Matthew Lampert

In this essay, I argue that any competent group agent must be a wanton. The impetus for this claim is an argument Arthur Applbaum makes in Legitimacy: The Right to Rule in a Wanton World that a formal institution (in this case, a government) can, under the right conditions, function as a free moral group agent. I begin by explaining Harry Frankfurt’s classic account of wantonism—not just for the benefit of readers who might not be familiar with the concept, but also to emphasize aspects of the concept relevant for the consideration of group agency. I then draw on the contemporary literature on group agency to argue that any successful group agent will be a wanton. I then turn to Applbaum’s account of group agency to argue that his proposed mechanisms for free moral group agency do not successfully overcome the challenge of wantonism. I close the essay by briefly addressing some of the ramifications of my argument for Applbaum’s larger project in Legitimacy. I argue that, after rejecting the flawed account of free moral group agency, we can productively recover some of Applbaum’s key insights within a revised account of political legitimacy.

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been traditionally framed within business ethics as a discourse attempting to identify certain moral responsibilities of corporations (as well as get these corporations to fulfill their responsibilities). This theory has often been normatively grounded in the idea that a corporation is (or ought to be treated as) a moral agent. I argue that it is a mistake to think of (or treat) corporations as moral agents, and that CSR’s impotency is a direct result of this mistake. I then outline a distinction between business ethics and business politics, arguing that CSR might be better framed as a political goal – one which might be able to take better advantage of the resources of corporate governance and a renewed (albeit shifted) focus on agency theory.

Jacques Rancière presents much of his work as a political intervention, exposing the ways in which so-called critical theory gets “recuperated” in service of oppression and the status quo. But Rancière’s own interventions are ambiguously situated with respect to these same issues. A major source of frustration for Rancière’s readers is locating any kind of positive claim about the role theory could or should play within politics. I argue that, while Rancière’s later work depoliticizes itself, we might look to his earlier work for resources that might a) help us rethink the role of critical theory; and b) take better advantage of Rancière’s later critical work.

While Jacques Rancière has never been affiliated in any way with the Institute for Social Research, this article examines the extent to which his work could be considered “Critical Theory” in the sense most closely associated with the Frankfurt School tradition. I argue that Rancière’s work is not critical theory in this narrow sense; I further lay out a kind of “Rancièrean” criticism of the very project of Frankfurt School Critical Theory. This in turn allows me to sketch out a version of Critical Theory that might survive a Rancièrean critique. Even by this renewed conception, however, I argue that Rancière’s own work still cannot be considered a project of Critical Theory; but I finish the essay by laying out what a possible “Rancièrean” Critical Theory might look like, and why I think such a project would be valuable.

Judith Butler has built her theory of interpellation through critical engagement with the work of Louis Althusser. For Butler, interpellation explains how the subject emerges in and through language, and her critique of Althusser is meant to open up psychic and discursive space for resisting status quo interpellations and the dominant ideology. In this essay, I argue that Butler’s account of interpellation suffers from two problems: first, she misreads Althusser; second (and more importantly), her account is isolating and politically demotivating. I then show that rereading Althusser provides us both with a criticism (albeit avant la lettre) of Butler’s position, and a new account of the resources at our disposal for resisting (and even opposing) the dominant ideology.

Jacques Rancière’s work has become a major reference point for discussions of art and politics. However, while Rancière’s negative theses are becoming widespread and well understood, his positive thesis is still poorly understood, owing partly to Rancière’s own formulation of the issue. I first clarify Rancière’s account of the links between politics and art. I then explore a gap in this account; Rancière has stuck too closely to a politics of art’s reception. I argue for a politics of art production, which would expand the possible engagement between politics and art.

Devin Zane Shaw’s new book Egalitarian Moments is an attempt to think with and through Jacques Rancière. Shaw’s highly original interpretation of Rancière opens space within Rancière’s thought for a new, expanded account of the politics of art and literature, and Shaw is then able to use this theory as a way of rereading the history of philosophy. Shaw’s project is ultimately an attempt to show that it is possible to do philosophy in an egalitarian way – that not all political philosophy need be “political philosophy” in Rancière’s pejorative sense – and that philosophy can serve as a vital resource for egalitarian political movements.