Matthias Rolffs

In a recent paper, Kerry McKenzie identifies theory change in science as a source for doubts about the value of engaging in metaphysics of science before a final theory is at hand. According to McKenzie, the basic problem is that naturalized metaphysics lacks a concept of progress. More specifically, naturalized metaphysics lacks a concept of progress as approximation that can easily be taken to correspond to the scientific sources of naturalized metaphysical inquiry. In this paper, we criticise the proposed concept of progress as approximation as too narrow a concept, notably, even in science, and propose an alternative notion of scientific progress that metaphysical investigations can and do latch on to, namely progress understood as exploring and constraining theory space. First, we motivate this notion of progress via an examination of progress in particle physics and propose that it can be applied to metaphysics as well. Second, we argue that this notion of progress leads to a convincing reply to McKenzie's argument. Third, we discuss how this notion of progress relates to the program of naturalized metaphysics and argue that it speaks in favor of a more lenient version of naturalistically-inclined metaphysics, namely inductive metaphysics.

This chapter explores the relationship between inductive metaphysics and conceptual re-engineering, arguing that both approaches can benefit from one another. Inductive metaphysics can integrate conceptual re-engineering to address placement problems more effectively, while conceptual re-engineering can enhance its applicability to metaphysics by incorporating inductive metaphysical approaches, in particular, inference to the best explanation. The chapter begins by introducing the key concepts of inductive metaphysics and conceptual re-engineering. It then examines existing proposals for applying conceptual re-engineering to metaphysics and develops an alternative approach – explanatory conceptual re-engineering – rooted in inductive metaphysical methodology. Finally, it demonstrates how this approach can address placement problems in metaphysics, arguing that it offers a more effective approach than traditional descriptive conceptual analysis.

Many authors worry that metasemantic externalism renders conceptual engineering impossible, as the facts determining meaning are beyond our control. I argue that this externalist worry is misplaced: There is no conflict between metasemantic externalism and conceptual engineering. I start by criticizing two extant strategies to reconcile conceptual engineering with metasemantic externalism on the grounds that they both lead to violations of crucial epistemic and conversational norms. I then propose a novel account, according to which conceptual engineers should be seen as re-introducing terms. This approach not only aligns with metasemantic externalism but also overcomes the issues present in extant strategies and stands on its own as a more plausible theory. I conclude by exploring the consequences of my account for implementation, and by defending it against objections.

Theories of graded causation attract growing attention in the philosophical debate on causation. An important field of application is the controversial relationship between causation and moral responsibility. However, it is still unclear how exactly the notion of graded causation should be understood in the context of moral responsibility. One question is whether we should endorse a proportionality principle, according to which the degree of an agent’s moral responsibility is proportionate to their degree of causal contribution. A second question is whether a theory of graded causation should measure closeness to necessity or closeness to sufficiency. In this paper, we argue that we should indeed endorse a proportionality principle and that this principle supports a notion of graded causation relying on closeness to sufficiency rather than closeness to necessity. Furthermore, we argue that this insight helps to provide a plausible analysis of the so-called ‘Moral Difference Puzzle’ recently described by Bernstein.

In dieser Arbeit verfolge ich das Ziel, eine weit verbreitete Position in der Philosophie des Geistes gegen einen einflussreichen Einwand zu verteidigen. Die Position, die ich verteidigen möchte, ist der nicht-reduktive Physikalismus. Der Einwand, gegen den ich diese Position verteidigen möchte, ist der Vorwurf des Epiphänomenalismus. Meine Erwiderung auf den Vorwurf des Epiphänomenalismus beruht auf einer eingängigen Beschäftigung mit der Metaphysik der Kausalität. Meines Erachtens liegt der Schlüssel zur Zurückweisung des Vorwurfs des Epiphänomenalismus in einer Unterscheidung zwischen verschiedenen Begriffen der Kausalität.

Bis hierher habe ich sowohl den nicht-reduktiven Physikalismus als auch den Vorwurf des Epiphänomenalismus weitgehend unabhängig von der Frage behandelt, was Verursachung ist. Diese Frage ist jedoch von großer Relevanz für die Plausibilität des Vorwurfs des Epiphänomenalismus. Es ist daher naheliegend, sich etwas detaillierter mit der Philosophie der Kausalität auseinanderzusetzen, um sich der Frage nach der Schlagkräftigkeit des Vorwurfs des Epiphänomenalismus anzunähern. In diesem Kapitel geht es daher um den Zusammenhang zwischen verschiedenen Fragestellungen aus der Philosophie der Kausalität auf der einen Seite und dem Vorwurf des Epiphänomenalismus auf der anderen Seite.

