Matthew Crippen

This article examines how the same heritage or revival site can produce both welcoming and hostile atmospheres depending on the cohort, yielding selectively permeable environments that enable some groups while constraining others. Climatic volatility further shapes these encounters, as extreme weather has been shown to increase negative valence by making movement and access more difficult, especially for marginalized populations. Drawing on built-form analysis and political history-supplemented with interview data on everyday navigation and affective experiences in cities-the paper examines three cases: Cairo's Tahrir Square, revivalist university campuses and Buenos Aires women's marches. To explain why these locales produce varying atmospheres for different groups, the article draws on affordance theory-an empirically grounded account of valenced action possibilities that exist independently of any one observer yet remain harder for vulnerable populations to negotiate. These challenges often intensify around heritage and revival aesthetics, which can alienate outsiders, and are amplified by Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) elements, such as elevation changes, ornamental walls and other territorial cues. The study contributes to urban political ecology, especially scholarship on how aestheticized urban forms serve as instruments through which powerbrokers materialize dominance and produce uneven access to public venues.

This article exposes some culturally contingent foundations of self-illness ambiguity, wherein psychiatric patients struggle to distinguish their authentic selves from their diagnosed conditions and to determine which is in control. In cultures where the self is experienced as fairly fluid and situational, with its causal force downplayed, "losing control" or "not knowing who one is" may carry less significance. Clinicians, however, may accentuate self-illness ambiguity by uncritically subsuming Western ideals of selfhood, such as aspirations toward independent individualism-perhaps contributing to the pathologization of culturally unfamiliar temperaments. Cultural environments, in turn, may range from supportive to hostile depending on how specific self-construals are valued within them, selectively exacerbating distress, though psychiatric frameworks may misinterpret such outcomes as internal disorders. The article finishes by urging a reevaluation of mental illness models to better account for cultural variability in self-understandings.

Built in the 19th century as part of Cairo’s Parisian-inspired downtown and renamed from Ismailia to Tahrir Square after the 1952 Egyptian Revolution, this public space became a protest hub during and after the 2011 Arab Spring, alarming Egypt’s powerbrokers. In response, Tahrir—meaning “liberation”—was outfitted in 2015 with features promoted by the Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) model, including decorative elements that make outsiders emotionally uncomfortable. This chapter argues that CPTED adjustments created an atmosphere more threatening to Egyptians than tourists, who faced less harassment, rendering the space selectively permeable. A second claim is that this selectively hostile atmosphere was not merely a psychological projection. This aligns with Gibson’s concept of “affordances” (action possibilities) as non-subjective “values.” Just as a river is safely swimmable or not depending on a person’s skills, Tahrir had different risk-values and hence use-values for Egyptians versus tourists. One might say the space was structured by “political affordances”—normative openings and closures that implicitly segregate. Though sometimes at odds with affordance theory, enactive cognitive science helps explain how behavioral dispositions—like hesitancy—selectively enacted threatening atmospheres in Tahrir Square by making individuals more conspicuous to surveilling police.

Known as self-illness ambiguity, subjective confusion about whether patients or their mental illnesses are in control may partly stem from clinical methods mimicking medical models that diagnose illnesses (e.g. viruses) as present or not irrespective of sufferers’ life stories. Researchers accordingly propose narrative contextualization as a way of disambiguating self from illness. But what if heightened self-attention is symptomatic of mental illness? Wellbeing may then associate with a smaller ‘me’ versus ‘not-me’ divide, a position Csikszentmihalyi’s flow psychology and Dewey’s aesthetics both support. What I call aesthetic flow involves embodied, non-linguistic dramatic structure, suggesting another way to view narrativity. By lessening self-preoccupation – and perhaps illness severity – this kind of narrativity may help dissolve self-illness ambiguity. However, a perplexity remains. Aesthetic flow depends on encountering resistance, including psychological obstacles. In life, as in art, this resistance delineates and individuates. Thus, aesthetic flow might lead to a temporary loss of self, followed by its reemergence in more immersively relational forms. A second complexity is that experiences of ‘self’ vary across time, cultures, and individuals – much like concepts of ‘justice’ or ‘love.’ This fluidity makes broad generalizations about selfhood and illness problematic. My solution partly sidesteps this by downplaying the importance of self.

