Meg Wallace

There is uneasy tension between our ordinary talk about beliefs and desires and the ontological facts supported by neuroscience. Arguments for eliminative materialism are persuasive, yet error theory about folk psychological discourse seems unacceptable. One solution is to accept mental fictionalism: the view that we are (or should be) fictionalists about mentality. My aim in this paper is to explore mental fictionalism as a viable theoretical option, and to show that it has advantages over other fictionalist views in the literature, as well as advantages over other theories of mind. However, mental fictionalism faces objections that do not plague other fictionalist accounts, nor other theories of the mind. These objections may provide some explanation as to why mental fictionalism has not (until recently) gained much traction in the literature. I end with some suggestions on how the mental fictionalist can address these objections, hopefully paving the way for further development of mental fictionalism as a live philosophical position in philosophy of mind.

This paper examines three meta-ontological deflationary approaches – frameworks, verbal disputes, and metalinguistic negotiation – and applies them to ontological debates in philosophy of mind. An intriguing consequence of this application is that it reveals a deep, systematic problem for mental deflationism – specifically, a problem of cognitive collapse. This is surprising; cognitive collapse problems are usually reserved for serious ontological views such as eliminative materialism and mental fictionalism, not deflationism. This paper investigates why deflationism about the mental is particularly problematic, and provides an explanation as to why mental fictionalism is in principle better equipped to address collapsing problems than deflationism is.

There is an uneasy tension between our ordinary talk about beliefs and desires and the ontological facts supported by neuroscience. Arguments for eliminative materialism can be fairly persuasive, yet error theory about folk psychological discourse may be unacceptable. One solution is to accept mental fictionalism: the view that we are (or should be) fictionalists about mentality. My aim in this paper is to explore mental fictionalism as a viable theoretical option, and to show that it has advantages over other fictionalist views in the literature, as well as advantages over other theories of mind. However, mental fictionalism faces particular objections that do not plague other fictionalist accounts, nor other theories of the mind. These objections may provide some explanation as to why mental fictionalism has not (until recently) gained much traction in the literature. I end with some suggestions on how the mental fictionalist can address these objections, hopefully paving the way for further development of mental fictionalism as a live philosophical position in philosophy of mind.

© 2015 The Author.A recent joint meeting was held on January 30, 2014, with the US Food and Drug Administration, National Cancer Institute, clinical scientists, imaging experts, pharmaceutical and biotech companies, clinical trials cooperative groups, and patient advocate groups to discuss imaging endpoints for clinical trials in glioblastoma. This workshop developed a set of priorities and action items including the creation of a standardized MRI protocol for multicenter studies. The current document outlines consensus recommendations for a standardized Brain Tumor Imaging Protocol, along with the scientific and practical justifications for these recommendations, resulting from a series of discussions between various experts involved in aspects of neuro-oncology neuroimaging for clinical trials. The minimum recommended sequences include: parameter-matched precontrast and postcontrast inversion recovery-prepared, isotropic 3D T1-weighted gradient-recalled echo; axial 2D T2-weighted turbo spin-echo acquired after contrast injection and before postcontrast 3D T1-weighted images to control timing of images after contrast administration; precontrast, axial 2D T2-weighted fluid-attenuated inversion recovery; and precontrast, axial 2D, 3-directional diffusion-weighted images. Recommended ranges of sequence parameters are provided for both 1.5 T and 3 T MR systems.