Max Deutscher

Paul Celan’s ‘Speeches’ determine what poetry is and why we need it. He does not want ‘timeless’ poetry but still ‘lays claim to infinity’; he would ‘reach through time’. He neither refuses poetry as contrary to reason, nor elevates it as pure immediacy of meaning. He questions the ambivalent attitudes towards art—as ‘artifice’ or as ‘profound’. Celan cuts into the loose fabric of such ordinary language to shape it. Those who trumpet ‘plain sense’ against such incisive art deface it as degenerate. Celan’s poetic language presents us as ‘of the earth’ and as ‘released from it’—Büchner’s Lenz seeks clarity in the silence of alpine light but falls into madness in his isolation. He is drawn towards the life of the villagers at the foot of the mountains. He perceives the warm household fires, but it is an illusion that he can be a part of that scene. Thus, Celan enquires into art’s intensity. It is at the risk of reciprocity that a reader entertains the language of a poem. Eliot’s old ‘shadow’ between ‘the idea and the reality’ now falls between the poet’s production and the reader’s reciprocation. The reader may need someone with a free hand to hold a lantern to the script.

Spivak translates Derrida’s “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” as “there is nothing outside the text.” By considering how the aphorism works within his study of Rousseau on sexual and textual supplements, and by reviewing related expressions in French, a mistranslation is revealed. This is not a simple error, however. The distortion is generated by Derrida’s own broader context. We must not only distinguish signification from reference but also place the aphorism within Derrida's allusion, in the first part of Of Grammatology, to an all-embracing arche-writing. The paper ends in thus opening out the discussion of a textual “inside” or “outside.”

It is argued that 'p but I do not believe that p' seems close to a contradiction because if the speaker is correct in all that s/he says then what s/he says is false. Similarly,what is wrong with 'p, but I have no opinion whether p' is that, whether 'p' or 'not-p', if the speaker believes it, s/he cannot be completely correct. The argument assumes that 'I believe that' is not a mere parenthesis as in 'p, I believe', and that to say 'I believe that p' is not only to claim a certain mentality, but to claim to be correct or mistaken depending upon whether 'p' is true or false.

There is a tradition of philosophy—a conception we can easily under-stand as a limit of a tendency of our own thinking—that philosophy consists only of argument. The rest of the vast prepon-derance of words in philosophical texts is simply embroidery. ‘Naturally’, it will be conceded, actual philosophy books contain more or less of verbal pictures, words and phrases whose purpose is to evoke images, and many stories—examples, hard cases for definitions, and 4 anecdotes. These, it will be said, ‘are only the embellishments, the relief from work, the appetizers or the post-prandial delicacies.’

The article aims to show that there are everyday analogues to husserl's 'transcendental' subjectivity, And that this 'transcendence' can be understood as a limit of these varieties of detachment. Evidence is cited that his 'transcendental ego' is the body itself, In its capacity to transcend its conditions. Within this 'naturalized' interpretation of transcendental subjectivity we can see its practical and philosophical importance to our objectivity. His notion of a 'life-World' is a prophylactic against the monomaniac holding of physicalistic or other theories, And his emphasis on and evocation of subjectivity is a reminder of the distinctness of other subjectivities.