Max Gab

In this paper we will argue that interpretivism about institutional group agents - prominently discussed by Deborah Tollefsen - does not provide a sound argument for the claim that groups can be granted the status of genuine agents. A central problem we identify is that Tollefsen’s view does not convincingly show that using the interpretivist strategy (i.e. taking the so called intentional stance towards group behavior) is actually necessary to discern ‘real patterns’ of social behavior. Second, we argue that the difference between the interpretivist strategy towards groups and an explanation of group behavior based on methodological individualism seems less clear than the theory of Tollefsen seems to suggests.

In this paper, we introduce the reader to current debates and theoretical disputes concerning minimal forms of shared intentionality. After briefly considering research on the phylogenetic origins of the human capacity to cooperate, we turn to minimal forms of shared intentionality observable in infants and young children. Based on these findings, we then briefly discuss whether dominant theories of shared intentionality adequately capture the full range of collective intentional phenomena or rely on overly complex cognitive assumptions. We conclude with an overview of the contributions to this special issue.