London School of Economics
London Interdisciplinary School
  •  7
    Shared and Social Discourse
    Topoi 39 (3): 587-595. 2020.
    On the premise that people achieve knowledge of things by sharing mental resources, what are the scope and philosophical significance of acts of shared intentionality in social discourse? Some philosophers and scientists of social cognition, most notably Jane Heal and Michael Tomasello, have drawn upon insights about the capacity of individual people to share mental resources and contents to argue for the importance of sociality in shaping mental activity. In this paper, I synthetize these stran…Read more
  •  20
    The Individual ‘We’ Narrator
    with Raphael Lyne
    British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (2). 2019.
    The prevailing assumption in literary studies tends to be that a ‘we’ narrative voice is either that of an individual purporting to speak for a group, or that of a collective of people whose perspectives have coalesced into a unified one. Recent work on social agency across the cognitive humanities suggests another way of understanding what might be conveyed by such a ‘we’. Social cognition research shows that individuals can have their capacities changed and enhanced when they interact with oth…Read more
  •  15
    Shared and Social Discourse
    Topoi 38 (tbc): 1-9. 2019.
    On the premise that people achieve knowledge of things by sharing mental resources, what are the scope and philosophical significance of acts of shared intentionality in social discourse? Some philosophers and scientists of social cognition, most notably Jane Heal and Michael Tomasello, have drawn upon insights about the capacity of individual people to share mental resources and contents to argue for the importance of sociality in shaping mental activity. In this paper, I synthetize these stran…Read more
  •  22
    The participatory dimension of individual responsibility
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41. 2018.
  •  12
    Collective Attitudes and the Anthropocentric View
    Journal of Social Ontology 2 (1): 149-157. 2016.
    The anthropocentric view holds that the social world is a projection of mental states and attitudes onto the real world. However, there is more to a society of individuals than their psychological make up. In The Ant Trap, Epstein hints at the possibility that collective intentionality can, and should, be discarded as a pillar of social ontology. In this commentary I argue that this claim is motivated by an outdated view of the nature and structure of collective attitudes. If we aim at a good th…Read more
  •  42
    Alignment in social interactions
    with M. T. Fairhurst and C. D. Frith
    Consciousness and Cognition 48 253-261. 2017.
    According to the prevailing paradigm in social-cognitive neuroscience, the mental states of individuals become shared when they adapt to each other in the pursuit of a shared goal. We challenge this view by proposing an alternative approach to the cognitive foundations of social interactions. The central claim of this paper is that social cognition concerns the graded and dynamic process of alignment of individual minds, even in the absence of a shared goal. When individuals reciprocally exchang…Read more
  •  45
  •  75
    Collective intentionality and socially extended minds
    Philosophical Psychology 30 (3): 247-264. 2017.
    There are many ways to advance our understanding of the human mind by studying different kinds of sociality. Our aim in this introduction is to situate claims about extended cognition within a broader framework of research on human sociality. We briefly discuss the existing landscape, focusing on ways of defending socially extended cognition. We then draw on resources from the recent literature on the socially extended mind, as well as the literature on collective intentionality, to provide a fr…Read more
  •  3
    Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition brings together contributions discussing issues arising from theoretical and empirical research on social ontology and social cognition. It is the first comprehensive interdisciplinary collection in this rapidly expanding area. The contributors draw upon their diverse backgrounds in philosophy, cognitive science, behavioral economics, sociology of science and anthropology. Based largely on contributions to the first Aarhus-Paris conference hel…Read more
  •  70
    Naturalizing Intention in Action (review)
    Philosophical Psychology 26 (6): 1-4. 2013.
    Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print
  •  36
    Why Not the First-Person Plural in Social Cognition?
    Behavioural and Brain Sciences 36 (4): 422-423. 2013.
    Through the mental alignment that sustains social interactions, the minds of individuals are shared. One interpretation of shared intentionality involves the ability of individuals to perceive features of the action scene from the perspective of the group (the ). This first-person plural approach in social cognition is distinct from and preferable to the second-person approach proposed in the target article.
  •  11
    No Title available: Reviews
    Economics and Philosophy 27 (2): 183-190. 2011.
  •  14
    Why not the first-person plural in social cognition?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4): 422-423. 2013.
    Through the mental alignment that sustains social interactions, the minds of individuals are shared. One interpretation of shared intentionality involves the ability of individuals to perceive features of the action scene from the perspective of the group. This first-person plural approach in social cognition is distinct from and preferable to the second-person approach proposed in the target article.
  •  146
    A Naturalistic Argument for the Irreducibility of Collective Intentionality
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1): 3-30. 2012.
    According to many philosophers and scientists, human sociality is explained by our unique capacity to “share” attitudes with others. The conditions under which mental states are shared have been widely debated in the past two decades, focusing especially on the issue of their reducibility to individual intentionality and the place of collective intentions in the natural realm. It is not clear, however, to what extent these two issues are related and what methodologies of investigation are approp…Read more
  •  19
    Review of Why We Cooperate (review)
    Economics and Philosophy 27 (2): 183-190. 2011.