Matthew Jeffers

Moral condemnation of hypocrisy is both ubiquitous and peculiar. Its incessant focus on word–action consistency gives rise to two properties that distinguish it from other types of moral judgment: non-additivity and content independence. Non-additivity refers to the fact that, in judgments of hypocrisy, good words do not offset bad actions, nor do good actions offset bad words. Content independence refers to the fact that we condemn hypocrisy regardless of whether we would condemn the words or actions in isolation from one another. To make sense of these peculiar properties, we present a costly signaling model of social cooperation, in which hypocrisy norms allow a separating equilibrium to emerge, thus facilitating reliable communication and higher levels of social trust. We compare our functionalist account of hypocrisy to other philosophical accounts, arguing that a functionalist analysis better illuminates our moral practices and public discourse.

Focusing on a particular facet of entitlement theory, I criticize the view that Nozick’s version of the theory provides an adequate description of procedural justice. I agree with Nozick that justice is procedural; however, I believe his entitlement theory as it currently stands is incomplete. I show that Nozick is committed to believing that the implied content of his entitlement theory is unjust, and therefore that a certain set of market transactions ought to be judged as legally wrong according to Nozick’s own political foundations. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the Non-Aggression Principle is inconsistent with what a procedurally just entitlement theory would require, and therefore diminishes the degree to which a full-fledged account of distributive justice can properly be called libertarian. Finally, I offer a principle intended as a starting point for a discussion of what constitutes just transfer, and briefly speculate as to the legal results of implementing such a principle

The philosophical debate concerning political exchange has largely been confined to debating the desirability of vote trading; where individuals can sell their votes or buy votes from others. However, I show that the vote credit systems prevalent in public choice theory entirely avoid the common objections to political exchange that afflict vote trading proposals. Namely, vote credit systems avoid equality concerns and inalienability concerns. I offer an alternative critique to formal mechanisms that encourage political exchange by drawing on the role that impartiality and impartial moral judgements play in democratic and electoral institutions.

Economists and philosophers discuss taxation in the context of the prevailing tax base. This prevailing tax base primarily consists of levies on earned income, capital, and consumption. In the optimal tax literature, economists find that this tax base possesses a problematic tradeoff between equity and efficiency. This tax base is also controversial amongst moral philosophers because it diminishes the principle of labor ownership. I explore a tax base that does not possess these two drawbacks and hence sidesteps problems with the current tax base raised both by optimal tax theorists and moral philosophers. Even partial replacement of the current tax base with the proposed tax base would increase efficiency, improve equity, and preserve labor ownership.

A recent movement within political philosophy called luck egalitarianism has attempted to synthesize the right’s regard for responsibility with the left’s concern for equality. The original motivation for subscribing to luck egalitarianism stems from the belief that one’s success in life ought to reflect one’s own choices and not brute luck. Luck egalitarian theorists differ in the decision procedures that they propose, but they share in common the general approach that we ought to equalize individuals with respect to brute luck so that differences in distribution are only a consequence of the responsible choices that individuals make. I intend to show that through the application of its own distributive procedures, the interpersonal luck egalitarian approach actually undermines its original motivation by making the lives of individuals subject to brute luck. I propose two alternative methods that the luck egalitarian could use to prevent the problems suffered by the interpersonal luck egalitarian standard.