Matthew Vinton

Kant’s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, the so-called Formula of Humanity, appeals to the humanity in our persons as an unconditional end-in-itself that may never be used merely as a means. Various interpretive challenges have led to scholarly disagreement concerning what Kant meant by the term ‘humanity’ in this formulation. Four views emerge from the literature: (1) humanity is an abstract idea, (2) humanity is the capacity for end-setting generally, (3) humanity is the capacity for morality, and (4) humanity is a good will. After surveying each of these views, this chapter argues for a teleological reading of ‘humanity’ in one’s person. A focus on Kant’s first Critique discussion of ideas and ideals reveals that the ‘idea of humanity’ and ‘ideal of humanity’ both determine which capacities define an actually existing human being and provide the regulative ideal or telos articulating the vocation of that human being’s existence. This ‘idea’ and ‘ideal’ of humanity reveal that the capacity for morality, broadly conceived as autonomous self-legislation of categorical moral demands extending both to the choice of maxims and the setting of obligatory ends, a capacity which undergirds and makes possible one’s non-moral capacities for end-setting and prudential choice, is definitional of humanity. This capacity simultaneously identifies human beings as the kind of being they are, and allows those beings to become worthy of that humanity through moral development.