Cheryl Misak has expressed concern that Frank Ramsey’s dispositionalist theory of belief may have difficulty accommodating akrasia—the phenomenon of agents intentionally acting against their better judgement in the face of countervailing pleasures and/or pains. She also mentions that Ramsey might be able to handle akrasia with recourse to his theory of partial belief and desire. This paper develops this position, arguing that Ramsey can indeed accommodate akrasia. I demonstrate that Ramsey’s the…
Read moreCheryl Misak has expressed concern that Frank Ramsey’s dispositionalist theory of belief may have difficulty accommodating akrasia—the phenomenon of agents intentionally acting against their better judgement in the face of countervailing pleasures and/or pains. She also mentions that Ramsey might be able to handle akrasia with recourse to his theory of partial belief and desire. This paper develops this position, arguing that Ramsey can indeed accommodate akrasia. I demonstrate that Ramsey’s theory of partial beliefs and his treatment of humans as expected utility maximizers allows for cases where desire overwhelms our normative beliefs, hence producing acts of akrasia. The paper concludes with a sketch of how this account can be extended to account for enkrateia and virtue, as well as an analysis of how well the Ramseyian treatment I put forth captures the original meaning of akrasia.
