Matthew King

I propose that an ill-appreciated contrast between the examples Socrates gives Meno, to show him how he ought to philosophize, is the key to understanding the Meno. I contend that Socrates prefers hisdefinitions of shape to his account of color because the former are concerned with what shape is, while the latter is concerned with how color comes to be. This contrast suggests that Plato intends ananalogous contrast between the (properly philosophical) way of inquiry that leads to Socrates’ definition of knowledge as “true belief tied down with an account” and the (not properly philosophical) way of inquiry that leads to Socrates’ account of how knowledge comes to be, that is, the “theory of recollection.”

ABSTRACT: This article shows how the "problem of moral luck" and Sartre's concept of "bad faith" are mutually illuminating, since both have to do with confusions about how much we control, or are controlled by, our situations. I agree with three recent proposals that the problem of moral luck results from certain epistemic malfunctions. However, I argue that the problem cannot be dissolved by overcoming these malfunctions because they are rooted in bad faith. Against the currently dominant interpretation, I argue that bad faith is an inescapable condition of human being because, while we are both free and factical, we can only exist as one or the other atonce (much as a "duck-rabbit" drawing can only be seen as duck or rabbit), thus always keeping an aspect of our nature hidden (though in plain sight) from ourselves.RÉSUMÉ: Cet article montre comment le «problème de la chance morale» et le concept de la «mauvaise foi» de Sartre sont révélateurs l'un l'autre, puisque tous les deux concernent une confusion au sujet du niveau de contrôle que nous avons sur nossituations, ou que nos situations exercent sur nous. Je suis en accord avec trois propositions récenies qui décrivent que le problème de la chance morale résulte de certains défauts de fonctionnement épistémique. Par contre, je soutiens que le problème ne peut pas être résolu en surmontant ces défauts, parce qu'ils sont fondés sur la mauvaise foi. À contre-courant de l'interprétation dominante actuelle, j'affirme que la mauvaise foi est un état inèvitable de l'être humain, parce que, bien que nous soyons libres et factices, nous pouvons seulement exister en tant qu'un ou l'autre au même moment. Ainsi, nous gardons toujours un aspect de notre nature cachée (quoiqu'en pleine vue) de nous-mêmes.

A substantial body of evidence suggests that autobiographical recollection and simulation of future happenings activate a shared neural network. Many of the neural regions implicated in this network are affected in patients with bipolar disorder , showing altered metabolic functioning and/or structural volume abnormalities. Studies of autobiographical recall in BD reveal overgeneralization, where autobiographical memory comprises primarily factual or repeated information as opposed to details specific in time and in place and definitive of re-experiencing. To date, no study has examined whether these deficits extend to future event simulation. We examined the ability of patients with BD and controls to imagine positive, negative and neutral future events using a modified version of the Autobiographical Interview that allowed for separation of episodic and non-episodic details. Patients were selectively impaired in imagining future positive, negative, and neutral episodic details; simulation of non-episodic details was equivalent across groups