This article examines multicultural classrooms through the selective permeability model, which posits that individuals encounter different action possibilities or affordances in the same setting. The goal is to illuminate how educational environments may support some students while disadvantaging others, thereby causing situated cognitive harm. The article proceeds in several parts. First, it explores selective permeability in relation to what Gibson describes as “positive” and “negative” affordances, articulating how these polarities can change depending on a person’s cultural background. Second, it integrates insights from cultural psychology, such as the influence of regional geography and city design on behavior-constraining cultural norms. These norms can productively funnel actions and learning. Yet when a student’s cultural norms clash with tacit classroom prescriptions, the situation can be analogous to arriving at a rink with rollerblades only to be placed on ice: the learner confronts action limiting negative affordances and undergoes situated cognitive harm. Third, the article presents qualitative and quantitative data that clarify how culture moderates what students find helpful or hindering. Notably, incongruent norms are not always detrimental; under certain circumstances, they can serve as a catalyst for growth.

In this article, I review textual evidence demonstrating that James and Dewey incorporated Kant’s ideas, even while criticizing him. I specifically argue that the pragmatic evolution of the Kantian a priori carried out by James and Dewey is a transition from the mental to the bodily. I further argue that the parallels between pragmatists and Kant, along with the transition from the mental to bodily, relate to scientific contexts in which all developed their outlooks. Though historically grounded, my ultimate goal is to show that pragmatism and by extension Kantianism mesh with and indeed contribute to cutting edge ideas in fields ranging from neuropathology to robotics and AI to cognitive science, whether in the form of Gibsonian theory or enactivism.

This article examines epistemic impacts of social media, merging Gibson’s affordance theory with the notion of selective permeability, which holds people encounter objective differences in a setting because of their distinct capacities, only here applying the idea to online spaces. I start by circumscribing my deployment of “affordances,” taking care not to totally divorce the term from Gibson’s intent, as often happens in information technologies research. I next detail ways that selective permeability characterizes online epistemic landscapes, focusing on how factors (like culture) moderate normative standards for sharing information. This leads to a discussion about selective receptivity and blindness to information in the context of social media—a situation that amplifies political divides and renders antagonists mutually incomprehensible. This segues into my final topic: an exposition of how social media can make the offline world more selectively hostile to some. An additional proposition is that practical habits cultivated on networking apps can modulate what affordances are present in offline arenas, as opposed to just affecting which ones get noticed. Throughout, I suggest that selective permeability answers an increasingly recognized challenge: the difficulty of generalizing conclusions about one app to others and across cultures, ages, etc. Ultimately, my aim is not only to explicate how social media fragments common social knowledge but to defend selective permeability as an epistemic template for comprehending social media.

This article argues that Dewey expresses what seems to be a core enactive commitment to constructivism: that creatures do not encounter pre-existing realities but bring them out by altering their surroundings. He adds that constructivism does not obviate realism because changes, once introduced, really are there in relation to a creature’s capacities. This poses a dilemma. If enaction primarily entails altering the external milieu, then the movement repeats pragmatism, also collapsing a basis upon which many of its authors differentiate their outlooks from ecological psychology’s realism. Yet if constructive activity is largely interior, as enactivists’ language sometimes suggests, then critics may be right in saying that the movement backslides into early Modern solipsism. A broader argument is that enactivists sometimes perpetuate what James characterizes as monistic halfway empiricism. Here, the risk is that researchers hold positions not because of evidence but regardless of it, or stipulate terminological definitions that exclude opposing views ahead of time. Even physics remains ununified, and there may be room for combining antagonistic accounts of mind. Or maybe normally hostile positions like enactivism and functionalism are, with some terminological reframing, reconcilable. The article also touches on historical points, such as the fact that American philosophy and enactivism have Asian and evolutionary influences, or that they react against common schools. The purpose is to clarify the movements in question and identify where enactivists engage in something like halfway empiricism by orienting themselves against enemies based more in fiction than fact.

