Matti Sintonen

Realism in Action is a selection of essays written by leading representatives in the fields of action theory and philosophy of mind, philosophy of the social sciences and especially the nature of social action, and of epistemology and philosophy of science. Practical reason, reasons and causes in action theory, intending and trying, and folk-psychological explanation are some of the topics discussed by these leading participants. A particular emphasis is laid on trust, commitments and social institutions, on the possibility of grounding social notions in individual social attitudes, on the nature of social groups, institutions and collective intentionality, and on common belief and common knowledge. Applications to the social sciences include, e.g., a look at the Erklären-Verstehen controversy in economics, and at constructivist and realist views on archeological reconstructions of the past

In this paper we maintain that abductive inferential processes should be embedded to a more general outlook on human cognition. Abduction has clear a.nities to the so-called interrogative model of inquiry in which inquiry and reasoning are conceptualized as a dialogue. We think, in addition, that dialogicality must be broadened to a “trialogical” framework which means a threefold relationship with mediating artefacts where the inquirer, other inquirers , and the object of knowledge are inextricably bound up with each other in long term processes of inquiry. Seen from this perspective Peirce's semeiotic pragmatism has close connections to modern ideas about distributed cognition; also to Pera's dialectical model of science, and Davidson's theory of triangulation concerning human mind, cognition, and knowledge

Ilkka Niiniluoto, a distinguished philosopher of science, has been a tirelesspokesman for scientific realism and reason more generally. Trained in the tradition of the Finnish school of inductive logic he has refined the notion of truthlikeness (verisimilitude) to make the realist idea scientific progress mathematically exact. Niiniluotos main technical works are included in his books Is Science Progressive? (1984) and Truthlikeness (1987), but his most recent general defense of scientific realism culminated in his Critical Scientific Realism (1999). Niiniluoto is, since 1981, Professor of Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Helsinki, and since 2003 the Rector of the University. He has for a long time been one of the most prominent public intellectuals in Finland. This Festschrift brings about a selection of philosophical essays on Niiniluotos philosophy by prominent member of the international community. The contributions are grouped around three themes. The first ones deal with philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mathematics, and the second group consists of papers on induction, truthlikeness, and scientific progress. The third part collects essays on the history of logical empiricism, the ontology of social groups, and the dispute between theism and atheism. This book is a tribute to Ilkka Niiniluoto on his 60th birthday, and it also contains Niiniluoto's replies to comments, queries and criticisms.

In the middle of a conference on the logic of science, an eminent biologist once said: “Does it not bother you guys that we scientists do not use any logic at all.” This statement was meant to be a friendly provocation, but there also was a serious message. Scientists often say that the logical analyses are exercises in formal logic and fail to illuminate what the scientists are doing, actual scientific practice. This recurring complaint, although not completely as I will suggest, has not gone unnoticed in the philosophy of science. Indeed, the current trend in analytic philosophy of science as well as in teaching the method of science has been away from logic as a means of illuminating scientific inquiry.

In the middle of a conference on the logic of science, an eminent biologist once said: “Does it not bother you guys that we scientists do not use any logic at all.” This statement was meant to be a friendly provocation, but there also was a serious message. Scientists often say that the logical analyses are exercises in formal logic and fail to illuminate what the scientists are doing, actual scientific practice. This recurring complaint, although not completely as I will suggest, has not gone unnoticed in the philosophy of science. Indeed, the current trend in analytic philosophy of science as well as in teaching the method of science has been away from logic as a means of illuminating scientific inquiry

Finland is internationally known as one of the leading centers of twentieth century analytic philosophy. This volume offers for the first time an overall survey of the Finnish analytic school. The rise of this trend is illustrated by original articles of Edward Westermarck, Eino Kaila, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Jaakko Hintikka. Contributions of Finnish philosophers are then systematically discussed in the fields of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, history of philosophy, ethics and social philosophy. Metaphilosophical reflections on the nature of philosophy are highlighted by the Finnish dialogue between analytic philosophy, phenomenology, pragmatism, and critical theory.

