Matthew Hammerton

This article explores the apparent tension between living a meaningful life and living a life that goes well for you. Philosophers typically distinguish between a life's moral goodness and its level of well-being, but many also treat meaning in life as a further, distinct evaluative dimension. Yet the close parallels between theories of meaning and theories of well-being raise a challenge: if both appeal to the same goods, such as love, knowledge, achievement, and moral excellence, is meaning really anything over and above well-being? After examining and rejecting several attempts to distinguish the two, I propose a new solution. Meaning and well-being draw on the same basic goods, but differ in how those goods aggregate. Well-being depends not only on the total quantity of goods in a life but also on their balance, whereas meaning is primarily a function of the total amount of objective value a life realizes or connects with, regardless of its distribution. This distinction explains why highly focused, even lopsided lives may be highly meaningful without being comparably high in well-being. Recognizing this divergence helps us understand the trade-offs we face in deciding how to live and helps illuminate the enduring question of what makes a life truly good.

This paper makes the case for what we call ‘logic-checking’. The paper begins by providing an overview of the development of fact-checking and of how fact-checking functions. As part of this discussion, we identify some limitations of fact-checking, including its reliance on testimony to function as intended. Such considerations, we argue, motivate logic-checking, which, when well articulated, can demonstrate that a piece of reasoning is flawed to an audience. What logic-checking involves is set out and examples of logic-checking are provided. The objection that experts in informal logic conducting logic-checking will be biased, thus undermining the whole enterprise, is considered and rejected.

This paper makes the case for what we call ‘logic-checking’. The paper begins by providing an overview of the development of fact-checking and of how fact-checking functions. As part of this discussion, we identify some limitations of fact-checking, including its reliance on testimony to function as intended. Such considerations, we argue, motivate logic-checking, which, when well articulated, can demonstrate that a piece of reasoning is flawed to an audience. What logic-checking involves is set out and examples of logic-checking are provided. The objection that experts in informal logic conducting logic-checking will be biased, thus undermining the whole enterprise, is considered and rejected.

Agent-relative consequentialism uses the theoretical framework of consequentialism to capture the constraints favored by deontologists. Christopher Howard has recently argued that agent-relative consequentialism is implausible because it can only capture such constraints at the expense of getting other normative facts incorrect. In this reply, I argue that Howard’s objection to agent-relative consequentialism fails because it rests on faulty intuitions that arise from a misunderstanding of basic structural features of agent-relative consequentialism.

Workism is the phenomenon of people making their work the primary source of meaning and identity in their life. Recent critics of workism have argued that there is a growing trend towards it in many societies and that this is a bad thing. This article brings a philosophical perspective to the debate on workism. It develops a precise account of what workism is and evaluates the main objections raised against it by examining their underlying philosophical assumptions. Ultimately, it is argued that workism, as a way of life, is not as objectionable as its critics suggest.

What are the fundamental divisions in ethics? Which divisions capture the most important and basic options in moral theorizing? In this article, I reject the ‘Textbook View’ which takes the tripartite division between consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics to be fundamental. Instead, I suggest that moral theories are fundamentally divided into three independent divisions, which I call the neutral/relative division, the normative priority division, and the maximizing division. I argue that this account of the fundamental divisions of ethics better captures the main concerns that normative ethicists have when assessing moral theories. It also helps us make progress in comparative ethics and makes visible theoretical possibilities obscured by the Textbook View.

Nick Bostrom is perhaps best known for his 2014 book Superintelligence, which explores the existential threat posed to humans by superintelligent AI. In his new book, Deep Utopia, he shifts gears to explore the existentialist threat that superintelligent AI poses. Suppose that humans successfully navigate the technological, moral, and political challenges that come with advanced AI. The result of such success, according to Bostrom, would be a kind of deep utopia. We would not only live in a post-work, and post-scarcity society (things already covered by shallower conceptions of utopia); we would also live in a “post-instrumental” society where almost anything we might consider doing, including pursuing our own personal enrichment, could be better accomplished by AI. Bostrom’s central concern is how we might find meaning and purpose in such a world. If everything you might consider doing can be done better by machine intelligence, what is there to live for?

Many ethical systems hold that agents earn merit and demerit through their good and bad deeds. Some of these ethical systems also accept merit transference, allowing merit to be transferred, in certain circumstances, from one agent to another. In this article, I argue that there is a previously unrecognized paradox for merit transference involving a phenomenon I call “merit inflation”. With a particular focus on Buddhist ethics, I then look at the options available for resolving this paradox. I conclude that merit inflation poses a serious challenge for any ethical system that broadly permits the transfer of merit.

Many philosophers now see meaning in life as a key evaluative category that stands alongside well-being and moral goodness. Our lives are assessed not only by how well they go for us and how morally good they are, but also by their meaningfulness. In this article, I raise a challenge to this view. Theories of meaning in life closely resemble theories of well-being, and there is a suspicion that the former collapse into the latter. I develop this challenge showing that it is formidable. I then answer it by offering a novel account of what meaning in life is and how it differs from well-being. The account I offer is able to resist the strongest form of the challenge while also having much intuitive appeal.

Deontic constraints prohibit an agent performing acts of a certain type even when doing so will prevent more instances of that act being performed by others. In this article I show how deontic constraints can be interpreted as either maximizing or non-maximizing rules. I then argue that they should be interpreted as maximizing rules because interpreting them as non-maximizing rules results in a problem with moral advice. Given this conclusion, a strong case can be made that consequentialism provides the best account of deontic constraints.

In traditional consequentialism the good is position-neutral. A single evaluative ranking of states of affairs is correct for everyone, everywhere regardless of their positions. Recently, position-relative forms of consequentialism have been developed. These allow for the correct rankings of states to depend on connections that hold between the state being evaluated and the position of the evaluator. For example, perhaps being an agent who acts in a certain state requires me to rank that state differently from someone else who lacks this connection. In this chapter several different kinds of position-relative rankings related to agents, times, physical locations, and possible worlds are explored. Arguments for and against adopting a position-relative axiology are examined, and it is suggested that position-relative consequentialism is a promising moral theory that has been underestimated.

The agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction is one of the most important in contemporary moral theory. Yet, providing an adequate formal account of it has proven difficult. In this article I defend a new formal account of the distinction, one that avoids various problems faced by other accounts. My account is based on an influential account of the distinction developed by McNaughton and Rawling. I argue that their approach is on the right track but that it succumbs to two serious objections. I then show how to formulate a new account that follows the key insights of McNaughton and Rawling’s approach yet avoids the two objections.

It is common to distinguish moral rules, reasons, or values that are agent-relative from those that are agent-neutral. One can also distinguish moral rules, reasons, or values that are moment-relative from those that are moment-neutral. In this article, I introduce a third distinction that stands alongside these two distinctions—the distinction between moral rules, reasons, or values that are patient-relative and those that are patient-neutral. I then show how patient-relativity plays an important role in several moral theories, gives us a better understanding of agent-relativity and moment-relativity, and provides a novel objection to Derek Parfit’s “appeal to full relativity” argument.