Nishitani deems Nietzsche a nihilist, but they both sought to overcome idealism. This shared commitment has normative and descriptive implications for the relationship between affect and history. Normatively, Nishitani praises Nietzsche for thinking history passionately. Descriptively, this praise suggests a shared belief that affectivity is in some significant respect constituted by historical inheritance. For these reasons, Nietzsche’s conception of affect and his genealogical inquiry can be p…
Read moreNishitani deems Nietzsche a nihilist, but they both sought to overcome idealism. This shared commitment has normative and descriptive implications for the relationship between affect and history. Normatively, Nishitani praises Nietzsche for thinking history passionately. Descriptively, this praise suggests a shared belief that affectivity is in some significant respect constituted by historical inheritance. For these reasons, Nietzsche’s conception of affect and his genealogical inquiry can be part of the problem of nihilism but also integral to its solution. I make this case through Nishitani’s analysis of Nietzsche’s historical-existential standpoint. From this standpoint, I revisit the nearly thirty-year debate over Nishitani’s critique of Nietzsche to argue that Nishitani’s view of Nietzsche as a consummate nihilist has a bivalent significance. On the one hand, Nishitani needs Nietzsche’s thought to negate nihilistic conceptions of affect derived from Hegel and Feuerbach. On the other hand, Nietzsche’s negation appears to remain limited by an abstract conception of space, which would impede the full liberation of affect from nihilism.
