Here, I shall present a new objection demonstrating from modest premises that one has a reason to take a sequence of actions that simply creates a happy person; yet this judgment in combination with plausible principles about sequences of actions entails that one has some reason to simply create a happy person. Additionally, I will argue that one's reasons to create a happy person are quite strong.

The self-indication assumption (SIA) claims that given that one exists, one should think that the universe has many people, for a universe that has more people is more likely to contain any particular person. SIA is attractive to many because it diffuses the infamous doomsday argument, and avoids the problems of its main rival, the self-sampling assumption (SSA), which instructs one to reason as if they’re randomly selected from the people in their reference class. Here, I will go further than the traditional argument for SIA from its ability to avoid the doomsday argument: I will show that any view other than SIA must accept the soundness of the doomsday argument and certain even stranger conclusions. Additionally, I’ll argue that the main objection to SIA, the presumptuous philosopher case, is unconvincing. Together then, these considerations give one a strong reason to adopt SIA.

Two individuals can both be ethical vegans but disagree on the normative basis of their moral beliefs. This article will look at the development of two competing theories that hold prominence in debates among animal advocates: utilitarianism and deontology. Next, we turn toward their divergence in epistemology, the moral status of experiences and individuals, and the limits of permissibility. Last, we unite utilitarianism and deontology by noting where they converge. This union comes from enlightenment thinking, the postulation of direct duties to animals, disapproval of factory farming conditions, and, most importantly, the goal of improving the lives of many animals.