Max Lewis

Gratitude is a pervasive, if often overlooked, aspect of our daily lives. At its core, it is a response to being benefitted. Yet, several philosophical puzzles surround this ostensibly ordinary emotion. This article is an overview of the major philosophical debates concerning gratitude. We start with personal gratitude, i.e., gratitude directed to an agent for something they have done. We consider what personal gratitude consists in. We then consider its normativity, i.e., when it is fitting, owed, a directed duty, or a virtue. We then turn to impersonal gratitude, i.e., gratitude for something without gratitude to any agent for it. We consider the normativity of this attitude, i.e., when it is fitting. We end by considering whether personal gratitude and impersonal gratitude are two species of the same genus—as their names suggest—or whether they are distinct attitudes.

It is common to think that our intimates are required to help us. But it can be problematic to appeal to certain kinds of facts (e.g., previous favors or prudentially relevant facts) in order to entice them to help us—even when those facts provide them with sufficient or decisive reason to help us. This is puzzling because, in these cases, our intimates have sufficient or decisive reason to act in the way we are trying to entice them to act. Moreover, it generally seems more problematic to appeal to certain kinds of facts (e.g., previous favors or prudentially relevant facts) in order to entice our intimates to do things that help us than it is to appeal to these facts in order to entice nonintimates to perform the same actions. This too is puzzling because one is usually permitted to ask more from one's intimates than non-intimates. I argue that these enticements are intuitively problematic because they indicate that one violates a demand of good intimate relationships. In particular, they indicate that one violates a demand for a certain kind of doxastic partiality; that is, one should trust one's intimates to follow what one's intimates know are demands of good intimate relationships. More specifically, one fails to trust one's intimates to be sufficiently motivated to protect or promote one's needs, desires, interests, projects, and well-being for one's own sake. Making such requests of nonintimates is not usually intuitively problematic because one is not required to trust non-intimates to be motivated in this way.

This paper defends a novel version of moderate pessimism about moral deference, i.e., the view that we have pro tanto reason to try to avoid moral deference. The problem with moral deference is that it puts one in a bad position to form what I call morally worthy attitudes, i.e., non-cognitive attitudes that have moral worth in the same sense that certain actions have moral worth. Forming morally worthy attitudes requires a special sensitivity to the sufficiency of the moral reasons one has to form these attitudes. However, when one defers about a moral claim, one takes it fully on trust, which entails that one is strongly disposed to not intentionally try to take precautions against believing that moral claim epistemically defectively (e.g., falsely or without sufficient justification). Thus, moral deference makes one strongly disposed to not try to acquire the sensitivity required for forming morally worthy attitudes. However, morally worthy attitudes are more valuable than merely fitting attitudes and plausibly have both final and non-final value. Thus, moral deference interferes with gaining something with final and non-final value.

A growing number of philosophers are defending what can be understood as Right Reason Accounts of the norm of assertion. According to these accounts, an agent’s asserting that p is epistemically permissible only if that agent asserts that p for a right (normative) reason, i.e., a reason that at least contributes to making it epistemically permissible to assert that p. In this paper, I argue that Right Reason Accounts do not allow for the possibility of asserting epistemically permissibly only for the wrong reason(s). However, it is a commonplace in all normative domains (e.g., morality, prudence, and aesthetics) that an agent can—at least sometimes—φ rightly (or permissibly) only for the wrong reason(s).

I aim to vindicate the claim that we can owe someone gratitude for believing in us and to show how this seemingly prosaic fact has important upshots for the normativity of gratitude. I start by sketching a novel account of what it is to believe in someone according to which it consists in holding an affective attitude of confident optimism toward their general ability in some domain(s). I then argue that people can deserve gratitude for holding this attitude. I close by showing how the possibility of being gratitudeworthy for believing in someone casts down on three commonplaces about when gratitude is owed.

In this article, I argue that it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature. I start by arguing that gratitude to someone/something can be fitting even if they do not intentionally benefit one. I then argue that a recent view on which it can be fitting to be grateful to nature faces counterexamples. Finally, I argue that it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature, because it is fitting to be grateful to someone/something only if they manifest the right kind of goodwill or care toward one. In particular, I argue that it is fitting to be grateful to someone/something only if they manifest a level of final care toward one beyond what can be legitimately expected or demanded of them. However, because nature does not manifest any level of goodwill or care, it cannot be fitting to be grateful to nature. I end by noting that it can still be fitting to be grateful that certain things are true about nature (e.g. that it provides many benefits to humans).