Contents: Matti SINTONEN: From the Science of Logic to the Logic of Science. I: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES. Zev BECHLER: Hintikka on Plenitude in Aristotle. Marja-Liisa KAKKURI-KNUUTTILA: What Can the Sciences of Man Learn from Aristotle? Martin KUSCH: Theories of Questions in German-Speaking Philosophy Around the Turn of the Century. Nils-Eric SAHLIN: 'HE IS NO GOOD FOR MY WORK': On the Philosophical Relations between Ramsey and Wittgenstein. II: FORMAL TOOLS: INDUCTION, OBSERVATION AND IDENTIFIABILITY. Theo A.F. KUIPERS: The Carnap-Hintikka Programme in Inductive Logic. Isaac LEVI: Caution and Nonmonotonic Inference. Ilkka NIINILUOTO: Inductive Logic, Atomism, and Observational Error. Arto MUTANEN: Theory of Identifiability. III: QUESTIONS IN INQUIRY: THE INTERROGATIVE MODEL. Sylvain BROMBERGER: Natural Kinds and Questions. Scott A. KLEINER: The Structure of Inquiry in Developmental Biology. Andrzej WISNIEWSKI: Some Foundational Concepts of Erotetic Semantics. Jan WOLE??N??SKI: Science and Games. IV: GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE: EXPLANATION AND DISCOVERY. Matti SINTONEN: Explanation: The Fifth Decade. Erik WEBER: Scientific Explanation and the Interrogative Model of Inquiry. George GEBHARD: Scientific Discovery, Induction, and the Multi-Level Character of Scientific Inquiry. Mika KIIKERI: On the Logical Structure of Learning Models. V: JAAKKO HINTIKKA: REPLIES. VI: ABSTRACTS.

The paper sketches an account of explanatory practice in which explanations are viewed as answers to explanation-requiring questions. To avoid difficulties in previous proposals, the paper uses the structuralist account of theory structure, arguing that theories are complex and evolving entities formed around a conceptual core and a set of intended applications. The argument is that this view does better justice to theories which involve a number of different kinds of theory-elements to give narrative explanations. Theories are, among other things, devices which can be used to turn explanation-requiring questions into a form which allows assessment of potential answers. Evolutionary theory, both in Darwin's and the modern synthetic forms, are used as examples. The view advanced is that modern evolutionary theory need not have a unique core to which other theories serve as subcontractors.

In what follows, I want to discuss two particular—though broad—topics that have been raised by recent advances in cognitive science and science studies. First, the role of creativity in scientists’ self-understanding has changed dramatically through centuries and, with help from our friends in cognitive science, it is now possible to go beyond the so-called scientific imagination. I shall also suggest that creativity requires persistence over a long period. In our times of immediate gratification, this is an increasingly difficult mental disposition to promote. Secondly, although discovery and creativity are seemingly drifting apart, it turns out that discoveries have a historical depth which creativity lacks. That is, discoveries are characteristically products of often long historical processes.

Jaakko Hintikka's Kantianism in philosophy of logic and mathematics is known to go further than Kant's own, for he argues that mathematical reasoning involves the "language-games" of seeking and finding. Therefore, logic mirrors the structure of this activity. But Hintikka also pushes the Copemican Revolution further to epistemology and philosophy of science. He agrees that "reason has insight only into what which it produces after a plan of ist own", but gives the idea a new logical turn. Kant thought that reason imposes certain architectonic constraints on the possible outcome of inquiry, but Hintikka's interrogative model of inquiry also emphasizes the activity of and therefore the strategy in, putting questions to Nature.

The paper explores two ways in which the logic of questions might aid in the understanding of explanations. First, the "logic" of question-answer sequences imposes constraints on what answers are acceptable for an inquirer. Secondly, there are field- specific type-requirements built into questions. There is always more to a question than meets the potential answerer's ear. It is argued that, since there are nonepistemic presuppositions of why-questions, there are no interesting necessary and sufficient conditions for all explanations. Explanations are a family of concepts tied together by the thin thread of the logic of question-answer sequences.