Laut dem Vorwurf des Epiphänomenalismus kann der nicht-reduktive Physikalismus der Existenz mentaler Verursachung nicht Rechnung tragen. Da es sich bei der Annahme mentaler Verursachung zugleich um eine absolut zentrale und unverzichtbare Annahme handele, sei der nicht-reduktive Physikalismus aufzugeben. Er führe unweigerlich in die absurde Position des Epiphänomenalismus, demzufolge es keine mentale Verursachung gibt. Ziel dieses Kapitels ist es, den Vorwurf des Epiphänomenalismus ausführlich zu rekonstruieren und verschiedene Reaktionen auf den Vorwurf zu diskutieren.

Resultant moral luck occurs whenever aspects of an agent’s moral responsibility are affected by luck pertaining to the outcomes of their actions. Many authors reject the existence of moral luck in this sense, but they do so in different ways. Michael Zimmerman argues that resultant luck affects the scope of moral responsibility, but not its degree. That is, it affects what agents are responsible for, but not how responsible they are. Andrew Khoury takes a more resolute approach, arguing that both the scope and the degree of moral responsibility are free from resultant luck. In this paper, I criticize both accounts and develop an alternative. I argue, first, that Khoury’s approach leads to an implausibly far-reaching error-theory about moral responsibility. Second, Zimmerman’s account cannot account for all the ways in which moral responsibility comes in degrees. Third, these problems can be overcome by introducing a distinction between two concepts of responsibility that both come with scope and degree. The first concept I call internal responsibility, as it applies exclusively to agent-internal factors. The second concept I call external responsibility, as it applies to (partly) agent-external factors such as actions and their outcomes. Given this distinction, we can avoid the problems of Khoury’s as well as Zimmerman’s accounts while preserving the central intuition behind the rejection of resultant moral luck.

In diesem Open-Access-Buch wird eine Verteidigung des nicht-reduktiven Physikalismus gegen den Vorwurf des Epiphänomenalismus entwickelt. Der nicht-reduktive Physikalismus besagt im Kern, dass mentale Eigenschaften zwar nicht mit physischen Eigenschaften identisch sind, sie aber dennoch so eng an physische Eigenschaften gebunden sind, dass man sinnvollerweise von einer auf grundlegender Ebene rein physischen Welt sprechen kann. Der Vorwurf des Epiphänomenalismus wendet gegen den nicht-reduktiven Physikalismus ein, dass aus seiner Grundidee folgt, dass es keine mentale Verursachung gibt: Wenn mentale Eigenschaften tatsächlich nicht mit physischen Eigenschaften identisch sind, sondern lediglich eng an sie gebunden sind, dann können mentale Eigenschaften niemals kausal wirksam werden. Die in diesem Buch entwickelte Verteidigung beruht auf einer Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Begriffen der Kausalität: Kausaler Produktion und kausaler Abhängigkeit. Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass der nicht-reduktive Physikalismus zwar darauf festgelegt ist, dass es keine mentale Verursachung im Sinne von kausaler Produktion gibt. Diese Konsequenz kann jedoch akzeptiert werden. Denn aus dem nicht-reduktiven Physikalismus folgt keineswegs, dass es keine mentale Verursachung im Sinne von kausaler Abhängigkeit gibt.

In a recent paper, Kerry McKenzie identifies theory change in science as a source for doubts about the value of engaging in metaphysics of science before a final theory is at hand. According to McKenzie, the basic problem is that naturalized metaphysics lacks a concept of progress. More specifically, naturalized metaphysics lacks a concept of progress as approximation that can easily be taken to correspond to the scientific sources of naturalized metaphysical inquiry. In this paper, we criticise the proposed concept of progress as approximation as too narrow a concept, notably, even in science, and propose an alternative notion of scientific progress that metaphysical investigations can and do latch on to, namely progress understood as exploring and constraining theory space. First, we motivate this notion of progress via an examination of progress in particle physics and propose that it can be applied to metaphysics as well. Second, we argue that this notion of progress leads to a convincing reply to McKenzie's argument. Third, we discuss how this notion of progress relates to the program of naturalized metaphysics and argue that it speaks in favor of a more lenient version of naturalistically-inclined metaphysics, namely inductive metaphysics.