Did Joel do the right thing when he saved Ellie? Are those infected by the Cordyceps conscious? Are communities necessary for human survival and flourishing? Should Ellie forgive Joel? Is Abby’s revenge morally justified? Is Ellie’s? The Last of Us franchise includes two of the best video games ever created and the critically acclaimed HBO series. Renowned for brilliant gameplay and world-class narrative, The Last of Us raises timeless and enduring philosophical questions. Beautiful, thrilling, and tragic, Ellie’s story of survival is as philosophical as it is profound. The Last of Us and Philosophy brings together an international team of philosophical experts and fans exploring the timeless questions raised by the video games and the show. Drawing insights ranging from Aristotle and Abby to Buddha and Bill, this book elucidates the roles that trust, community, love, justice, and hope play in The Last of Us. Twenty-four original essays cover both The Last of Us Part I and II and the HBO series, offering accessible and nuanced philosophical analysis of Naughty Dog’s amazing world. Whether you’re a fan of the video games or of the HBO series, The Last of Us and Philosophy will take you on a philosophical journey where you look for the light.

Post-Punk and Philosophy is a collection of twenty chapters by philosophers who are also post-punk fans, discussing many different aspects of the Post-Punk phenomenon. When does simplicity become too simple? Was punk a white proletarian movement? Are the best post-punk bands really pre-punk? Does technological innovation guarantee musical or artistic innovation? Does rock have a future? Post-Punk and Philosophy is a worthy follow-up to Punk Rock and Philosophy (2022), also edited by Heter and Greene, hailed as "a really fascinating book reflecting diverse points of view: thought-provoking, intelligent, and controversial" (John Holmstrom, founding Editor-in-Chief of PUNK magazine).

Embark on a revealing philosophical journey through the universe of The Witcher “If I'm to choose between one evil and another, I'd rather not choose at all,” growls the mutant “witcher,” Geralt of Rivia. Andrzej Sapkowski's Witcher books lay bare the adventures of monster hunters like Geralt, who seek to avoid humanity's conflicts and live only for the next kill and the coin that comes with it. But Geralt's destiny is complicated by his relationship with a powerful sorceress, Yennefer of Vengerberg. When he connects with a displaced princess, Ciri, Geralt lands right in the middle of the political conflicts of the Continent, which is endangered by Nilfgaard, a domineering southern kingdom that threatens to conquer the world. Part of the Blackwell Philosophy and Pop Culture series, The Witcher and Philosophy brings on twenty-seven philosophers to test their mettle against werewolves, the bruxa, strigas, vodyanoi, and kikimora; their work addresses the phenomenally popular books, three standalone Witcher video games, and the hit Netflix streaming show. These authors pass on their fascination with all manner of horror and sorcery: the mutations that make Geralt and others witchers, the commonalities between the Continent and post-apocalyptic settings, the intricacies of political power and scandal in the world of The Witcher, and reflections of our own world's changing views on race and gender that might offer hope—or portend a grim future. Engaging and accessible, The Witcher and Philosophy considers key themes and questions such as: Who is human, and who is a monster? Can Geralt afford to stay neutral? What kind of politics do sorceresses engage in? How many universes converge on the Continent? If we stare long enough into the abyss, does it stare back into us? Silver or steel? “Destiny is just the embodiment of the soul's desire to grow,” says Jaskier the bard, proving himself to be a natural philosopher. The tales of The Witcher remind us that our lives are a play written by both choice and destiny. And it is your destiny to read and be inspired by The Witcher and Philosophy.

Though past commentators have attacked cities as corrupt, dirty places, it is almost too obvious to need stating that a sustainable future depends on them. This is because most people live in cities and because the streamlined use of urban space brings a wide range of efficiencies. Simultaneously, urban living and associated technologies may impact psychology such that people see humans and their cities as outside of nature, which has been shown to reduce concern for the wellbeing of the planet. Exploring these points in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, we speculate on psychologically fueled environmental consequences of remote technologies. One possibility is that they may diminish contact with what we colloquially call “nature,” thereby reducing concern for it. Another possibility is that remote technologies may promote personalized work rhythms, allowing people more time in the outdoors, amplifying concern for the environment. Recognizing that vulnerable segments of the population are currently excluded from this second option, we optimistically sketch scenarios in which technologies may—somewhat ironically—help humankind escape technological entrapment, freeing people from a variety of backgrounds to reconnect in caring ways with nature.

