Williamstown, Massachusetts, United States of America
  • Humean Theories of Motivation
    In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 5, Oxford University Press. 2010.
  •  1
    Humean Theories of Motivation
    Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5. 2010.
  •  55
    Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (review)
    Philosophical Review 111 (2): 259-261. 2002.
    In Finite and Infinite Goods, Adams develops a sophisticated and richly detailed Platonic-theistic framework for ethics. The view is Platonic in virtue of being Good-centered; it is theistic both in identifying God with the Good and, more distinctively, in including a divine command theory of moral obligation. Readers familiar with Adams’s earlier divine command theory will recall that in response to the worry that God might command something evil, Adams introduced an independent value constrain…Read more
  •  183
    Slaves of the Passions (review) (review)
    Hume Studies 36 (2): 225-228. 2010.
    In Slaves of the Passions, Mark Schroeder provides a systematic, rigorously argued defense of a Humean theory of reasons for action, taking pains to respond to influential objections to the view. While inspired by Hume, Schroeder makes it clear that he aims to develop a Humean theory, not necessarily one that Hume himself embraced, and for this reason little is said about Hume in the book. One respect in which Schroeder takes himself to be departing from Hume is in developing a normative account…Read more
  •  2
    Constructivism
    In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 385-401. 2017.
  •  90
    Constructivist Practical Reasoning and Objectivity
    In David Archard, Monique Deveaux, Neil Manson & Daniel Weinstock (eds.), Reading Onora O'Neill, Routledge. pp. 17-36. 2013.
  •  134
    Humean Theories of Motivation
    In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics , Volume 5, Oxford University Press. pp. 195-223. 2010.
  •  239
    Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3): 231-242. 2007.
    Realists about practical reasons agree that judgments regarding reasons are beliefs. They disagree, however, over the question of how such beliefs motivate rational action. Some adopt a Humean conception of motivation, according to which beliefs about reasons must combine with independently existing desires in order to motivate rational action; others adopt an anti-Humean view, according to which beliefs can motivate rational action in their own right, either directly or by giving rise to a new …Read more