The simple knowledge norm of assertion holds that one may assert that p only if one knows that p. Turri :37–45, 2011) and Williamson both argue that more is required for epistemically permissible assertion. In particular, they both think that the asserter must assert on the basis of her knowledge. Turri calls this the express knowledge norm of assertion. I defend SKNA and argue against EKNA. First, I argue that EKNA faces counterexamples. Second, I argue that EKNA assumes an implausible view of permissibility on which an assertion is epistemically permissible only if it is made for a right reason, i.e., a reason that contributes to making it the case that it is epistemically permissible to make that assertion. However, the analogous view in other normative domains is both controversial and implausible. This is because it doesn’t make it possible for one to act or react rightly for the wrong reason. I suggest that proponents of EKNA have conflated requirements for φ-ing rightly with requirements for φ-ing well. Finally, I argue that proponents of SKNA can explain the intuitive defectiveness of asserting on the basis of an epistemically bad reason, even when the asserters know the content of their assertion, by arguing that the asserters are epistemically blameworthy.

Philosophers think that there is something fishy about moral deference. The most common explanation of this fishiness is that moral deference doesn’t yield the epistemic states necessary for certain moral achievements. First, I argue that this explanation overgeneralizes. It entails that using many intuitively kosher belief-formation methods should be off-putting. Second, I argue that moral deference is sometimes superior to these other methods because it puts one in a better position to gain the relevant moral achievements.

In this paper, I offer a novel defense of moderate pessimism about moral deference, i.e., the view that we have pro tanto reason to avoid moral deference. I argue that moral deference fails to give us the epistemic credentials to satisfy plausible norms of moral assertion. I then argue that moral assertions made solely on the basis of deferential moral beliefs violate a plausible epistemic and moral norm against withholding information that one knows, has evidence, or ought to believe will importantly affect another person’s deliberation. Finally, I argue that not only does moral deference fail to put the audience in a good epistemic position it also puts the audience in a bad epistemic and moral position. First, there is a tight connection between outright believing something and being disposed to assert it and so deferential moral beliefs often motivate people to assert something that they don’t have the epistemic credentials to properly assertion. Second, there will often be moral reasons to make assertions—even based on deferential moral beliefs. These assertions, while all-things-considered permissible, will be epistemic impermissible and involve violating a moral norm.

Mona Simion has recently argued for a function-first norm of moral assertion. According to function-first accounts, the norm of any kind of assertion is determined by the function of that kind of assertion. She argues that, on the assumption that moral understanding is the goal of moral inquiry, the function of moral assertion is reliably generating moral understanding in others and that the norm of moral assertion should fall out of that function. In particular, she thinks the norm should be such that satisfying it is the most reliable way for one’s moral assertions to generate moral understanding in others—at least when all else goes well. With this in mind, she proposes The Explanation Proffering Account of Moral Assertion. First, I argue that satisfying EPNMA is not the only or most reliable way for one’s moral assertion to generate moral understanding in one’s audience. I propose an alternative norm on which one must accompany one’s moral assertions with a maieutic speech act, i.e., an utterance in the form of a question or assertion that aims to elicit knowledge or other epistemic states from an audience. Second, I present counterexamples to EPNMA wherein speakers make moral assertions that violate EPNMA and yet they are not intuitively epistemically criticizable for their assertion. I conclude by briefly sketching an alternative account that avoids the pitfalls of EPNMA.

Pessimists think that there is something wrong with relying on deference for one’s moral beliefs—at least if one is morally mature. Call this no deference. They also tend to think that what explains our aversion to cases of moral deference is the fact that they involve deference about moral claims. Call this moral explanation. Recently, both no deference and moral explanation have come under attack. Against no deference, some philosophers offer purported counterexamples involving moral advice. I argue that proponents of this objection face a trilemma depending on how they spell out the details of their counterexamples. Against moral explanation, some philosophers offer debunking explanations of our aversion to moral deference. They present cases of non-moral deference that are troubling and argue that the feature that explains our aversion to this non-moral deference also explains our aversion to moral deference. I argue that none of these explanations (nor their conjunction) can explain all troubling cases of moral deference and that they face objections of their own. I conclude that we should be optimistic about the prospects of moral deference pessimism.