Melanie Coughlin

ABSTRACT Fricker’s 2007 theorization of epistemic justice lets disabled people down (Bain 2023, Barnes 2016, Dotson 2012, Shotwell 2017, Tremain 2017). This article highlights reasons behind this let down as a way of discussing the limitations of progressivism for disability justice more generally. As an alternative support, this article presents Yoritaka’s 2010 theorization of disability in terms of a “Way of Living Together on a Downward Trajectory.” Overlapping with crip theorists’ rejections of ableist visions of the future, Yoritaka’s chronopolitics supports a more general critique of the assumption that we can only accept how we are if we also assume that “things will get better.” Instead, Yoritaka asks the disabled community to cultivate an awareness of our own evil. From this basis, he asks us to reconsider the ideal of individual independence and offers the alternative of living together on a downward trajectory. Here the article opens a discussion about the significance of this proposal for cripping epistemic justice.

Nishitani deems Nietzsche a nihilist, but they both sought to overcome idealism. This shared commitment has normative and descriptive implications for the relationship between affect and history. Normatively, Nishitani praises Nietzsche for thinking history passionately. Descriptively, this praise suggests a shared belief that affectivity is in some significant respect constituted by historical inheritance. For these reasons, Nietzsche’s conception of affect and his genealogical inquiry can be part of the problem of nihilism but also integral to its solution. I make this case through Nishitani’s analysis of Nietzsche’s historical-existential standpoint. From this standpoint, I revisit the nearly thirty-year debate over Nishitani’s critique of Nietzsche to argue that Nishitani’s view of Nietzsche as a consummate nihilist has a bivalent significance. On the one hand, Nishitani needs Nietzsche’s thought to negate nihilistic conceptions of affect derived from Hegel and Feuerbach. On the other hand, Nietzsche’s negation appears to remain limited by an abstract conception of space, which would impede the full liberation of affect from nihilism.

Nishitani deems Nietzsche a nihilist, but they both sought to overcome idealism. This shared commitment has normative and descriptive implications for the relationship between affect and history. Normatively, Nishitani praises Nietzsche for thinking history passionately. Descriptively, this praise suggests a shared belief that affectivity is in some significant respect constituted by historical inheritance. For these reasons, Nietzsche’s conception of affect and his genealogical inquiry can be part of the problem of nihilism but also integral to its solution. I make this case through Nishitani’s analysis of Nietzsche’s historical-existential standpoint. From this standpoint, I revisit the nearly thirty-year debate over Nishitani’s critique of Nietzsche to argue that Nishitani’s view of Nietzsche as a consummate nihilist has a bivalent significance. On the one hand, Nishitani needs Nietzsche’s thought to negate nihilistic conceptions of affect derived from Hegel and Feuerbach. On the other hand, Nietzsche’s negation appears to remain limited by an abstract conception of space, which would impede the full liberation of affect from nihilism.