Matthias Neuber

Pierre Duhem gilt ais einer der wichtigsten Reprüsentanten der franzosischen Wissenschaftsphilosophie um 1900. Seine Konzeption physikalischer Theorien wird üblicherweise ais moderne Umsetzung des antiken – proto-positivistischen – Programms der „Rettung der Phänomene‟ angesehen. Diese Sicht ist richtig, bedarf aber der Ergänzung, indem der diskursive Kontext der Duhemschen Position berücksichtigt wird. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird dargelegt, dass Duhems philosophischer Zeitgenosse Abel Rey eine zentrale Rolle in diesem Zusammenhang spielte.

Die Auffassung des Realismusproblems als eines Scheinproblems kann, wie die beiden vorangegangenen Kapitel verdeutlicht haben sollten, in eine positive und eine negative Komponente aufgegliedert werden. In negativer Hinsicht handelt es sich um die Abweisung des metaphysischen Außenwelt-Realismus, in positiver Hinsicht um den Versuch der Etablierung eines auf die Wissenschaften anwendbaren und mit dem logischen Empirismus verträglichen ‚empirischen‘ Realismus. Nun hatte sich allerdings – vor allem im Zusammenhang mit der Rekonstruktion der im Vergleich zu Carnap detaillierter artikulierten Ansicht Schlicks – gezeigt, dass eben dieses Vorhaben der Begründung eines empirischen Realismus zu gravierenden Problemen führt.

Nachdem sich nun herausgestellt hat, dass der Realismus im Kontext der Sprache eine Form der Internalisierung erfährt, die der realistischen Programmatik als solcher die Grundlage entzieht, stellt sich die Frage, welche Option dann noch verbleibt. Was den logischen Empirismus anbelangt, scheint das Potenzial bezüglich einer Integration des realistischen Programms nach allem, was bisher gesagt worden ist, de facto aufgebraucht zu sein. Doch dieser Eindruck ist verfehlt. Denn es gibt – neben der Schein- und der Sprachproblem-Perspektive – noch eine dritte logisch-empiristische Sicht auf den Realismus.

It is shown that Carnap’s Aufbau was inspired by the early Moritz Schlick’s conception of ‘empirical realism.’ Demarcating it from ‘metaphysical’ realism the empirical realist position was applied by Schlick to Einstein’s theory of relativity. As will be argued in the paper, Carnap too thought that empirical realism is the adequate epistemological framework for a rational reconstruction of the language of science. On the whole, the aim is to make clear that the established view of Carnap as an ardent anti-realist is in need of correction: Carnap was a metaphysical anti-realist, but not an anti-realist as concerns science.

Alois Riehl was one of the few Kantian-inspired philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century who argued for a realist approach to Kant’s original doctrine. He therefore rejected prevailing idealist reconstructions and attempted to establish a view of Kant as an important forerunner of what he programmatically called ‘critical realism.’ In the present paper it will be shown what this exactly meant for the interpretation of Kant’s and especially Riehl’s own critique of idealism as a systematic position. In particular, it is stated that anti-idealism in Riehlian terms amounts to a ‘realistic rehabilitation’ of Kantian things-in-themselves. Furthermore, some connections are drawn to early-twentieth century American realism.

Analytic philosophy in the United States emerged parallel to the demise of idealism. During the second half of the nineteenth century, Josiah Royce had contributed importantly to the predominance of idealist systems and corresponding academic groups. With the rise of pragmatism and new realism, the situation changed dramatically: the idealist movement lost momentum and realism began to dominate the discourse. The present paper argues that the critiques of idealism put forward by the realists during the first two decades of the twentieth century were instrumental to the emergence of analytic philosophy in the United States. As I will explain, Ralph Barton Perry (1876–1957) was the key figure in the underinvestigated genesis of this movement.

American critical realism was defended in two versions, an “essentialist” and an “empirical.” The main proponent of the essentialist version was George Santayana, who in his Scepticism and Animal Faith (1923) outlined a critical realist account of epistemology based substantially on an articulate doctrine of essences. In the present paper, an attempt is made to critically examine the resulting approach, particularly in relation to perception. It will be argued that Santayana failed to develop a sufficiently convincing essentialist view of perception, and that his actual significance in terms of the impact of the critical realist movement was, contrary to what is often claimed, quite limited.

