Matthew Dugandzic

There is a qualitative difference between light and grave sins, but contemporary moral theology lacks the resources for drawing the line between them. The manuals of moral theology abandoned after the Second Vatican Council offer invaluable methodological resources for dealing with this problem, but this methodology is often hard to understand, since much of its underlying theory is implicit. By comparing manuals, studying their use of words, and examining their sources, this article attempts to render their implicit theoretical backdrop explicit in order to understand the methods by which they determined whether sins were light or grave. A secondary aim of this article is to show certain casuistic categories and methods are right at home in a virtue-ethics framework.

This paper introduces a series of questions related to the ethics of brain organoid research for Catholic researchers. We aim to address the common ethical questions associated with this research, particularly in human models, as well as emerging questions about suggested future uses of organoids. This investigation may also serve as a useful reference point for universities and corporate research and development laboratories in the biotechnology space working with organoid models, as we provide a set of practical recommendations that establish a path forward for the ethical use of this new platform.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reason, Passion, and Metaphysics in Bonaventure:Against Hylomorphic EnthusiasmMatthew J. DugandzicIntroductionContemporary commentators on Aquinas's understanding of the passions all agree that reason is supposed to be the ruler of the passions, but they disagree on the character of this rule. Some would ascribe a high degree of freedom to the passions, such that, even though reason is overall the ruler of the passions, sometimes the passions are right to resist this rule.1 Others argue that the passions ought to obey reason slavishly, such that, if any passion is to be virtuous, it must result from "reason's immediate control,... [that is,] reason now commanding this or that passion."2 Many other thinkers would fall somewhere in between these two positions at various points, such that giving a full account of the range of these positions would be quite complicated, but these scholars could also be placed neatly into two categories according to how they would answer the following question: Are virtuous passions only those that arise in response to reason's immediate command, or can other passions be included, such as those that, for example, without [End Page 123] being explicitly commanded to do so by reason, prompt reason to do this or that, or even inform reason about some aspect of an object?3 Until recently, most scholars of Thomas Aquinas would have held the latter position, that the passions sometimes have some positive roles to play in the virtuous life even when they arise in the absence of an immediate command from reason.4 In recent years, however, the number of scholars who maintain the former position, holding that any passion that does not arise in response to reason's immediate command is not virtuous, has been growing.5 [End Page 124]My aim in this article is further to bolster the case of those who hold that, for Aquinas, the only passions that are virtuous are those that arise from reason's immediate command. I will do this by criticizing an argument that is commonly used by those who oppose this position, and which I refer to as "hylomorphic enthusiasm." Generally speaking, the logic of hylomorphic enthusiasm goes like this: Aquinas's understanding of the relationship between passion and reason is rooted in his hylomorphic view of the unity between body and soul, which unity implies that, for him, reason and passion have something of a collegial relationship, whereby reason rules the passions not despotically, but as a ruler who, though in charge, is nevertheless interested in hearing what his subjects have to say. Paul Gondreau, for example, says that, in Aquinas's view, reason rules over the passions as in a "constitutional monarchy," in which "citizens submit to the supreme authority of the monarch, yet without relinquishing all their political rights and privileges."6 For Gondreau, Aquinas's characterization of the relationship between reason and passion was unique for his time, and was due to his similarly unique "hylemorphic [sic] metaphysics of human nature."7 Bonaventure, on the other hand, did not share this hylomorphic view of the relationship between body and soul, but was rather a substance dualist, and so, consequently, he thought that reason cannot rule the passions politically, but can only "'tame' the passions by a kind of exterior imposition, or forced 'submission to reason' [obtemperat ratoini)]."8In sum, the position of the hylomorphic enthusiasts is this: Aquinas's hylomorphic view of the unity of body and soul implies a collegial view of reason's rulership over passion, while Bonaventure's more dualistic view of the relationship between body and soul implies that reason could rule the passions only despotically, rather than politically. There are a number of premises, both implicit and explicit, in this argument. For the sake of focusing this paper, I will choose to focus on two. First, I will focus on the explicit claim that Bonaventure held a dualistic view of the relationship [End Page 125] between body and soul; I maintain that Bonaventure's understanding of the relationship between body and soul is no more dualistic than Aquinas's. Second, an implicit premise of hylomorphic enthusiasm is that having a hylomorphic or...

In the De malo, Thomas Aquinas claims that the first movements (primi motus) of the sensitive appetite are sinful. This seems surprising, since these movements do not appear to be under the control of reason. Unfortunately, the brevity of Aquinas’s discussion makes it difficult to understand why he would make such a claim. However, if he is read in light of the medieval debate about the first movements that was ongoing during his time, then Aquinas’s reasoning becomes much clearer. This paper thus gives an overview of the medieval debate concerning the sinfulness of the first movements in order to situate Aquinas within his historical context. It argues that Aquinas largely adopts the position of William of Auxerre, who distinguished between first first movements (motus primo primi) and second first movements (motus secundo primi). Auxerre argued that the first first movements were of animal sensuality and where therefore not sinful. The second first movements were of human sensuality and therefore, since they were in some way rational, were sinful. The paper then discusses how Aquinas makes use of this distinction and how this affects the interpretation of his position that the first movements are sinful.