Max Rohstock

Negative statements are a traditional means in ancient metaphysics to describe the transcendence of absolute Unity, or God. Though many modern scholars believe that negative theology is the essential mode in which human beings apprehend the unio mystica, Nicholas of Cusa’s notion of God as not-other (non aliud) suggests that negative theology’s function extends beyond transcendence to signaling the superessentiality of God and enunciating divine activity. The idea of God as not-other is a double negation: God’s superessentiality negates every other (aliud) while defining itself as absolute transcendence. Through this double negation, moreover, all other things derive their existence from God. Yet how can negation, typically a sign of difference and privation, and criticized by many modern scholars, characterize the self-defining superessentiality and activity of God? How do we understand the possibility of active negation? The answer lies in the negative self-referentiality of the superessential not-other. Without recourse to affirmative theology, this concept expresses the idea of a self-defining and creative God and explains how the divine can be perceived in its derivatives.

The henology of Proclus seems to be fragile: If the Absolute is transcendent, how can it be the object of philosophical thought? The central thesis of this article is that the concept of the One in ourselves is the foundation of the Proclean henology. I argue that we need to awaken the One in ourselves, and that this discovery is a genuine philosophical experience of evidence as opposed to a mere and unreflected belief. This experience marks the point where we conceive the transcendent Absolute undoubtedly as ‘what’ it ‘is’ – as un-circumscribable – and are at the same time ‘thrown back’ upon our-selves to recognize our own epistemological limits.

In the following article, I want to conduct an experiment: I ask what happens if we assume that Plotinus constructed transcendence radically. If we take transcendence seriously, however, the question arises as to what extent Plotinus can still address transcendence. This problem can only be solved if we clarify how Plotinus addresses transcendence. I show that Plotinus makes it possible to experience transcendence with the help of the “loving Intellect,” that is, henological striving. Thus, henological striving becomes the hinge of his metaphysics. Additionally, this striving reveals Plotinian metaphysics as a transcendental philosophical theory of subjectivity avant la lettre.

Transcendence occupies a central role in the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa: Without it, his thought would lose its coherence. Yet, how can a concept that has confronted philosophy with seemingly intractable problems serve such a foundational function? The analysis begins from a widely acknowledged thesis: In Nicholas’s thought, transcendence has both an “objective” and a “subjective” dimension. On the “objective” side, Nicholas attempts to articulate the principle-function of transcendence by formulating a series of concepts of God. On the “subjective” side transcendence is understood as that which exceeds the grasp of human cognition. Every search for God culminates in “learned ignorance” (docta ignorantia), Nicholas’s term for our recognition of the limitation of our own (epistemic) capacities. The crucial question is how these two dimensions are related. This question is not of historical interest alone. Its exploration may also help to demonstrate the continuing relevance of Nicholas’s philosophy.

Pyrrhonian skepticism is considered to be the most radical form of skeptical thinking, insofar as it even questions itself. Nevertheless, this skepticism is said to lead to ataraxia, that is, to a ‘happy’ state of life. Does skepticism, therefore, represent a serious alternative in the colorful variety of philoso-phical doctrines of salvation? I would like to make a proposal for the eva-luation of the skeptical doctrine: it seems that the skeptics’ talk of ataraxia is problematic. Especially with regard to its individual ethics, it can not only be demonstrated that skepticism is not a philosophical position. With its ex-treme doubt, it even destroys all trust and can in this respect be understood as poison for the human self.

Transcendence occupies a central role in the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa: Without it, his thought would lose its coherence. Yet, how can a concept that has confronted philosophy with seemingly intractable problems serve such a foundational function? The analysis begins from a widely acknowledged thesis: In Nicholas’s thought, transcendence has both an “objective” and a “subjective” dimension. On the “objective” side, Nicholas attempts to articulate the principle-function of transcendence by formulating a series of concepts of God. On the “subjective” side transcendence is understood as that which exceeds the grasp of human cognition. Every search for God culminates in “learned ignorance” (docta ignorantia), Nicholas’s term for our recognition of the limitation of our own (epistemic) capacities. The crucial question is how these two dimensions are related. This question is not of historical interest alone. Its exploration may also help to demonstrate the continuing relevance of Nicholas’s philosophy.

