The conception of justice as the “first virtue of social institutions” (Rawls, 1971) and the “virtue of soul” (Plato, 1956) puts forth two different points of view in the realm of social-political thought. From one point of view, the demand for objective principles of justice at the institutional level presupposes a particular epistemic framework where universal/objective truth and specific methods to reach it have been given importance. I would delve into arguing that the presuppositions to rea…
Read moreThe conception of justice as the “first virtue of social institutions” (Rawls, 1971) and the “virtue of soul” (Plato, 1956) puts forth two different points of view in the realm of social-political thought. From one point of view, the demand for objective principles of justice at the institutional level presupposes a particular epistemic framework where universal/objective truth and specific methods to reach it have been given importance. I would delve into arguing that the presuppositions to reach objectivity in the epistemic and the political realm are quite similar. It is the epistemological foundation of Descartes that facilitates the political to seek objectivity in its principles. On the other hand, by proposing justice as the “virtue of soul”, Plato proposes an epistemology that is grounded in his notion of the Good. The individual in these two epistemological and political systems engages with the world from two completely different approaches. In this paper, I will explore the relationship of these epistemic frameworks with their respective theories of justice and consider the scope of pluralism.