Predictive processing theorists have claimed PTSD and depression are maladaptive and epistemically distorting because they entail undesirably wide gaps between top-down models and bottom-up information inflows. Without denying this is sometimes so, the “maladaptive” label carries questionable normative assumptions. For instance, trauma survivors facing significant risk of subsequent attacks may overestimate threats to circumvent further trauma, “bringing forth” concretely safer personal spaces, to use enactive terminology, ensuring the desired gap between predicted worries and outcomes. The violation of predictive processing can go in the opposite direction too, as when depression coincides with energy-depletion, and hence objectively strenuous situations in which things look farther away because they are (accurately anticipated to be) harder to reach. These examples partly encapsulate what predictive processing theorists call “active inference,” yet with differences. In the first case, actions fruitfully obviate predictions rather than fulfilling them. In the second, mental models do not dysregulate bodily processes, making coping harder. Instead, problems (e.g., personal obstacles, gastric illness) deplete energy, eliciting a depressive and adaptive slow-down. Some predictive proponents apply correspondence criteria when alleging mismatches between internal models and the world, while incongruously asserting that the brain did not evolve to see things veridically, but to execute actions. An alternative is to adopt pluralistic, pragmatic epistemologies suited to the complexity of mind. The upshot is that mental outlooks can depart from the norm without epistemically being distorted and that mismatches between anticipatory worries and outcomes, when they actually exist, can be a measure of adaptive and epistemic success.

Selective permeability holds that people’s distinct capacities allow them to do different things in a space, making it unequally accessible. Though mainly applied to urban geography so far, we propose selective permeability as an affordance-based approach for understanding diversity in education. This has advantages. First, it avoids dismissing lower achievements as necessarily coming from “within” students, instead locating challenges in the environment. This implies that settings (not just people) need remedial attention, also raising questions about normative judgments in disability nomenclature. Second, affordances can be negotiated in numerous ways to reach a goal, analogously to how people with missing arms have learned to drive with their feet, so restrictive problem-solving methods are often counterproductive. Third, our approach illuminates how cultural factors ranging from gait styles to language and hence group coordination modulate action possibilities, so that cultural groups may encounter objectively different affordances in the same classroom. But fourth, while fit with environment allows for skill refinement, non-fit can contribute to growth situations, which suggests a degree of selective closure can be desirable. Throughout, we argue social constructs—including educational ones—are literally built or enacted barriers or openings that have reality in environments in the same way that affordances do.

Everyday (mis)uses of deepfakes define prevailing conceptualizations of what they are and the moral stakes in their deployment. But one complication in understanding deepfakes is that they are not photographic yet nonetheless manipulate lens-based recordings with the intent of mimicking photographs. The harmfulness of deepfakes, moreover, significantly depends on their potential to be mistaken for photographs and on the belief that photographs capture actual events, a tenet known as the transparency thesis, which scholars have somewhat ironically attacked by citing digital imaging techniques as counterexamples. Combining these positions, this paper sets out two core points: (1) that conceptions about the nature of photography introduce imperatives about its uses; and (2) that popular cultural understandings of photography imply normative ideas that infuse our encounters with deepfakes. Within this, I further raise the question of what moral ground deepfakes occupy that allows them to have such a potentially devastating effect. I show that answering this question involves reinstating the notion that photographs are popularly conceived of as transparent. The rejoinder to this argument, however, is that to take the sting out of deepfakes we must, once again, become skeptical of the veracity of all images, including photoreal ones. This kind of critical mindedness was warranted before the invention of photography for both pictorial imprints and written accounts from various media sources. Given this, along with the fact that photographic trickery is nothing new, deepfakes need not push us into a post-truth epistemic abyss, for they imply a decidedly old turn.