Roy Wood Sellars (1880–1973) is often reduced to his role as father of Wilfrid Sellars. This is unfair because during the 1920s, ‘30s, and ‘40s, Roy Wood was one of the leading figures of the then prevailing American realist movement. In the present paper, I will focus on one particular facet of R. W. Sellars’ philosophical approach: his continual examination of Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity. I shall primarily reconstruct his discussion of Einstein’s theory, as it can be found in his seminal The Philosophy of Physical Realism (1932). In contrast to authors such as Bertrand Russell or Émile Meyerson, Sellars refused to interpret special relativity in a realist vein. In his view, it should be seen as an “ars mensurandi” and thus being interpreted purely operationally. As with Einstein himself, the concept of simultaneity was his paradigm case in point. However, Sellars opined that besides the physical (mensurational) concepts of time and simultaneity there also exists an ontological understanding of these notions. “Real” time and “absolute” simultaneity are, according to Sellars, the indispensable non-relativistic counterparts to Einstein’s respective relativistic conceptions. They are to be interpreted realistically since they prove, Sellars maintains, to be explanatory regarding events in Einstein-Minkowski’s world. In the course of the paper, I shall compare this view with the one defended by Henri Bergson. Furthermore, Sellars’ later approach from the 1940s and ‘50s will be briefly considered and critically discussed by confronting it with more recent attempts at ontologically ‘grounding’ special relativistic kinematics.

American philosophical realism developed in two forms: “new” and “critical” realism. While the new realists sought to ‘emancipate’ ontology from epistemology and defended a direct theory of perception, the critical realists promoted a representationalist account of perception and thus argued for an epistemological dualism. Bertrand Russell’s early philosophical writings figured prominently in both of these American realist camps. However, while the new realists quite enthusiastically embraced the Russellian analytic style of reasoning (and Russell himself appreciated the American new realists as anti-idealist allies), the critical realists were significantly more reserved toward Russell’s point of view. In the present paper, I identify the reasons for this difference in reception. In particular, I will show that the critical realists’ reservations pertained primarily to a more traditionalist—‘continental’—account of philosophy, whereas the neo-realists proved instrumental in setting the stage for later full-blown analytic philosophy in the United States.

This paper examines Ralph Barton Perry's analysis of the ‘ego-centric predicament’. It will be shown that Perry convincingly argued against prevailing contemporary versions of idealism and that it makes perfectly good sense to consider him a precursor of subsequent trends in American analytic philosophy. Perry's appraisal and promotion of the contemporary logic of relations in the framework of early twentieth-century American neorealism provides further evidence of his being a proto-analytic philosopher. His personal acquaintance with Bertrand Russell proved instructive in this regard. On the whole, Perry's distinctive approach to philosophy was instrumental in establishing the analytic style of reasoning in the United States. This paper is devoted to substantiating this claim. It is thus hoped that a clearer picture of early twentieth-century American philosophy will begin to emerge.

The late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century debate over ‘internal’ and ‘external’ relations is well explored, as far as its course in Britain is concerned. F. H. Bradley’s idealistic internalism, on the one hand, and Bertrand Russell’s realistic externalism, on the other, were at the center of this debate. Less well known, however, is that there was also a discussion about relations in the United States at the time. The central figures in this discussion were Edward Gleason Spaulding and John Dewey. Like Russell, Spaulding advocated a realist-inspired externalism, while Dewey criticized this viewpoint from a pragmatist perspective. The aim of the present paper is to reconstruct the exchange between Spaulding and Dewey and to elaborate the specifics of this exchange. In doing so it will emerge, among other things, (1) that, in contrast to Bradley’s idealist rejection of externalism, Dewey’s pragmatist attempt at a refutation was more in line with common sense and science and (2) that Spaulding’s version of externalism differed markedly from Russell’s in its strong empirical orientation. Overall, an undeservedly forgotten chapter in the history of early twentieth-century American philosophy is revisited and reassessed.

Hans Vaihinger and the Stiftung Nietzsche-Archiv. The Letters to Richard Oehler. Hans Vaihinger’s letters to Richard Oehler document the ideological constellation in the context of the First World War. Unconcealed enthusiasm for the war, associated national-chauvinist resentment, and pronounced anti-communism immediately after the war clearly emerge. At first sight, this may be surprising, since Vaihinger is generally regarded as a progressive liberal pacifist. As this article attempts to make clear, however, it is also evident in Vaihinger’s case that the First World War and its immediate aftermath led – at least temporarily – to quite questionable intellectual attitudes even among declared pacifists. In this respect, Vaihinger’s letters to Nietzsche’s cousin, librarian at the Nietzsche Archive in Weimar and later convinced National Socialist Richard Oehler are evaluated as revealing documents of contemporary history.

The relationship between American pragmatism and American critical realism needs to be reconsidered. The two currents shared many aspects, but there were also significant differences. One of these differences pertains to the object of perception or, more precisely, to the question of what we talk about when we talk about this, for example, being blue. By re-addressing that question, some light can be shed on the historical development of analytic philosophy in the United States during the first half of the twentieth century. My case in point is the respective positions of C. I. Lewis and R. W. Sellars. I shall point out that Sellars’s view has more to recommend it because it provides a more compelling framework for a comprehensive explanation of perception.