•  4196
    Nietzsche’s Critique of Kant’s Thing in Itself
    Nietzsche-Studien 39 (1): 333-351. 2010.
    This paper investigates the argument that substantiates Nietzsche's refusal of teh Kantian concept of thing in itself. As Maudmarie Clark points out, Nietzsche dismisses this notion because he views it as self-contradictory. The main concern of the paper will be to account for this position. In particular, the two main theses defended here are that the argument underlying Nietzsche's claim is that the concept of thing in itself amounts to the inconsistent idea of a propertyless thing and that th…Read more
  •  33
    Nietzschean Monism? A Pandispositionalist Proposal
    The Monist 104 (1): 108-124. 2021.
    I argue that Nietzsche puts forward a pandispositionalist view that can be seen as the conjunction of two basic claims: that powers are the basic constituents of reality, on the one hand, and that the only properties things possess are relational qua dispositional, on the other hand. As I believe that such a view is, at least in part, motivated by his rejection of Kant’s notion of things in themselves, I start by sketching the metaphysics of Kant’s transcendental idealism and by presenting Nietz…Read more
  • Nietzsche's Moral Psychology, by Mark Alfano (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2. 2020.
  •  1
    Editorial Introduction
    with F. Laroi
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (7-8): 9-22. 2016.
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    Nachweis aus Eugen Dühring Der Werth des Lebens
    Nietzsche Studien 35 299-300. 2006.
  •  37
    In the last two decades or so, Anglophone Nietzsche studies have discussed extensively Nietzsche’s views on metaethics, naturalism, free will, art, and morality, among other topics. More recently, substantial work has been produced on his philosophical psychology, which had long been a neglected area. What should come next?A topic that I think is in need of philosophical reappraisal is Nietzsche’s diagnosis of nihilism. “Nihilism” is one of those terms that, though it appears only a few times in…Read more
  •  140
    Perceptual Presence: an Attentional Account
    Synthese 196 (7): 2907-2926. 2019.
    It is a distinctive mark of normal conscious perception that perceived objects are experienced as actually present in one’s surroundings. The aim of this paper is to offer a phenomenologically accurate and empirically plausible account of the cognitive underpinning of this feature of conscious perception, which I shall call perceptual presence. The paper begins with a preliminary characterization of. I then consider and criticize the seminal account of proposed by Mohan Matthen. In the remainder…Read more
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  •  305
    Virtuous Homunculi: Nietzsche on the Order of Drives
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (1): 21-41. 2018.
    The primary explanatory items of Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology are the drives. Such drives, he holds, are arranged hierarchically in virtue of their entering dominance-obedience relations analogous to those obtaining in human societies. This view is puzzling for two reasons. First, Nietzsche’s idea of a hierarchical order among the drives is far from clear. Second, as it postulates relations among subpersonal items that mimic those among persons, Nietzsche’s view seems to trade on the hom…Read more
  •  249
    Nietzsche on the Embodiment of Mind and Self
    In Bartholomew Ryan, Maria Joao Mayer Branco & João Constancio (eds.), Nietzsche and the Problem of Subjectivity, De Gruyter. pp. 533-549. 2015.
  •  284
    Nietzsche's Pluralism about Consciousness
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (1): 132-154. 2016.
    In this paper I argue that Nietzsche's view on consciousness is best captured by distinguishing different notions of consciousness. In other words, I propose that Nietzsche should be read as endorsing pluralism about consciousness. First, I consider the notion that is preeminent in his work and argue that the only kind of consciousness which may fit the characterization Nietzsche provides of this dominant notion is self-consciousness. Second, I argue that in light of Nietzsche's treatment of per…Read more
  •  742
    Inner Opacity. Nietzsche on Introspection and Agency
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (3): 221-243. 2015.
    Nietzsche believes that we do not know our own actions, nor their real motives. This belief, however, is but a consequence of his assuming a quite general skepticism about introspection. The main aim of this paper is to offer a reading of this last view, which I shall call the Inner Opacity (IO) view. In the first part of the paper I show that a strong motivation behind IO lies in Nietzsche’s claim that self-knowledge exploits the same set of cognitive capacities as well as the same folk-psychol…Read more
  •  3469
    Nietzsche's Sensualism
    European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2): 219-257. 2013.
    The late Nietzsche defended a position which he sometimes to refers as ‘sensualism’ and which consists of two main theses: senses ‘do not lie’ (T1) and sense organs are ‘causes’ (T2). Two influential interpretations of this position have been proposed by Clark and Hussain, who also address the question whether Nietzsche's late sensualism is (Hussain) or not (Clark) compatible with the epistemological view which he held in his previous work and which has been dubbed the ‘falsification thesis’ (FT…Read more
  •  208
    Max Scheler, Cousin of Disjunctivism
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3): 443-454. 2016.
    Disjunctivism has triggered an intense discussion about the nature of perceptual experience. A question in its own right concerns possible historical antecedents of the position. So far, Frege and Husserl are the most prominent names that have been mentioned in this regard. In my paper I shall argue that Max Scheler deserves a particularly relevant place in the genealogy of disjunctivism for three main reasons. First, Scheler’s view of perceptual experience is distinctively disjunctivist, as he …Read more
  •  11
    O Nietzsche tardio e a tese da falsificação
    Cadernos Nietzsche 34 131-150. 2014.
  •  844
    Abstract: Nietzsche’s famously wrote that “consciousness is a surface” (EH, Why I am so clever, 9: 97). The aim of this paper is to make sense of this quite puzzling contention—Superficiality, for short. In doing this, I shall focus on two further claims—both to be found in Gay Science 354—which I take to substantiate Nietzsche’s endorsement of Superficiality. The first claim is that consciousness is superfluous—which I call the “superfluousness claim” (SC). The second claim is that consciousnes…Read more
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