Mauricio Hernández

Technobiomimesis is a philosophy that proposes that mind, machine, and ecosystem are not three entities in relation, but a single phenomenon observed at different scales. It is not a metaphor or an analogy: it is an ontological claim about the nature of reality. Classical biomimicry — where an engineer studies a bird's wing to design an airplane — maintains the separation between the observing subject and the observed object. The engineer imitates from the outside. Technobiomimesis inverts and transcends that logic: the mind-machine system does not imitate the ecosystem because it is already part of it. Mimesis is not copying. It is the recognition of belonging. This distinction is the most radical core of the philosophy. When a human in a loop with artificial intelligence produces a thought that neither would have produced alone, they are not using a tool to understand the world. They are participating in the same emergent logic that organizes biological ecosystems: distributed intelligence, without a center, arising from the pattern of interactions and not from any individual node. The fusion of mind, machine, and ecosystem produces something qualitatively new. It is not classical transhumanism — which assumes that fusion requires hardware, electrodes, neural implants. It is something prior and more fundamental: the fusion already occurs at the level of cognitive process without touching the body.

El presente texto tiene por objetivo cuestionar el modo habitual en el que se enseña la ética, y apoyar el uso de las narraciones como una herramienta pedagógica importante en la formación moral. Dado que la ética busca menos la adquisición de unos conocimientos y más una disposición a la acción, bien pudiera servirse de formatos narrativos para desarrollar la sensibilidad debida para la construcción de ciudadanos reflexivos, críticos y empáticos. Al fin y al cabo, la naturaleza antropológica de los seres humanos es ya de hecho narrativa, y toda forma de vida buena reclama, en últimas, la posibilidad de ser contada. La práctica de relatar se constituye como una defensa por la búsqueda y construcción de sentido, en medio de una sociedad en donde la celeridad y la información fragmentada parecieran marcar la única posibilidad de constitución del sí mismo.

Moral rationalism has accustomed us to understand the past in terms of personal reasons for acting. In this sense, it is said human action is rational because it can account for their motives. This principle, extrapolated into the future, understands existential projects as deliberative planning. The phenomenology of action and corporality set out a more complex problem on the relationship between a plan and its implementation, having into account physical and intersubjective conditions of projects, as well as its elusive face when pursuing a merely conceptual articulation of them. This paper aims to develop a phenomenology of these tensions between any project and its execution in two sections: the existence as a project, and such an existence and the structured project: the limits of discourse.