Matthew Brewer

In the geosciences, field measurements are key sources of data, alongside more traditional laboratory experiments. Regardless of the data’s source, pursuitworthiness is arguably not just a question of the intrinsic merit of the knowledge produced, but also the value of that knowledge in light of limited resources (e.g., time, money, and labor). There is a long tradition of research on this issue in the geosciences, going back to the work of the pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. Motivated by his work as a government-funded geoscientist, Peirce developed a highly original theory of the “economy of research.” In this paper, we argue that Peirce’s views have been largely misunderstood, and offer an alternative interpretation of Peirce’s economy of research as an account of the pursuitworthiness of data. We argue that Peirce’s account is a forerunner of a current sophisticated data collection program in the geosciences, called targeted observation (or adaptive sampling), which is used to evaluate the pursuitworthiness of various possible measurements, experiments, or observations. We conclude by applying Peirce’s philosophical insights to assess the promise and limitations of targeted-observation programs in the geosciences today.

According to what I call the Probabilistic View, absence of evidence is evidence of absence when finding evidence is highly expected. However, this view fails to make sense of the practice of using absence of evidence in the paleosciences, where finding evidence is typically not highly expected. Using a case from paleogeology, I offer a novel account of when absence of evidence should be evidence of absence, which I call the Pragmatic View: Appeals to absence of evidence as evidence of absence are warranted because they offer a scaffold to investigate auxiliary hypotheses related to the hypothesis in question.