Die 4. Auflage bringt zunächst die Kommentierung der Präambel und der Art. 1 bis 19 auf den aktuellen Stand von Judikatur und Literatur. Die grundlegende Struktur des Kommentares wurde beibehalten und um neuere Entwicklungen wie die Implikationen der Europäisierung und Digitalisierung sowie der Corona-Pandemie ergänzt.Die Herausgeberschaft des Kommentares hat ab der 4. Auflage Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf übernommen. Auch im Autorenkreis sind personelle Veränderungen zu verzeichnen: Mit Ausnahme von Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf, Alexander Thiele und Ferdinand Wollenschläger, die bereits an der 3. Auflage mitgewirkt haben, liegen die Kommentierungen in den Händen neuer Autorinnen und Autoren.Der Kommentar erscheint in drei Bänden und wird nur geschlossen abgegeben.Der Grundgesetz-Kommentar ist Bestandteil des Moduls Verfassungsrecht PREMIUM, das bei beck-online.de erhältlich ist.

Max Rohstock examines the metaphysics of the Neoplatonic tradition and J. G. Fichte. Firstly, he finds love to be the central principle that grounds the philosophy of Plotinus, Proclus, Dionysius, Eriugena, Cusanus and Fichte. Secondly, he demonstrates that the metaphysical speculations of Neoplatonism and Fichte do not merely coincide in certain aspects. Rather, they demonstrate profound systematic parallels that help to understand why the often-proclaimed abyss between pre- and post-Kantian philosophy is misleading. Both theses are justified on the basis of the often-misunderstood concept of metaphysical transcendence.

In der Philosophie Platons und der ihm folgenden Tradition bilden Theorie und Praxis stets eine Einheit, wobei die Theorie der Praxis in folgender Hinsicht übergeordnet wird: Die Theorie, verstanden als Schau (θεωρία/theôria) der „Idee des Guten“, fundiert die Praxis gelingenden Lebens und konkreter Handlungen. Bei Meister Eckhart scheint sich dieses Verhältnis zu komplizieren. Ausgangspunkt ist die Beobachtung, dass in seinen Werken eine Aufwertung der sog. vita activa, der tatkräftig-anpackenden Lebensform, beobachtet werden kann: Diese Lebenspraxis sei sogar, so lautet die wirkmächtige Interpretation Dietmar Mieths, die Spitze des Menschenmöglichen und gegenüber der vita contemplativa vorzuziehen. Wie verträgt sich aber diese These mit dem oft kolportierten Vorrang der Theorie gegenüber der Praxis? In der vorliegenden Arbeit soll das Verhältnis von Kontemplation und Theorie einerseits zur vita activa andererseits geklärt werden.

Die Metaphysik hat eine lange Geschichte und ebenso viele Bedeutungen. Ein Konsens scheint aber unter den Denkern, die Metaphysik betreiben, hinsichtlich der Funktion der Metaphysik zu bestehen: Sie gehört zum Kerngeschäft der Philosophie. Denn sie soll die Grundlegung jeglicher systematisch konzipierter Philosophie sein. 0Wenn die Metaphysik aber als derart zentral vorgestellt wird, so muss die schwierige Frage nach einem gesicherten Zugang zur durchaus umstrittenen Disziplin der Metaphysik im Allgemeinen und ihrem?Gegenstand?, dem Absoluten, im Speziellen erörtert werden. Inwiefern kann sich die Metaphysik als fundierende Disziplin der Philosophie erweisen? Und inwiefern haben wir einen sicheren Zugang zum Absoluten, das innerhalb der Metaphysik als Grundlegung der Philosophie überhaupt verstanden wird? Aufgabe des Sammelbandes ist es, diese Fragen anhand ausgewählter Denker aus Antike, Mittelalter und Neuzeit zu beantworten.